Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Haitian national who was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident at age 13 faced removal proceedings after being convicted in New Hampshire for the sale of a controlled drug, which was classified as an aggravated felony under federal immigration law. During removal proceedings, he sought deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), arguing that he would likely be tortured if returned to Haiti due to risks posed by Haitian authorities, gangs, and individuals seeking revenge, especially given his severe mental illness.An Immigration Judge (IJ) sustained the removal charge and denied his application for CAT relief after conducting hearings and considering evidence. The IJ found that, although conditions in Haitian detention facilities were deplorable and extrajudicial violence was a problem, the petitioner had not shown that the Haitian government maintained these conditions with the specific intent to torture detainees. The IJ also found insufficient likelihood that the petitioner would be targeted for torture by gangs, mobs, or private individuals with government acquiescence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, and the petitioner timely sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.The First Circuit held that the BIA erred by failing to address the petitioner’s CAT claim regarding the risk of torture by low-level Haitian officials in detention facilities. The court vacated the BIA’s order and remanded for further consideration of this specific claim, instructing the BIA to properly distinguish between intent and purpose requirements for torture under CAT. The petition for review was otherwise denied, as the court found no error in the agency’s handling of other aspects of the CAT claim or in its evidentiary rulings. View "Fleurimond v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A naturalized U.S. citizen and his noncitizen son challenged the U.S. Secretary of State and the Consul General of the U.S. Consulate in Rio de Janeiro over the reclassification of a visa petition. The father, after becoming a lawful permanent resident, filed a Form I-130 petition for his son, who was under 21 at the time. The son turned 21 during the process, and the petition was approved when a visa in the F2A category was available. After the father naturalized, the consulate reclassified the petition into the F1 category for adult children of U.S. citizens, resulting in a lengthy wait for visa availability. The plaintiffs alleged that, under the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA), the son should still be considered under 21 for visa purposes, and the reclassification was unlawful.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the complaint, relying on the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, which generally bars judicial review of consular decisions regarding visa denials. The court did not address the merits of whether the reclassification was lawful under the CSPA.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability did not bar judicial review in this instance because the plaintiffs were challenging the reclassification of the visa petition, not a visa denial. The court then addressed the merits and concluded that, under the CSPA, the son’s statutory age should be calculated using the formula provided for F2A beneficiaries, which accounts for bureaucratic delays. Therefore, the son remained a “child” for visa purposes at the time of the father’s naturalization, and the reclassification to the F1 category was unlawful. The First Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Teles De Menezes v. Rubio" on Justia Law

Edwin Otero operated a violent drug trafficking organization across Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, distributing heroin and engaging in brutal acts to maintain control. In April 2019, suspecting a member of his group was cooperating with authorities, Otero orchestrated a kidnapping and assault in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, where the victim was beaten, stripped, and sexually exploited. Otero recorded the attack and boasted about it to others. A month later, he was involved in another violent incident, ordering a crew member to shoot a drug debtor. Otero was arrested in May 2019 after a DEA investigation uncovered his extensive criminal activities.Otero was charged in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts with multiple counts related to drug trafficking, kidnapping, firearms offenses, and obstruction of justice. He pleaded guilty to eight counts without a plea agreement. The presentence investigation report calculated a total offense level of 43, including a six-level enhancement for sexual exploitation during the kidnapping, resulting in a guideline range of life imprisonment. The district court sentenced Otero to 456 months’ imprisonment, with 336 months for most counts served concurrently and 120 months for a firearms count served consecutively. Otero objected to the sexual exploitation enhancement and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, preserving these issues for appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed Otero’s procedural and substantive challenges for abuse of discretion. The court held that the district court did not err in applying the sexual exploitation enhancement, finding sufficient evidence that Otero’s conduct met the relevant statutory definitions. The appellate court also found the sentence substantively reasonable, noting it fell within the guidelines and was supported by a plausible rationale. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Otero" on Justia Law

Brandon Velez was stopped by Manchester, New Hampshire police officers for vehicle equipment violations. After parking near his residence, Velez did not immediately comply with officers’ orders to exit his car. When he verbally refused and reached for his phone, officers attempted to physically remove him, leading to a struggle. During the altercation, one officer struck Velez multiple times and tased him twice. Velez was arrested and charged with misdemeanors and a traffic violation, ultimately pleading guilty only to the traffic violation. He later sued the officers and the City of Manchester, alleging wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, excessive force, assault and battery, and failure to train.The case was removed from state court to the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted, finding that the officers had probable cause for the arrest and that the force used was not excessive. Velez appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment order de novo. The appellate court held that the officers had probable cause to arrest Velez for resisting detention under New Hampshire law, defeating his wrongful arrest and false imprisonment claims. The court also found that, although one officer’s use of force was excessive under the Fourth Amendment, qualified immunity shielded the officer from liability because the law was not clearly established in the specific context. The court further held that Velez’s state-law assault and battery claim failed under the same immunity standard, and that his claims against the City for failure to train were unsupported by evidence of a municipal policy or deliberate indifference. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the defendants on all counts. View "Velez v. Eutzy" on Justia Law

Over a period of 35 years, the defendant operated a dogfighting enterprise known as Stone City Kennel, where he bred, trained, and sold dogs for fighting, mentored others in the practice, and participated in over 150 dogfights across the Americas and the Caribbean. He was known as a prominent figure in the dogfighting world. After admitting incriminating information to an undercover agent, he was indicted in the District of Puerto Rico for conspiracy to violate the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and for possession of dogs for use in animal fighting. A search of his property revealed four dogs in poor condition, leading to a superseding indictment with additional possession counts. He ultimately pleaded guilty to one conspiracy count and two possession counts.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico grouped the offenses and calculated a Sentencing Guidelines Range (GSR) of 12 to 18 months. However, the Presentence Investigation Report and the government argued for a much higher sentence, citing the exceptional scale and cruelty of the defendant’s conduct. At sentencing, the court heard expert testimony and considered the defendant’s extensive involvement, the cruelty involved, and the need for deterrence. The court imposed an 84-month sentence: 36 months for conspiracy and 24 months for each possession count, to be served consecutively, and described the sentence as an upward variance based on the statutory sentencing factors.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the defendant’s challenges, including claims of double jeopardy, inadequate explanation, and substantive unreasonableness. The court held that consecutive sentences for conspiracy and possession did not violate double jeopardy, that the statutory text allowed separate punishment for each dog possessed, and that the district court adequately explained and justified the upwardly variant sentence. The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Casillas-Montero" on Justia Law

Several individuals who had received grants of parole under programs established by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela challenged the government’s decision to terminate those grants. The parole programs, created during the Biden Administration, allowed eligible individuals from these countries to enter the United States temporarily for up to two years, based on urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit. When President Trump took office in January 2025, he issued executive orders directing DHS to end categorical parole programs, including the CHNV programs. DHS subsequently published a notice terminating the programs and revoking all existing grants of parole within thirty days, rather than allowing them to expire naturally.The plaintiffs, affected by the early termination, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district court certified a class of affected individuals and granted a preliminary stay, preventing DHS from revoking their parole grants before the original expiration dates. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the categorical termination was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), in part because the agency’s rationale rested on a legal error and failed to adequately consider reliance and humanitarian interests.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The First Circuit held that the relevant statute requires DHS to grant parole only on a case-by-case basis, but does not impose the same limitation on the termination of parole. The court also found that the agency’s explanation for terminating the parole programs was not so deficient as to be arbitrary and capricious under the APA. Concluding that the plaintiffs had not made a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits, the First Circuit vacated the district court’s stay and remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Noem" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was indicted by a Rhode Island grand jury, along with several co-defendants, on charges related to an alleged mortgage fraud conspiracy. He filed multiple motions to dismiss the charges in Rhode Island Superior Court, arguing that the indictment was tainted by prosecutorial misconduct and the presentation of misleading or missing evidence. After evidentiary hearings, a Magistrate denied his motions, and an Associate Justice of the Superior Court, on de novo review, adopted the Magistrate’s decision and added that the plaintiff had not shown sufficient prosecutorial misconduct to justify dismissal. The plaintiff did not appeal this ruling. Later, the charges against him were dismissed by the state as part of a plea agreement with a co-defendant.Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a malicious prosecution suit in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island against state law enforcement defendants. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that collateral estoppel barred the plaintiff from relitigating whether the indictment was procured by fraud or misconduct, since that issue had already been decided in state court. The plaintiff responded only that the issues were not identical, and did not contest the “final judgment” or “full and fair opportunity to litigate” elements of collateral estoppel.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiff had waived his arguments regarding the “final judgment” and “full and fair opportunity” elements by failing to raise them in the district court, and that no exceptional circumstances justified excusing this waiver. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, holding that collateral estoppel applied and barred the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim. Costs were awarded to the defendants. View "Shabshelowitz v. Rhode Island Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

In March 2025, the President issued an executive order directing federal officials to eliminate non-statutory functions and reduce statutory functions of three federal agencies: the Institute of Museum and Library Services (IMLS), the Minority Business Development Agency (MBDA), and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS). These agencies, established and funded by Congress, provide grants and services to states and other entities. Following the executive order, the agencies terminated, reassigned, or placed on leave nearly all employees and canceled numerous grants, which plaintiffs—twenty-one states—alleged caused immediate and ongoing harm, including loss of services, forced layoffs, and canceled programming.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs had suffered and would continue to suffer concrete injuries due to the agencies’ actions. The court determined that the agencies’ actions likely violated the Administrative Procedure Act and constitutional provisions, including the Take Care Clause and separation of powers. The injunction barred implementation of the executive order as to the three agencies, required reversal of actions taken to implement the order, restoration of employees, and resumption of grant funding, while allowing for efficiency measures not motivated by the executive order. The district court denied the government’s request for a stay of the injunction pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed only the government’s motion for a stay pending appeal. The court denied the stay, holding that the government failed to make a strong showing of likely success on the merits, particularly because it did not adequately challenge the district court’s constitutional analysis and had not preserved certain arguments. The court also found that the balance of harms and public interest did not favor a stay. View "Rhode Island v. Trump" on Justia Law

Melissa Allen experienced multiple seizures at home and was taken to Lowell General Hospital, where she was found to be seven months pregnant and suffering from severe hypertension. Dr. Fernando Roca, an obstetrician affiliated with Lowell Community Health Center (LCHC), determined an emergency caesarian section was necessary. After the procedure, Allen suffered a devastating neurological injury and died eleven days later at a Boston hospital. The cause of death was listed as intracranial hemorrhage and eclampsia.Brad O'Brien, as personal representative of Allen’s estate, initially filed a wrongful death medical malpractice suit in Massachusetts state court against Dr. Roca and the hospital. At the time of the incident, Dr. Roca was employed by LCHC, a federally funded health center deemed under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) to have federal employee status for certain purposes. The United States substituted itself as defendant and removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, which dismissed the suit as time-barred under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). On O'Brien’s first appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the substitution order due to reliance on the wrong statutory basis and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court again substituted the United States as defendant and dismissed the complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the Secretary’s regulation allowing for “pre-deeming” FTCA coverage in certain hospital on-call scenarios was consistent with the PHSA, and that Dr. Roca’s treatment of Allen fell within this coverage. The court also held that O’Brien’s claim was untimely under the FTCA’s statute of limitations and that the FTCA’s savings clause did not apply. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "O'Brien v. United States" on Justia Law

Robert Miller died at his home in Cape Cod in 2019 following an encounter with Barnstable police officers Sean Roycroft and Spencer Jackson. The officers responded to a 911 call from Miller’s girlfriend, who requested a psychiatric evaluation but did not report any crime. Upon arrival, a struggle ensued as the officers attempted to handcuff Miller, who ended up face-down on the floor with Roycroft’s arm pinned beneath him. During the struggle, Jackson delivered two punches to Miller in an effort to facilitate handcuffing. Miller’s girlfriend witnessed one of the officers drive a knee into Miller’s back and heard Miller say, “I can’t breathe” and “Amy, help me.” After Miller was handcuffed, he became unresponsive and was later pronounced dead. The medical examiner attributed the death to cardiac dysrhythmia in the setting of excited delirium, while the plaintiff’s expert opined that Miller died from prone restraint cardiac arrest due to pressure on his back.The plaintiff, Miller’s son, brought a federal excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the officers in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. After discovery, the officers moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district judge denied summary judgment, finding that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the officers used excessive force, particularly after Roycroft freed his arm and Miller was restrained. The judge concluded that clearly established law prohibited kneeling on a restrained person’s back and that a reasonable jury could find the officers’ conduct violated Miller’s constitutional rights.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the denial of qualified immunity for the officers’ conduct while Roycroft’s arm was pinned (Phase One), affirmed the denial for conduct after Miller was restrained and a knee was placed on his back (Phase Two), and dismissed the appeal in part for fact-based arguments not suitable for interlocutory review. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Miller v. Roycroft" on Justia Law