Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant, Ronald Yoel Marte Carmona, was convicted on charges related to multiple fentanyl sales. He appealed, challenging the district court's denial of his motions to suppress the fruits of a Terry stop and arguing that the evidence supporting his six convictions was insufficient.Previously, the defendant had been indicted on one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl, and five counts of distribution and possession with intent to distribute forty grams or more of fentanyl. Each of the distribution counts corresponded with a particular controlled buy. The defendant moved to suppress the fruits of a traffic stop and the fruits of a search of an apartment, arguing that the stop was unconstitutional because it was not supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motions, finding that the agents possessed reasonable suspicion to effectuate the stop.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the Terry stop was reasonable, grounded in articulable suspicion, and that the verdicts were supported by the record evidence. The court also found that the agents who stopped the defendant possessed a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was involved in past criminal conduct, making the Terry stop permissible. The court further held that the evidence presented at trial established that a rational factfinder could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was guilty of the charges. View "US v. Carmona" on Justia Law

The defendant, Jean Carlos Polaco-Hance, was convicted of being a felon in unlawful possession of a machinegun. He was sentenced to seventy-two months in prison, a sentence that was forty percent higher than the upper end of the range recommended under the federal sentencing guidelines. Polaco appealed his sentence, arguing that it was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.In the lower courts, Polaco had pled guilty to attempting to smuggle about $100,000 in cash from the United States to the Dominican Republic and making a false statement to a United States agency. He was sentenced to fifteen months of imprisonment for each offense, to be served concurrently, and three years of supervised release. He began his supervised release term on May 29, 2020. About three months later, Polaco was arrested for the offenses that form the basis of this appeal. A federal grand jury indicted Polaco on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and one count of unlawfully possessing a machinegun. The case proceeded to trial, after which a jury found Polaco guilty on both counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the district court had provided sufficient reasons to justify its higher sentence, including the large amount of ammunition in Polaco's possession. The court also found that the sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The court noted that the district court had considered Polaco's machinegun possession alongside other case-specific factors, including the large cache of ammunition and the high-capacity magazines Polaco had when he was arrested, as well as what the district court viewed as a heightened need for deterrence. View "US v. Polaco-Hance" on Justia Law

A Rhode Island oral and maxillofacial surgeon, Dr. Stephen T. Skoly, refused to comply with a COVID-19 Emergency Regulation issued by the Rhode Island Department of Health (RI DOH) that required all healthcare workers and providers to be vaccinated against COVID-19. Following his public declaration of noncompliance, the RI DOH issued a Notice of Violation and Compliance Order against him. Skoly then filed a lawsuit in federal court against the state and its officials, alleging violations of equal protection, due process, and First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed his complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The district court's decision was based on the fact that the state officials were either entitled to absolute or qualified immunity for their actions. The court held that the RI DOH directors were exercising prosecutorial authority delegated to them by Rhode Island law, thus granting them absolute immunity. As for Governor McKee, the court found that he was protected by qualified immunity as Skoly had no clearly established right to continue practicing while violating the vaccine mandate. The court also rejected Skoly's First Amendment retaliation claim, stating that the posting of the Notice constituted government speech, which could not form the basis of a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Skoly's complaint. The appellate court agreed with the lower court's findings that the state officials were entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity and that Skoly's constitutional claims were without merit. The court also upheld the dismissal of Skoly's First Amendment retaliation claim, stating that Skoly had not sufficiently alleged that he was targeted due to his opposition to the First Emergency Regulation. View "Skoly v. McKee" on Justia Law

Nathan Reardon, who had been self-employed for 24 years, was convicted of bank fraud after submitting fraudulent applications for loans under the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a financial assistance program enacted by Congress in response to the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic. Reardon used several of his businesses to submit the fraudulent applications and misused the funds from the approved loan. He was sentenced to twenty months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. As part of his sentence, the district court imposed a special condition prohibiting Reardon from all forms of self-employment during his supervised release term.Reardon appealed this special condition, arguing that it was overly restrictive and unnecessary. The government suggested a "middle ground" where the condition could be modified to avoid a total prohibition against self-employment, but the district court overruled Reardon's objection and imposed the self-employment ban without explaining why it was the minimum restriction necessary to protect the public, as required by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that while the district court was justified in imposing an occupational restriction, it did not provide sufficient explanation for why a total ban on self-employment was the minimum restriction necessary to protect the public. The court therefore vacated the self-employment ban and remanded the case for reconsideration of the scope of that restriction. View "United States v. Reardon" on Justia Law

The case involves an Indonesian family, Edwin Kurniawan Tulung, Elizabeth Angelia Karauwan, and their son Enrico Geraldwin Tulung, who fled to the United States in 2004 due to fear of persecution for their Christian faith. They entered the US on tourist visas and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Their application was denied by an Immigration Judge in 2009, a decision affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in 2011 on the grounds that past harm did not rise to the level of persecution and future persecution was not sufficiently likely. The family's petition for review was denied in 2012.The family filed their first motion to reopen based on changed country conditions in 2014, which was denied by the BIA. They did not appeal. In 2020, they filed their second motion to reopen, which was also denied by the BIA. Again, they did not seek judicial review. Instead, they filed three motions in 2022: a third motion to reopen, a motion to reconsider the denial of the second motion to reopen, and a motion to amend the second motion to reopen. The BIA denied all three motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the BIA's denial of the motions to reconsider and amend. However, it found that the BIA committed an error of law in reviewing the motion to reopen. The court held that the BIA incorrectly disregarded evidence by comparing it to conditions at the time of the previous motion to reopen, rather than at the time of the original merits hearing. The court vacated the BIA's denial of the motion to reopen and remanded for further proceedings. View "Tulung v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the Employees Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (ERS), which was established in 1951 as the Commonwealth's pension program for public employees. The appellants are seven individual beneficiaries of pensions paid by ERS. They had been litigating claims against UBS Financial Services Inc. (UBS) in the Commonwealth Court of First Instance related to UBS's role in issuing ERS pension funding bonds in 2008. Meanwhile, in January 2022, as part of its broad authority to promulgate orders necessary to carry out the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), the district court confirmed the Modified Eighth Amended Title III Joint Plan of Adjustment (the Plan).The district court had previously confirmed the Plan, which implemented several changes related to ERS and its pension plan payments to retired Commonwealth employees. The Plan replaced the Committee with the Avoidance Action Trustee as the plaintiff with exclusive power to prosecute the Underwriter Action and recover damages that ERS incurred. The Plan also ordered the immediate dissolution of ERS.UBS filed a motion to enforce the Plan, requesting that the district court enjoin the ERS Beneficiaries from pursuing the Commonwealth Action. The district court granted UBS's motion and enjoined the ERS Beneficiaries from pursuing the Commonwealth Action. The district court concluded that the ERS Beneficiaries' Commonwealth Action claims were rooted in a generalized injury and were derivative of ERS's right to recover on its own behalf. The district court further rejected the ERS Beneficiaries' arguments that they were entitled to recover for non-derivative general tort claims against UBS under various Commonwealth statutes.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the ERS Beneficiaries sought to raise derivative claims that belong exclusively to the Trustee or the Commonwealth. The court held that continued litigation of the FAC's derivative claims violates the terms of the Plan and PROMESA. View "UBS Financial Services Inc. v. Estate of Jose Nazario Serrano" on Justia Law

The case involves Puerto Rico Fast Ferries LLC ("Fast Ferries") and Mr. Cade, LLC and SeaTran Marine, LLC ("SeaTran") (collectively, "defendants-appellees"). Fast Ferries had entered into a Master Time Charter Agreement with Mr. Cade, LLC to charter the motor vessel Mr. Cade and procure a licensed crew. The agreement contained mediation and forum-selection clauses. When the final Short Form expired, Fast Ferries returned the vessel to its home port in Louisiana. A year later, Fast Ferries filed a complaint against Mr. Cade, LLC and SeaTran alleging breach of contract and liability pursuant to culpa in contrahendo. The defendants-appellees moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the Master Agreement was still in effect and required a written agreement for the charter of M/V Mr. Cade.The district court granted the motion to dismiss in part, concluding that the Master Agreement did not contain a termination date and remained in effect. Therefore, the contract's mediation and forum-selection clauses were binding on the parties. However, the district court did not address Fast Ferries' argument that SeaTran was not a signatory of the agreement and, therefore, could not invoke the mediation and forum-selection clauses contained therein.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's order on the defendants-appellees' motion to dismiss. The court held that the Master Agreement was still in effect and that SeaTran, despite being a non-signatory, could enforce the Master Agreement's mediation and forum-selection clauses. The court reasoned that Fast Ferries' claims against SeaTran were necessarily intertwined with the Master Agreement, and thus, Fast Ferries was equitably estopped from avoiding the mediation and forum-selection clauses with respect to SeaTran. View "Puerto Rico Fast Ferries LLC v. SeaTran Marine, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves Hartono Djokro and his son William Djokro, citizens of Indonesia who entered the United States as nonimmigrant visitors and overstayed their visas. In 2007, Hartono Djokro filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), including his son as a derivative applicant. They were served with notices to appear by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2008, charging them with removability for having remained in the United States longer than they had been authorized.In 2009, an immigration judge (IJ) denied their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT. The IJ found that the petitioners were ineligible for relief on several grounds, including that they had failed to establish a pattern or practice of persecution against either Chinese or Christians in Indonesia. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's decision in 2012. The petitioners' first motion to reopen was denied by the BIA in 2013.In the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the petitioners sought review of the BIA's denial of their second untimely motion to reopen, filed in 2021. The court denied the petition, finding that the BIA reasonably concluded that the petitioners had failed to satisfy the requirements for an exception to late filing. The court held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that the petitioners failed to establish changed conditions or circumstances material to their eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal. The court found that the record amply supported the BIA's determination that the petitioners had not met their burden of showing that the exception for changed country conditions applies. View "Djokro v. Garland" on Justia Law

Suzanne Brown, a federal prisoner, appealed the denial of her habeas corpus petition. Brown was convicted on twelve counts of making a materially false statement to a federal agency and was sentenced to twelve months of imprisonment and a two-year term of supervised release. She began her term of imprisonment in January 2022, with release scheduled for January 2023. However, in March 2022, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) calculated that Brown had earned fifteen First Step Act (FSA) credits, which it applied to accelerate her release date to December 17, 2022. In August 2022, BOP transferred Brown to home confinement under the emergency measures of the CARES Act, still with a calculated release date of December 17, 2022.Brown filed a petition for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine, arguing that she had earned enough FSA credits to qualify for release on September 2, 2022, and that BOP's decision not to correct her FSA credit calculation and apply FSA credits to accelerate her release would result in her being held unlawfully in custody. A magistrate judge recommended that Brown's petition for habeas corpus be denied, and the district court adopted that recommendation and denied the petition. Brown timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the denial of the habeas petition de novo. Brown conceded that controlling precedent foreclosed some of the relief she sought earlier. She now asked only that the court hold her term of supervised release began on August 2, 2022, when she was transferred to home confinement. However, the court affirmed the denial of habeas relief, stating that the BOP's transfer of Brown to home confinement was a form of BOP custody, and her term of supervised release could not begin until the BOP released her from that custody. The court expressed no view as to whether Brown could receive relief under other procedural mechanisms, such as 18 U.S.C. § 3583. View "Brown v. Penders" on Justia Law

The defendant, Victor J. Calderon-Zayas, was convicted of aiding and abetting another person to illegally possess a machine gun, a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 922(o). This conviction occurred while Calderon-Zayas was on supervised release for a previous conviction related to drug distribution. The machine gun in question was a modified pistol, which the court deemed more dangerous than an average machine gun. Calderon-Zayas was sentenced to a sixty-month sentence, which was above the guidelines range, and an additional eighteen-month sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, where Calderon-Zayas pled guilty to the charges. He challenged the length of his sentence, arguing that the court overemphasized the aggravating factors and overlooked the mitigating factors. He also argued that the court improperly relied on the dangerous nature of the firearm involved as a basis for the upward variance. As for the revocation sentence, he argued that the court erred by not considering the § 922(o) sentence when crafting the punishment for the supervised release violation.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The appellate court found no error in the lower court's decision and affirmed both the § 922(o) and revocation sentences. The court held that the sentencing court properly balanced the § 3553(a) factors and that the dangerousness of the modified pistol was a valid consideration for an upward variance in the sentence. The court also found that the consecutive revocation sentence was within the court's discretion and did not require consideration of the § 922(o) sentence. View "United States v. Calderon-Zayas" on Justia Law