Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions for certain drug-trafficking offenses, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on any of its allegations of error.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of cocaine with like intent. On appeal, Defendant raised four claims of error. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the fruits of a wiretap; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in removing a juror for cause; (3) there was no plain error in the court's challenged evidentiary rulings; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the probative value of certain intercepted phone calls was not substantially outweighed by any unfairly prejudicial effect. View "United States v. Encarnacion" on Justia Law

The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner's petition for review of a final administrative removal order (FARO) issued against her in 2018 by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), holding that this Court lacked jurisdiction over the petition.The DHS issued a FARO against Petitioner stating that she was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because she had been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(K). While Petitioner's petition for review of the FARO was still pending the DHS issued a notice to appear for separate removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1229a based on Petitioner's extended presence in the United States after her visa had expired. The DHS subsequently canceled the FARO. The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner's petition for review, holding that in the wake of the government's purported cancellation of Petitioner's FARO, the cancellation will result in there being no final removal order against Petitioner at the present time. View "Xu v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying a motion to intervene filed by LBRY Foundation Inc. (Foundation) in a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) civil enforcement action against LBRY, Inc. (LBRY), holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion.The SEC brought his complaint alleging that LBRY failed to register as investment contracts under section 5 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. 77e, LBRY Credits (LBC), an offering of digital assets. Foundation, whose assets consisted of grants of LBRY, moved to intervene, seeking to contest the SEC's enforcement action with alternative legal arguments than those given by LBRY. The district court denied the motion. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Foundation was not entitled to intervene as of right. View "Securities & Exchange Commission v. LBRY Foundation Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.Upon executing a no-knock search warrant following reports of discharged shots the police found two shotguns and related paraphernalia in Defendant's bedroom. In his motion to suppress, Defendant argued that the police exceeded the scope of the warrant by searching his bedroom, which was located on the third floor of the building, because the searched warrant was for "88 Foundation St. 2nd floor." The district court denied the motion, concluding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the officers reasonably believed that the warrant permitted the search of Defendant's third-floor bedroom. View "United States v. Pimentel" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that this dispute concerning the disposition of assets once held by the uncle of the parties in this case belonged in a state court, not in a federal court, holding that the district court did not err.Plaintiff Sandra Lerner and her cousin, Defendant Stephen Colman, were both citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Plaintiff attempted to plead claims under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962, 1964(c), and appended state law claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. The district court concluded that the complaint did not adequately state a cause of action under RICO and then dismissed the state law claims without prejudice to their being refiled in state court. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the RICO claim failed because Plaintiff did not allege a pattern of racketeering activity. View "Lerner v. Colman" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied in part Petitioner's petition for judicial review and remanded this immigration case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) for further consideration, holding that remand was required for consideration of an argument Petitioner raised before the BIA but the BIA did not address.The BIA in this case affirmed an immigration judge's (IJ) decision denying Petitioner asylum relief, withholding of removal under Immigration and Nationality Act, protection pursuant to the Convention Against Torture Act, and ordering her removed. Petitioner filed a petition for review. The First Circuit remanded the case, holding (1) because the BIA did not address Petitioner's argument that the record evidence supported Petitioner's membership in a particular social group, that of Salvadoran female small business owners, remand was required for such consideration; and (2) this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear Petitioner's second claim. View "Gomez-Abrego v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant for conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States and other offenses and resentencing him to a 300-month sentence, holding that Defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable.Defendant, who had been imprisoned for the last thirteen years for tax fraud and his role and an armed standoff with the U.S. Marshals Service, filed a second motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The district court granted the motion and subsequently resentenced Defendant to a term that was 144 months below the prior sentence. Defendant appealed, raising two constitutional objections to his sentence and challenging the reasonableness of his sentence. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's constitutional challenges were without merit; (2) there was no procedural error in the district court proceedings; and (3) the sentence imposed was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

The First Circuit held that a district court, when adjudicating a prisoner-initiated motion for compassionate release, is not bound by the Sentencing Commission's current policy statement and may consider the First Step Act's (FSA) non-retroactive changes in sentencing law on an individualized basis to determine whether an extraordinary and compelling reason exists for compassionate release.While Defendant was serving his sentence Congress passed the FSA. See Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. The FSA reduced certain enhanced mandatory minimum penalties and modified the criteria for qualifying prior offenses and also amended the compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), to allow prisoners to file their own motions for compassionate release. Defendant subsequently moved for compassionate release. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the FSA's changes could not support an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. The First Circuit vacated the judgment below, holding that the court erred by concluding, as a matter of law, that the FSA's prospective changes to the mandatory minimum penalties could not, even when considered on an individualized basis, support a decision for compassionate release. View "United States v. Ruvalcaba" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the forty-six-month sentence Defendant received after pleading guilty to various firearm offenses, holding that the district court erred in finding that Defendant was an unlawful drug user at the time of his offenses.Defendant was charged with dealing firearms without a license and illegally possessing a machine gun in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(1)(A) and 922(o). In sentencing Defendant, the district court classified Defendant as an unlawful user of marijuana at the time of his offenses, thus applying U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)'s "prohibited person" enhancement. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for resentencing, holding that the government did not meet its burden of proving qualifying drug use. View "United States v. Espinoza-Roque" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated and reversed the judgment of the district court holding that two laws passed by Maine's Legislature in 2019 that amended the Maine Fair Credit Reporting Act, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, 1306 et seq. (Maine Act) were preempted under section 1681t(b)(1)(E) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., holding that remand was required.The amendments to the Maine Act were passed in order to regulate the reporting of overdue medical debt and debt resulting from economic abuse. Plaintiff, an industry group representing the "Big Three" credit reporting agencies, brought a facial preemption challenge to the laws. The district court concluded that the amendments were preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(E). The First Circuit remanded the matter for further proceedings, holding (1) section 1681t(b)(1)(E) narrowly preempts state laws that impose requirements or prohibitions with respect to the specific subject matters regulated under section 1681c; and (2) the amendments were not preempted in their entirety. View "Consumer Data Industry Ass'n v. Frey" on Justia Law