Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision dismissing Sandra St. John's appeal from the judgment of the Immigration Judge (IJ) denying her statutory motion to reopen, holding that there was no abuse of discretion in the agency's denial of St. John's statutory motion to reopen.The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against St. John based on her conviction for mayhem in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. After going into ICE custody, St. John filed a motion in the Massachusetts superior court asking it to vacate her mayhem conviction and grant a new trial on ineffective assistance of trial grounds. St. John then moved for reopening of her removal proceedings on the grounds that her motion to vacate had rendered the mayhem conviction nonfinal for immigration purposes. The IJ denied the motion, and the BIA dismissed the appeal. The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the agency did not abuse its discretion in declining to reopen the order of removal based on final criminal convictions. View "St. John v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's putative class action against McNeil Nutritionals, LLC and Johnson & Johnson Consumer, Inc. challenging certain statements on the packaging of Lactaid products, holding that the district court correctly dismissed the complaint.Plaintiff brought this action claiming that Lactaid's labels violated federal labeling requirements, leading Plaintiff to have been mislead into purchasing Lactaid products, which she claimed were more expensive than other lactase supplements. The district court granted Defendants' second motion to dismiss. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's claims were impliedly preempted by the statutory enforcement authority of the Food and Drug Administration. View "DiCroce v. McNeil Nutritionals, LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court ordering A.R., who was adjudicated delinquent in a proceeding under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), 18 U.S.C. 5031-5042, detained in a juvenile institution until he reached the age of twenty-one, followed by a term of juvenile delinquent supervision, holding that remand was required.A.R., who was born in 2003, was adjudicated delinquent pursuant to his admission of aiding and abetting an attempted robbery of a motor vehicle and five carjackings, each of which would have been a violation of 18 U.S.C. 2119 had A.R. been an adult. On appeal, A.R. primarily challenged the district court's order of a detention period rather than a probationary one. The First Circuit affirmed as to the court's imposition of detention but reversed and remanded as to two other matters, holding (1) A.R.'s disposition was both procedurally and substantively reasonable; (2) the district court erred in failing to recommend that A.R. be placed in a local detention facility; and (3) the district court erred in imposing a term of detention and supervision that together exceeded the applicable statutory maximum. View "United States v. A.R." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the tax court sustaining a notice of deficiency issued by the Internal Revenue Services (IRS) to TBL Licensing LLC for the 2011 tax year, holding that the Tax Commissioner properly determined that TBL's transfer of its intangible property was followed by a disposition of that property, requiring TBL to pay the tax due in a lump sum.In 2011, TBL transferred the intangible property at issue, which was worth approximately $1.5 billion, to an affiliated foreign corporation. TBL argued that the tax attributable to the transfer, which occurred in the context of a corporate reorganization involving an exchange as described in section 26 U.S.C. 361, could be paid on an annual basis by one of TBL's affiliates. The IRS disagreed and assessed a deficiency based on its position that TBL was required to pay tax on the entire gain and to do so in its 2011 tax return. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was nothing in 26 U.S.C. 367(d) that would absolve TBL of its responsibility under the disposition-payment rule. View "TBL Licensing LLC v. Werfel" on Justia Law

In this appeal arising out of a challenge to Rhode Island's liquor laws the First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for Defendants as to all claims, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to the constitutionality of the in-state-presence requirement for retailers.Plaintiffs, Rhode Island wine consumers, brought this action alleging that, in violation of the Commerce Clause, Rhode Island consumers are denied access to alcohol deliveries from out-of-state retailers. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The First Circuit vacated the lower judgment in part, holding that the district court erred in entering summary judgment as to the constitutionality of the in-state-presence requirement for retailers and remanded for a fuller consideration of the parties' respective offers of proof. The district court upheld the in-state-presence requirement for retailers. The First Circuit affirmed the judgment in part and vacated it in part and remanded the matter for further proceedings, holding that a discriminatory aspect of the State's version of the "three-tier system" could not be affirmed. View "Anvar v. Dwyer" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated Defendant's statutory maximum thirty-six-month sentence that the district court imposed following a revocation of supervised release, holding that the district court's failure adequately to justify the sentence was procedural error.After a revocation hearing, the district court revoked Defendant's supervised release term for violations of the conditions of his release. The district court sentenced Defendant to thirty-six months' imprisonment, the statutory maximum for Defendant's violation. The First Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, holding that none of court's rationales explained why Defendant's case was so distinct from other such revocation cases that he deserved a 400 percent increase over the guidelines sentencing range. View "United States v. Reyes-Correa" on Justia Law

The circuit court affirmed Defendant's sentence, imposed in connection with his drug-related offenses, holding that the district court did not err by adopting a four-level role-in-the-offense enhancement when formulating Defendant's guideline sentencing range.After applying the relevant enhancements and reductions, the court imposed a downwardly variant sentence of 216 months' imprisonment on each count of conviction, to run concurrently. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his argument that his exercise of control in the underlying operation was of an insufficient duration to ground application of the four-level enhancement. View "United States v. Poliero" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's 516-month sentence entered upon his guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to conduct enterprise affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity (RICO), holding that there was no error relating to Defendant's sentence.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erroneously applied a sentencing enhancement for the use or attempted use of a minor in the commission of the offense under the United States Sentencing Guidelines and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the minor-use enhancement was properly applied in this case; and (2) the sentence imposed by the district court was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Vaquerano Canas" on Justia Law

The First Circuit certified to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) the unresolved question of what is meant, in the context of a franchise agreement, by "performing any service," as that phrase is used in the Massachusetts Independent Contractor Law (ICL), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148B(a).Plaintiffs, owners and operators of 7-Eleven franchises in Massachusetts, filed a putative class action against 7-Eleven, Inc. for alleged violations of the Massachusetts ICL, the Massachusetts Wage Act, and the Massachusetts Minimum Wage Law, challenging 7-Eleven's decision to classify them as independent contractors rather than employees. The district court ruled in favor of 7-Eleven and then, after remand, ruled for 7-Eleven again. At issue was whether Plaintiffs performed "any service" for 7-Eleven under the Massachusetts ICL. The First Circuit certified to the Massachusetts SJC the following question: Do Plaintiffs perform "any service" for 7-Eleven within the meaning of the Massachusetts ICL where they perform various contractural obligations under their franchise agreement and 7-Eleven receives a percentage of the franchise's gross profits. View "Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Plaintiff's claims against Defendant, Tufts University, on summary judgment and refusing to alter to amend that ruling under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), holding that there was no error.Plaintiff sued Tufts, her former employer, alleging that she was denied a full professor position on the basis of sex discrimination and/or retaliation for engaging in protected conduct in violation of federal and state anti-discrimination laws, specifically, for her filing a claim of sexual harassment. The district court granted summary judgment for Tufts. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) correctly entered summary judgment in favor of Tufts on Plaintiff's discrimination and retaliation claims; and (2) did not err in denying Plaintiff's motion for an altered or amended judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e). View "Ing v. Tufts University" on Justia Law