Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting the government's motion to dismiss this lawsuit alleging improper termination and breach of contract for failure to state a claim on the grounds that the claims were time-barred, holding that there was no basis to disturb the district court's decision.This matter arose out of a contract for between J-Way Southern and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) for dredging water waters in Menemsha Harbor, Martha's Vineyard. After USACE terminated the contract J-Way filed suit, alleging improper termination and breach of contract. The district court granted USACE's motion to dismiss, concluding that J-Way's claims were time-barred. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction over this maritime contract dispute; and (2) the district court properly denied the government's motion to dismiss. View "J-Way Southern, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico dismissing without prejudice this collection and foreclosure action that VS PR, a limited liability corporation, brought against several defendants, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.In a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, Defendants argued that VS PR had not established that complete diversity between the parties existed as required by 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(1). The district court denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice. VS PR later filed a motion to dismiss the complaint voluntarily pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). The district court granted the motion for voluntary dismissal and dismissed the action without prejudice. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Rule 41(a) requires that an action must be dismissed with prejudice following a voluntary dismissal pursuant to a court order only when the court order so provides. View "VS PR, LLC v. ORC Miramar Corp." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the entry of final judgment entered in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff's wage and employment misclassification claims, holding that the Massachusetts Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148 (MWA), did not apply to the undisputed facts in this case.Plaintiff, a Florida-based financial planner with a Massachusetts-based financial services company and office, sued his former broker-dealer in a Massachusetts federal district court alleging that Defendant had misclassified him as an independent contractor instead of an employee in violation of Massachusetts law. The district court concluded that Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law and granted Defendants' motion in its entirety. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that the MWA did not apply to Plaintiff's employment relationship with Defendant. View "Viscito v. National Planning Corp." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court denying Appellant's motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act (FSA), holding that Appellant was not entitled to a sentence reduction.After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of racketeering, conspiracy to commit racketeering, murder in aid of racketeering, and other crimes. The district court imposed three concurrent life sentences for the racketeering charges. Following the passage of the FSA, Appellant filed a pro se motion for compassionate release, arguing that the age at the time of his crimes, the length of his sentence, and his rehabilitation efforts warranted the reduction of his sentence. The district court denied the request. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that no extraordinary and compelling reasons existed so as to warrant a reduction of Appellant's life sentence. View "United States v. Sepulveda" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court denying Defendants' motion for entry of an automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. 922, incorporated into Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), 48 U.S.C. 2101-2241, through 48 U.S.C. 2161(a), holding that Defendants were entitled to an automatic stay.Plaintiffs, who owned an operated the Integrand Assurance Company, sued Defendants, Puerto Rico government officials whose defense was assumed by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico pursuant to the Commonwealth's legal representation and indemnification statute, alleging, among other claims, that the government officials violated their First Amendment rights, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause. Defendants, who were granted legal representation under Law 9, filed a notice of automatic stay. The district court denied the motion, concluding that PROMESA did not stay the litigation. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the automatic stay provision in Title III of PROMESA applied to this action. View "Victor J. Salgado & Associates v. Cestero-Lopategui" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated Defendant's sentence entered after he pleaded guilty to illegally possessing a machine gun, holding that Defendant's upwardly variant sentence could not stand.After a hearing, the sentencing judge imposed a variant sentence of forty-eight months - eighteen months more than the top of the recommended sentencing range. On appeal, Defendant argued that his incarcerative term was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The First Circuit agreed with one of Defendant's claims of procedural error, holding (1) under United States v. Rivera-Berrios, 968 F.3d 130 (1st Cir. 2020), when neither the judge nor the record identifies a "special characteristic attributable either to the offender" or the circumstances of the offense that removes the "case from the mile-run," the upwardly variant sentence "cannot endure"; and (2) the judge erred in sentencing Defendant. View "United States v. Flores-Gonzalez" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court's dismissal of Debtor's motion to enforce an automatic stay as to a subsidiary of the Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, holding that the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally strips tribes of their immunity,Debtor sought to enforce the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay against one of his creditors, a subsidiary of the Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians (Band). Debtor sought an order prohibiting further collection efforts as well as damages and attorney fees. The Band and its affiliates moved to dismiss the enforcement proceeding, asserting tribal sovereign immunity. The bankruptcy court agreed and granted the motion to dismiss. The First Circuit reversed the decision of the bankruptcy court dismissing Debtor's motion to enforce the automatic stay, holding that tribes are governmental units and, thus, the Bankruptcy Code abrogates tribal sovereign immunity. View "Coughlin v. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians" on Justia Law

The First Circuit granted in part a petition for review from Petitioner in which Petitioner challenged the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the immigration judge's (IJ) denial of Petitioner's request for deferral of removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading treatment or Punishment (CAT), holding that the BIA's decision was not supported by substantial evidence.Petitioner, a noncitizen who was granted asylum in 2002, was served with a notice to appear from removal proceedings. The notice alleged that Petitioner was subject to removal from the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) and 1182(a)(2)(C) based on his prior Massachusetts state law convictions. Ali submitted to the IJ an application for asylum, for withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT, asserting that he was be subject to torture in Somalia. The IJ sustained the charges and ordered Petitioner removed to Somalia. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit vacated the BIA's order, holding that the BIA did not address Petitioner's contention that the IJ failed to consider relevant evidence concerning the torture that Petitioner would face from private militias and armed criminals, and the failure to consider that evidence was not harmless. View "Ali v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed all but a small portion of the sentence and restitution order imposed by the district court in connection with Defendant's guilty plea to charges of falsely impersonating a federal officer and wire fraud, holding that the inclusion of travel expenses in the restitution order was error.Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of impersonating a federal officer and four counts of wire fraud. The district court imposed five concurrent eighteen-month terms of immurement and ordered restitution in the amount of $30,605. On appeal, Defendant challenged his sentence as both procedurally and substantively unreasonable and argued that his restitution order was excessive because it improperly included certain travel expenses. The First Circuit largely affirmed, holding (1) there was no procedural error; (2) Defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable; and (3) the restitution order was not improper with the exception of the inclusion of travel expenses in the amount of $605. View "United States v. Carrasquillo-Vilches" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court entering summary judgment in favor of an airline and dismissing an airline passenger's personal injury complaint, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the airline.The passenger in this case was injured after falling while disembarking from an aircraft via a mobile staircase made of a last step that was steeper than the earlier steps. At issue was whether Plaintiff's injuries resulted from an "accident" within the meaning of the Montreal Convention. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the airline, determining that the passenger's injuries were not the result of an accident within the meaning of the Montreal Convention. The First Circuit vacated the judgment, holding that it is for a jury to decide whether the passenger's injuries resulted from an accident within the meaning of the Montreal Convention. View "Moore v. British Airways PLC" on Justia Law