Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a Guatemalan petitioner, López, who sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture in the United States. After an immigration judge denied her applications, López appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), indicating her intent to file a supporting brief. On the deadline, her counsel attempted to file the brief electronically but mistakenly submitted it to the immigration court instead of the BIA. The immigration court rejected the filing weeks later, and counsel promptly refiled with the BIA and moved for acceptance of the late brief, explaining the technical error.The BIA, through an unsigned notice, denied the motion to accept the late-filed brief, stating only that the rationale was insufficient and that no further motions or reconsideration would be entertained. Subsequently, a single-member panel of the BIA dismissed López’s appeal, adopting the immigration judge’s decision and stating that the grounds for appeal were waived because they were not developed in a timely brief or statement. The BIA did not address the circumstances of the late filing or the explanation provided by López’s counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the BIA’s actions. The court held that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to provide an adequate explanation for denying the motion to accept the late-filed brief, especially given the plausible and promptly explained reason for the delay. The First Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA for further consideration consistent with its opinion, without addressing the merits of the underlying asylum claims. View "Lopez-Gomez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Guatemalan citizen and her minor son entered the United States without legal status in August 2021. In November 2022, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against her. Nearly a year later, she applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), naming her son as a derivative applicant. She claimed that, for four years prior to her departure, unidentified hooded men in her home village threatened to kidnap her children if she did not support their side in a local land conflict. She did not report these threats to authorities, and neither she nor her family suffered physical harm or kidnapping attempts.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found her asylum application untimely, rejecting her argument that ignorance of immigration law constituted an extraordinary circumstance excusing the late filing. The IJ also found that the threats did not amount to past persecution, nor did she establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, as the threats were unfulfilled and not linked to a protected ground. The IJ denied withholding of removal, citing her failure to meet the higher burden required, and denied CAT protection, finding no evidence she would likely be tortured or that the Guatemalan government would acquiesce in such harm. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing that her circumstances were not extraordinary and that the threats were insufficiently specific or severe to constitute persecution or torture.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of her untimely asylum application under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). The court further held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s denial of withholding of removal and CAT protection, as the record did not compel a finding of past persecution, future persecution, or likely torture. The petition for review was dismissed in part and denied in part. View "Zapet-Alvarado v. Bondi" on Justia Law

An employee of an airline company in Puerto Rico suffered a work-related injury when an airplane door struck his head. After the incident, he sought medical treatment and eventually reported to Puerto Rico’s State Insurance Fund (the Fund) for workers’ compensation. The employer did not initially provide the necessary incident report for the Fund, nor did it file a Work Accident Report with the Fund until nearly two years later. The employee was placed on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and continued to receive treatment, including surgery and physical therapy. While still under medical care and unable to return to work, he was terminated by the employer, who cited his failure to keep them informed of his status.The employee filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, alleging several claims under federal and Puerto Rico law, including a retaliation claim under Puerto Rico’s Whistle-Blower Act (Law 115). The district court dismissed some claims at the motion to dismiss stage and granted summary judgment on the remaining claims, including the Law 115 retaliation claim. The district court found that the five-month gap between the employee’s report to the Fund and his termination was too long to establish causation, and also concluded that the employer’s stated reasons for termination were not pretextual.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the summary judgment ruling de novo. The court held that the district court erred by treating close temporal proximity as a necessary condition for causation and by failing to consider the employer’s shifting explanations for the termination as evidence of pretext. The First Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment on the Law 115 claim and remanded for further proceedings, holding that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding causation and pretext. View "Mercado v. Hyannis Air Service, Inc." on Justia Law

A borrower in Rhode Island financed a home purchase with a mortgage from a national bank. The mortgage required the borrower to make advance payments for property taxes and insurance into an escrow account managed by the bank. The bank did not pay interest on these escrowed funds, despite a Rhode Island statute mandating that banks pay interest on such accounts. Years later, the borrower filed a class action lawsuit against the bank, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment for failing to pay the required interest under state law.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island dismissed the complaint, agreeing with the bank that the National Bank Act preempted the Rhode Island statute. The court reasoned that the state law imposed limits on the bank’s federal powers, specifically the power to establish escrow accounts, and thus significantly interfered with the bank’s incidental powers under federal law. The court did not address class certification or the merits of the unjust enrichment claim, focusing solely on preemption.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case after the Supreme Court’s decision in Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A., which clarified the standard for preemption under the National Bank Act. The First Circuit held that the district court erred by not applying the nuanced, comparative analysis required by Cantero. The appellate court found that the bank failed to show that the Rhode Island statute significantly interfered with its federal banking powers or conflicted with the federal regulatory scheme. The First Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the borrower’s claims to proceed. View "Conti v. Citizens Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

A Haitian national who was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident at age 13 faced removal proceedings after being convicted in New Hampshire for the sale of a controlled drug, which was classified as an aggravated felony under federal immigration law. During removal proceedings, he sought deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), arguing that he would likely be tortured if returned to Haiti due to risks posed by Haitian authorities, gangs, and individuals seeking revenge, especially given his severe mental illness.An Immigration Judge (IJ) sustained the removal charge and denied his application for CAT relief after conducting hearings and considering evidence. The IJ found that, although conditions in Haitian detention facilities were deplorable and extrajudicial violence was a problem, the petitioner had not shown that the Haitian government maintained these conditions with the specific intent to torture detainees. The IJ also found insufficient likelihood that the petitioner would be targeted for torture by gangs, mobs, or private individuals with government acquiescence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, and the petitioner timely sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.The First Circuit held that the BIA erred by failing to address the petitioner’s CAT claim regarding the risk of torture by low-level Haitian officials in detention facilities. The court vacated the BIA’s order and remanded for further consideration of this specific claim, instructing the BIA to properly distinguish between intent and purpose requirements for torture under CAT. The petition for review was otherwise denied, as the court found no error in the agency’s handling of other aspects of the CAT claim or in its evidentiary rulings. View "Fleurimond v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A naturalized U.S. citizen and his noncitizen son challenged the U.S. Secretary of State and the Consul General of the U.S. Consulate in Rio de Janeiro over the reclassification of a visa petition. The father, after becoming a lawful permanent resident, filed a Form I-130 petition for his son, who was under 21 at the time. The son turned 21 during the process, and the petition was approved when a visa in the F2A category was available. After the father naturalized, the consulate reclassified the petition into the F1 category for adult children of U.S. citizens, resulting in a lengthy wait for visa availability. The plaintiffs alleged that, under the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA), the son should still be considered under 21 for visa purposes, and the reclassification was unlawful.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the complaint, relying on the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, which generally bars judicial review of consular decisions regarding visa denials. The court did not address the merits of whether the reclassification was lawful under the CSPA.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability did not bar judicial review in this instance because the plaintiffs were challenging the reclassification of the visa petition, not a visa denial. The court then addressed the merits and concluded that, under the CSPA, the son’s statutory age should be calculated using the formula provided for F2A beneficiaries, which accounts for bureaucratic delays. Therefore, the son remained a “child” for visa purposes at the time of the father’s naturalization, and the reclassification to the F1 category was unlawful. The First Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Teles De Menezes v. Rubio" on Justia Law

Edwin Otero operated a violent drug trafficking organization across Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, distributing heroin and engaging in brutal acts to maintain control. In April 2019, suspecting a member of his group was cooperating with authorities, Otero orchestrated a kidnapping and assault in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, where the victim was beaten, stripped, and sexually exploited. Otero recorded the attack and boasted about it to others. A month later, he was involved in another violent incident, ordering a crew member to shoot a drug debtor. Otero was arrested in May 2019 after a DEA investigation uncovered his extensive criminal activities.Otero was charged in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts with multiple counts related to drug trafficking, kidnapping, firearms offenses, and obstruction of justice. He pleaded guilty to eight counts without a plea agreement. The presentence investigation report calculated a total offense level of 43, including a six-level enhancement for sexual exploitation during the kidnapping, resulting in a guideline range of life imprisonment. The district court sentenced Otero to 456 months’ imprisonment, with 336 months for most counts served concurrently and 120 months for a firearms count served consecutively. Otero objected to the sexual exploitation enhancement and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, preserving these issues for appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed Otero’s procedural and substantive challenges for abuse of discretion. The court held that the district court did not err in applying the sexual exploitation enhancement, finding sufficient evidence that Otero’s conduct met the relevant statutory definitions. The appellate court also found the sentence substantively reasonable, noting it fell within the guidelines and was supported by a plausible rationale. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Otero" on Justia Law

Brandon Velez was stopped by Manchester, New Hampshire police officers for vehicle equipment violations. After parking near his residence, Velez did not immediately comply with officers’ orders to exit his car. When he verbally refused and reached for his phone, officers attempted to physically remove him, leading to a struggle. During the altercation, one officer struck Velez multiple times and tased him twice. Velez was arrested and charged with misdemeanors and a traffic violation, ultimately pleading guilty only to the traffic violation. He later sued the officers and the City of Manchester, alleging wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, excessive force, assault and battery, and failure to train.The case was removed from state court to the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted, finding that the officers had probable cause for the arrest and that the force used was not excessive. Velez appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment order de novo. The appellate court held that the officers had probable cause to arrest Velez for resisting detention under New Hampshire law, defeating his wrongful arrest and false imprisonment claims. The court also found that, although one officer’s use of force was excessive under the Fourth Amendment, qualified immunity shielded the officer from liability because the law was not clearly established in the specific context. The court further held that Velez’s state-law assault and battery claim failed under the same immunity standard, and that his claims against the City for failure to train were unsupported by evidence of a municipal policy or deliberate indifference. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the defendants on all counts. View "Velez v. Eutzy" on Justia Law

Over a period of 35 years, the defendant operated a dogfighting enterprise known as Stone City Kennel, where he bred, trained, and sold dogs for fighting, mentored others in the practice, and participated in over 150 dogfights across the Americas and the Caribbean. He was known as a prominent figure in the dogfighting world. After admitting incriminating information to an undercover agent, he was indicted in the District of Puerto Rico for conspiracy to violate the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and for possession of dogs for use in animal fighting. A search of his property revealed four dogs in poor condition, leading to a superseding indictment with additional possession counts. He ultimately pleaded guilty to one conspiracy count and two possession counts.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico grouped the offenses and calculated a Sentencing Guidelines Range (GSR) of 12 to 18 months. However, the Presentence Investigation Report and the government argued for a much higher sentence, citing the exceptional scale and cruelty of the defendant’s conduct. At sentencing, the court heard expert testimony and considered the defendant’s extensive involvement, the cruelty involved, and the need for deterrence. The court imposed an 84-month sentence: 36 months for conspiracy and 24 months for each possession count, to be served consecutively, and described the sentence as an upward variance based on the statutory sentencing factors.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the defendant’s challenges, including claims of double jeopardy, inadequate explanation, and substantive unreasonableness. The court held that consecutive sentences for conspiracy and possession did not violate double jeopardy, that the statutory text allowed separate punishment for each dog possessed, and that the district court adequately explained and justified the upwardly variant sentence. The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Casillas-Montero" on Justia Law

Several individuals who had received grants of parole under programs established by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela challenged the government’s decision to terminate those grants. The parole programs, created during the Biden Administration, allowed eligible individuals from these countries to enter the United States temporarily for up to two years, based on urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit. When President Trump took office in January 2025, he issued executive orders directing DHS to end categorical parole programs, including the CHNV programs. DHS subsequently published a notice terminating the programs and revoking all existing grants of parole within thirty days, rather than allowing them to expire naturally.The plaintiffs, affected by the early termination, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district court certified a class of affected individuals and granted a preliminary stay, preventing DHS from revoking their parole grants before the original expiration dates. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the categorical termination was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), in part because the agency’s rationale rested on a legal error and failed to adequately consider reliance and humanitarian interests.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The First Circuit held that the relevant statute requires DHS to grant parole only on a case-by-case basis, but does not impose the same limitation on the termination of parole. The court also found that the agency’s explanation for terminating the parole programs was not so deficient as to be arbitrary and capricious under the APA. Concluding that the plaintiffs had not made a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits, the First Circuit vacated the district court’s stay and remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Noem" on Justia Law