Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves a civil enforcement action by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against Henry B. Sargent for allegedly violating registration and antifraud provisions of federal securities laws. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the SEC, finding that Sargent violated section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 by directing unregistered public offerings of penny stocks. The court ordered equitable remedies, including disgorgement and a ten-year ban on trading penny stocks, but dismissed the SEC's fraud claims and denied an additional civil penalty.Sargent appealed the partial summary judgment, arguing that his transactions were exempt from registration and that the district court abused its discretion in imposing the ten-year ban and calculating the disgorgement amount. The SEC cross-appealed, contending that the district court erred in not imposing a civil penalty and in dismissing its fraud claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment, the disgorgement amount, and the dismissal of the SEC's fraud claims. However, it found that the district court erred in imposing equitable remedies and in concluding that it lacked the power to issue a civil penalty. The appellate court vacated the injunction against Sargent and remanded the case for further proceedings to assess the appropriateness of injunctive relief and civil penalties for Sargent's section 5 violation. View "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Sargent" on Justia Law

Franciele dos Reis Olimpio Alves, a native and citizen of Brazil, along with her husband and child, arrived in the United States in 2021 and were placed in removal proceedings. They conceded removability, and Olimpio filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, citing abuse by her ex-partner in Brazil. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied her request for relief, concluding that even if the abuse amounted to persecution, it was not on account of a protected ground.Olimpio appealed the IJ's denial of her asylum claim to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that Olimpio's ex-partner's motivation to harm her was based on personal issues regarding their relationship, not on account of her membership in a particular social group. Olimpio, her husband, and child then petitioned for review of the BIA's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that it reviews both the IJ's and the BIA's decisions as a unit when the BIA adopts portions of the IJ's findings while adding its own analysis. The court upheld the agency's factual findings under the substantial-evidence standard, which requires upholding the findings unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise.The court held that Olimpio did not demonstrate the requisite nexus between her claimed persecution and a protected ground. The agency reasonably concluded that her ex-partner's actions were motivated by personal issues rather than her membership in the proposed social group of "Brazilian women who are victims of domestic violence." Consequently, the petition for review was denied. View "Sanches Alves v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Sine Phimmady, a Laotian refugee admitted to the U.S. in 1979, was convicted of multiple assault-related crimes in 1992 and 1993. He served five years in prison and was subsequently placed in removal proceedings by the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS). An Immigration Judge (IJ) found him deportable based on his convictions, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal. After being released from INS custody in 2000, Phimmady rebuilt his life, maintaining steady employment and starting a family. In 2022, he successfully vacated his 1993 convictions due to a lack of proper immigration warnings during his plea hearings.Phimmady requested the BIA to reopen his removal proceedings sua sponte, citing the vacatur of his convictions. The BIA denied his motion, stating that he had not demonstrated an exceptional situation warranting reopening, particularly noting his delay in seeking post-conviction relief. Phimmady filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the BIA had a settled practice of granting reopening in cases where convictions were vacated due to defects in the criminal proceedings. The BIA denied the reconsideration, emphasizing the need to consider the specific facts and circumstances of each case, including Phimmady's delay and the nature of his convictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the BIA does not have a settled practice of granting sua sponte reopening solely based on the vacatur of convictions. The court found that the BIA's decisions often consider the totality of circumstances, including the noncitizen's diligence in seeking post-conviction relief. Therefore, the court denied Phimmady's petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision. View "Phimmady v. Bondi" on Justia Law

In this case, Jesús Abdiel Feliciano-Candelario was indicted on five federal counts related to three separate armed robberies. Feliciano pled guilty to four counts under a plea agreement, which included a joint recommendation for a 130-month sentence, below the calculated Guidelines range of 157 to 181 months. The district court, however, sentenced him to 181 months. Feliciano appealed, challenging the sentence on several grounds.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially reviewed the case. Feliciano moved to sever the charges into three separate trials, which the court granted. During a status conference, the court discussed the possibility of sequential sentencing if Feliciano were convicted in separate trials. Eventually, Feliciano and the government reached a plea agreement, and Feliciano pled guilty to four counts, with the fifth count dismissed. The district court sentenced him to 181 months, applying a four-level enhancement for "otherwise using" a knife during a carjacking, among other considerations.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with Feliciano that the district court improperly applied the four-level enhancement for "otherwise using" a knife instead of the three-level enhancement for "brandishing" it. The court vacated the sentence on the carjacking count and remanded for further proceedings regarding that enhancement. On other grounds, including the government's alleged breach of the plea agreement and the district court's consideration of community factors, the court affirmed the district court's decisions. The court found no plain error in the government's actions or the district court's consideration of community-based factors and rejected Feliciano's argument about the district court's supposed belief in a hypothetical, piecemeal sentencing process. View "United States v. Feliciano-Candelario" on Justia Law

A developer purchased a historical property in Newton, Massachusetts, and began restoration work. The Newton Historical Commission issued a stop-work order, claiming the developer violated the permit by demolishing large portions of the building. The developer, 29 Greenwood, LLC, disagreed but complied with the order and submitted revised proposals, all of which were denied. The developer then filed a lawsuit, alleging a violation of the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution and state law.The case was initially filed in state court but was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the dispute was a typical zoning issue not rising to the level of a constitutional taking. The developer appealed the dismissal, arguing that the Commission acted in bad faith and would never permit the reconstruction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that two related actions were pending in state court, which could potentially resolve or narrow the federal constitutional issues. The court decided to abstain from ruling on the federal issues until the state court proceedings concluded, invoking the Pullman abstention doctrine. The court vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded the case with instructions to stay the federal proceedings pending the outcome of the state court cases. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs. View "29 Greenwood, LLC v. City of Newton" on Justia Law

The case involves the Massachusetts Lobstermen's Association, Inc. (MALA) challenging a final rule issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) that seasonally bans vertical buoy lines used in lobster and Jonah crab trap fishing in certain federal waters off Massachusetts from February 1 to April 30 each year. The NMFS issued this rule to protect the endangered North Atlantic right whales from entanglement in these buoy lines during their foraging period.Previously, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled in favor of MALA, holding that the final rule conflicted with a temporary statutory authorization for lobster and Jonah crab fishing contained in a rider to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023. The district court found that the final rule did not fall within the exception provided in the rider, which allowed for actions to extend or make final an emergency rule that was in place on the date of the rider's enactment, December 29, 2022. The court concluded that the 2022 emergency rule was not "in place" on that date because it was not actively preventing fishing in the Wedge area at that time.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the 2022 emergency rule was indeed "in place" on December 29, 2022, for the purposes of the rider's exception. The court reasoned that the emergency rule's findings and authority were still relevant and could serve as a basis for future regulatory actions, such as the final rule. Therefore, the final rule was lawful and enforceable under the exception provided in the rider. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Mass. Lobstermen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv." on Justia Law

A registered nurse, Alexandra Melino, sued her former employer, Boston Medical Center (BMC), alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Massachusetts General Laws by denying her request for a religious exemption from BMC's COVID-19 vaccination mandate. Melino's primary duties involved direct patient care in critical units. During the pandemic, BMC converted several units to COVID-19 units and faced significant staffing challenges due to the virus. BMC implemented a vaccination policy based on CDC recommendations to mitigate the risk of COVID-19 transmission among staff and patients.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment to BMC, holding that Melino's requested exemption would impose undue hardship on the hospital. The court found that Melino could not work remotely, could not work in-person unvaccinated without risking patient safety, and that any feasible accommodation would impose substantial costs on BMC. Melino's motion to strike portions of an affidavit submitted by BMC was also denied due to her failure to comply with local procedural rules.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that BMC had demonstrated undue hardship by showing that allowing Melino to work unvaccinated would increase the risk of COVID-19 transmission. The court noted that Melino did not provide any medical evidence to contradict BMC's reliance on CDC recommendations. Additionally, Melino's argument that BMC should have considered alternative accommodations was waived as it was not raised in the lower court. The court upheld the district court's rulings, affirming the grant of summary judgment in favor of BMC. View "Melino v. Boston Medical Center" on Justia Law

In April 2009, Doneyn Bourke and William Hayward, Sr. defaulted on their $950,000 mortgage for a property in Nantucket, Massachusetts. The mortgage holder, Emigrant Mortgage Company, Inc., foreclosed on the property, but Bourke and Hayward refused to vacate. Emigrant Mortgage Company and Retained Realty, Inc., the foreclosure sale purchaser, filed a lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to seek remedies. The federal district court rejected Bourke and Hayward's arguments against federal jurisdiction and their counterclaims, ruling in favor of the plaintiffs. The court declared that Retained Realty, Inc. was entitled to possession of the property and that Bourke and Hayward owed $6,500 per month in use and occupancy payments from March 21, 2011, until they vacated the property.Previously, the Massachusetts Land Court had issued a certificate of title to Bourke and Hayward in 2006. After defaulting on their loan, Emigrant foreclosed by conducting a foreclosure sale and making an entry onto the property. The Land Court registered the foreclosure deed to Retained Realty, Inc. in 2012. Retained Realty, Inc. then filed a summary process action in the Nantucket District Court, which initially ruled in their favor. However, the Massachusetts Appellate Division found the foreclosure notice inadequate but upheld the foreclosure by entry. The Nantucket District Court later entered judgment for Bourke and Hayward for possession due to the premature summary process action.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's ruling, rejecting Bourke and Hayward's arguments that the Massachusetts Land Court statute deprived the federal court of jurisdiction. The court held that the federal district court had proper diversity jurisdiction and that there was no ongoing state in rem proceeding to invoke the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction. The court also upheld the district court's findings on the merits, including the foreclosure by entry and possession and the application of estoppel by deed. View "Emigrant Mortgage Company, Inc. v. Bourke" on Justia Law

Anlert Perez-Segura pled guilty to conspiring to import cocaine into the United States. In exchange for a specific term of imprisonment, he waived his right to appeal any aspect of his conviction and sentence. He was caught captaining a boat carrying cocaine off Puerto Rico's western coast. A grand jury indicted him on four counts, and he agreed to plead guilty to one count in exchange for the government dropping the remaining counts and advocating for a 120-month sentence, the mandatory minimum. The plea agreement included a supplement acknowledging that the court could impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum if he qualified for the "safety valve" under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico held a change-of-plea hearing and later a sentencing hearing. At the sentencing hearing, Perez-Segura's counsel indicated that he did not qualify for the safety valve because he was uncooperative. The court sentenced him to 120 months' imprisonment, and he appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Perez-Segura argued that the district court erred by not inquiring further into his eligibility for the safety valve and that his counsel was ineffective for not advocating for it. The appellate court found that his waiver of the right to appeal was enforceable and that he did not demonstrate a miscarriage of justice. The court also noted that his ineffective assistance claim was better suited for a collateral proceeding due to the lack of a developed record on why his counsel acted as she did and whether her actions were prejudicial.The First Circuit dismissed the appeal, allowing Perez-Segura to raise his ineffective assistance claim in a collateral proceeding. View "United States v. Perez-Segura" on Justia Law

Mario Rafael Castillo was charged with one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a child under twelve and one count of abusive sexual contact of a child under twelve. He pleaded guilty to the second count, which involved his younger granddaughter, while the government dismissed the first count. The plea agreement allowed Castillo to seek a 78-month sentence, and the government could argue for up to 180 months. Castillo was initially sentenced to 235 months by the district court, which applied a sentencing guidelines cross-reference that increased the advisory guideline range.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the initial sentence due to a procedural error in applying the cross-reference. On remand, the district court acknowledged the lower guideline range but reimposed the 235-month sentence. Castillo appealed again, arguing that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by not genuinely recommending the 180-month sentence and instead undermining it.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with Castillo. The court found that the prosecutor's statements, although technically recommending 180 months, effectively undermined the plea agreement by emphasizing the district court's authority to impose a harsher sentence and suggesting that Castillo was a danger to society. The court held that the prosecutor's actions constituted a breach of the plea agreement.The First Circuit vacated Castillo's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing before a different judge, emphasizing the importance of prosecutors upholding their end of plea agreements to maintain the integrity of the judicial process. View "United States v. Castillo" on Justia Law