Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A petitioner, Kathya Roxana Duarte De Martinez, sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order affirming the denial of her application for cancellation of removal. Duarte argued that her removal would cause "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to her minor son, A.M., who has an intellectual disability. She claimed that A.M. would be deprived of educational services in El Salvador due to his inability to learn Spanish, which would severely impact his development and social functioning.An Immigration Judge (IJ) initially heard the case, finding Duarte and her husband credible but ultimately concluding that the hardship to A.M. and his brother did not meet the high statutory standard. The IJ noted that A.M. could attend a special education program in El Salvador, which was affordable for the family. Duarte appealed to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ's decision, stating that the availability of special education services in El Salvador, even if inferior, did not constitute exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. The BIA also noted that language barriers are common hardships and found no clear error in the IJ's findings.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA failed to consider A.M.'s specific circumstances, including his severe language impairment and the impact of his disabilities on his ability to learn Spanish. The court held that the agency did not undertake the required individualized inquiry into whether A.M. would be deprived of all schooling or an opportunity to obtain any education. The court granted the petition, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Duarte De Martinez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Pedro Martínez-Mercado, a former postmaster of the Sabana Grande Post Office in Puerto Rico, moved to New Jersey with a postal remittance bag containing over $11,000 in cash and money orders. He was convicted by a jury in the District of Puerto Rico for misappropriating postal funds and stealing or converting government property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1711 and 641. The district court sentenced him to six months in prison.Martínez appealed, arguing that the district court should have allowed him to present evidence showing his intent to return the funds, that the court gave an erroneous supplemental jury instruction, that the prosecutor made improper remarks during rebuttal, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Martínez waived his argument regarding the exclusion of evidence about his intent to repay by failing to object to the district court's in limine ruling and by not raising the issue under the plain error standard on appeal. The court also determined that Martínez waived his challenge to the supplemental jury instruction by explicitly agreeing to the revised instruction during trial.Regarding the prosecutor's remarks, the court acknowledged that the comment suggesting Martínez's defense was a common tactic used by defendants with no defense was improper. However, it concluded that the isolated remark did not affect the trial's fairness, given the strong evidence against Martínez and the district court's instructions to the jury.Finally, the court found that the evidence was sufficient to support Martínez's convictions. The evidence showed that Martínez knowingly and intentionally converted postal funds for his own use and deprived the United States of those funds, at least temporarily. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Martinez-Mercado" on Justia Law

In this case, a seaman, Magnus Aadland, filed a lawsuit in 2017 against Boat Santa Rita II, Inc. (BSR II) and related parties, alleging that he fell ill while working offshore in 2014 and was owed maintenance and cure, which were not provided. Aadland sought compensatory damages for unpaid maintenance and cure, emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorney's fees.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts initially ruled in favor of BSR II, finding that Aadland had reached maximum medical recovery (MMR) by the time of the trial in September 2020 and that BSR II had satisfied its duty of cure. The court also denied Aadland's claims for emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorney's fees.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the District Court's judgment, finding that the District Court had erred in its application of the law, particularly regarding the duty of cure and the applicability of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Gauthier v. Crosby Marine Service, Inc. The First Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings.On remand, the District Court ruled that Aadland had not reached MMR as of September 2020 and that BSR II owed cure in the amount of $605,338.07, which was the amount paid by Aadland's private insurer, Tufts. The court credited BSR II's $400,000 payment to Tufts and $238,374 in advances to Aadland against this amount, resulting in a credit for BSR II. The court again denied Aadland's claims for emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorney's fees.On further appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment regarding emotional distress damages but vacated the judgment regarding punitive damages and attorney's fees, finding that BSR II's breach of its duty of cure was willful. The case was remanded for the District Court to determine whether punitive damages and attorney's fees should be awarded. The First Circuit also affirmed the District Court's finding that Aadland had not reached MMR as of September 2020 and the setoff amount for BSR II's payment to Tufts. View "Aadland v. Boat Santa Rita II, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC; MSPA Claims 1, LLC; and Series PMPI filed a lawsuit in September 2018 against Fresenius Medical Care Holdings and related entities, alleging negligence, product liability, and design defect claims related to the GranuFlo product used in hemodialysis treatments. The claims arose from a 2012 public memorandum by Fresenius that GranuFlo could lead to cardiopulmonary arrest. The plaintiffs argued that the statute of limitations was tolled by a putative class action filed in 2013 (the Berzas action) in the Eastern District of Louisiana, which was later transferred to the District of Massachusetts as part of multidistrict litigation (MDL).The District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the plaintiffs' claims as time-barred, concluding that the Berzas action ceased to be a class action by June 2014 when the named plaintiffs filed Short Form Complaints or stipulations of dismissal, which did not include class allegations. The court also noted that the Berzas plaintiffs did not pursue class certification actively, and the case was administratively closed in April 2019.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The First Circuit held that the Berzas action lost its class action status by June 2014, and any tolling under American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah ended at that time. The court reasoned that allowing indefinite tolling based on an inactive class certification request would contravene the principles of efficiency and economy in litigation. Therefore, the plaintiffs' 2018 complaint was untimely, and the district court's dismissal was upheld. View "MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Kenneth Pontz was convicted by a jury of violating a federal embezzlement statute, 18 U.S.C. § 641, by misrepresenting his financial situation to obtain public benefits over an eight-year period. The government presented evidence that Pontz had received Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits by falsely claiming he lived alone, while he actually lived with his wife, who received Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits. Pontz's misrepresentations allegedly began in 2004 and continued until 2020.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied Pontz's motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that the statute of limitations barred charges for conduct occurring before June 16, 2017. The district court ruled that § 641 embezzlement was a "continuing offense," allowing the government to charge Pontz for conduct dating back to 2014. At trial, the court admitted testimony from an SSA employee, Luis Aguayo, as lay opinion under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, despite Pontz's objections that it was based on technical knowledge requiring expert testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and held that § 641 embezzlement is not a continuing offense under the standard established in Toussie v. United States. The court found that the nature of embezzlement does not involve a renewed, daily threat of harm once the elements of the crime are complete. Consequently, the government could not charge Pontz for embezzlement occurring more than five years before his indictment. The court vacated the restitution and forfeiture orders and remanded to the district court to determine the appropriate remedy for the statute-of-limitations error. The court upheld the district court's evidentiary rulings regarding Aguayo's testimony. View "United States v. Pontz" on Justia Law

The case involves Lecy Frederico Rosa, his wife Maristela Gomes-De Souza Frederico, and their minor child, M.E.F., who entered the United States without inspection near El Paso, Texas, on January 27, 2022. They were apprehended by Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) agents and placed in removal proceedings with notices to appear (NTAs) dated February 3, 2022. The NTAs alleged that the petitioners were citizens of Brazil and charged them with being removable as aliens present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled. The petitioners denied these charges.An immigration judge (IJ) ordered the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to submit evidence of the petitioners' alienage. DHS provided "EARM Summaries" for each petitioner, which included information such as names, dates of birth, physical descriptions, and encounters with CBP. The petitioners moved to terminate their removal proceedings, arguing that the EARM Summaries were insufficient and unreliable evidence of alienage. The IJ denied the motion, finding that DHS had established alienage by "clear and convincing" evidence, and ordered the removal of all three petitioners. The petitioners appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that the correct standard of proof was "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence." The BIA rejected this argument, concluding that the two standards were identical and that the EARM Summaries met the required standard.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the BIA applied an incorrect standard of proof. The court held that "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence" is a more demanding standard than "clear and convincing evidence." Consequently, the court vacated the BIA's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the correct standard of proof. View "Rosa v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Dr. Susan O'Horo, an interventional radiologist and Director of Quality and Safety at Boston Medical Center Corporation (BMC), alleged that she faced discriminatory and retaliatory actions at her workplace. She claimed that her efforts to report safety concerns, particularly regarding a colleague, Dr. Mikhail Higgins, were met with hostility and that she was ultimately forced to resign due to the intolerable work environment.In the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Dr. O'Horo filed claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 151B, and the Massachusetts Health Care Whistleblower Act (MHCWA). The defendants, including BMC, Boston University Medical Center Radiologists, Inc. (BUMCR), and Dr. Jorge Soto, moved for summary judgment. The magistrate judge recommended granting the motion, and the district court adopted this recommendation, dismissing all of Dr. O'Horo's claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Dr. O'Horo failed to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination or retaliation. The court found that the alleged adverse actions, such as the reassignment of her duties and the scheduling of reviews, did not constitute materially adverse employment actions. Additionally, the court concluded that the hostile work environment claim was insufficient as the workplace was not objectively hostile or abusive. The aiding and abetting claim under Chapter 151B was dismissed as it was derivative of the failed discrimination claims. Lastly, the court held that Dr. O'Horo did not establish a prima facie case under the MHCWA, as she failed to show that the actions taken against her were retaliatory. View "O'Horo v. Boston Medical Center Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge by eighteen states and other plaintiffs against the enforcement of Executive Order No. 14,160, which limits the recognition of U.S. citizenship for certain individuals born in the United States. The Executive Order specifies that individuals born to mothers unlawfully present in the U.S. or temporarily present mothers, where the father is not a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident, will not be recognized as U.S. citizens. The plaintiffs argue that this order violates the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1401.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted a preliminary injunction preventing the enforcement of the Executive Order. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, and that the balance of harms and public interest favored the injunction. The court issued a "universal" preliminary injunction, applying nationwide, to prevent the enforcement of the Executive Order.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the government's motion for a stay pending appeal of the preliminary injunction. The court denied the stay, concluding that the government failed to make a "strong showing" that it was likely to succeed on the merits of its appeal, particularly regarding the plaintiffs' standing and the lawfulness of the Executive Order. The court also found that the government did not meet its burden on the other factors required for a stay, including irreparable harm and public interest. The court upheld the nationwide scope of the preliminary injunction, noting that the government did not adequately address the necessity of such broad relief to prevent harm to the plaintiffs. View "State of New Jersey v. Trump" on Justia Law

Vicor Corporation supplied power converter modules to Foxconn for years. Vicor alleged that Foxconn switched to manufacturing and importing knock-off modules that infringed Vicor's patents. In July 2023, Vicor filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission (ITC) alleging patent infringement by Foxconn. Simultaneously, Vicor sued Foxconn for patent infringement in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, which stayed the case pending the ITC's resolution. Foxconn then initiated arbitration in China, claiming Vicor had agreed to arbitrate disputes based on terms in purchase orders. Vicor filed a new lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, seeking to enjoin the arbitration and declare it was not bound by the arbitration or license terms.The district court granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) and later a preliminary injunction against the arbitration, despite Foxconn's request for a stay under 28 U.S.C. § 1659. The court acknowledged that Section 1659 applied but concluded it could still grant preliminary relief based on the All Writs Act and its inherent authority to preserve its jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that Section 1659 required the district court to stay proceedings because Vicor's claims involved issues also present in the ITC proceeding. The appellate court held that the district court erred in granting the preliminary injunction despite Foxconn's request for a stay. Consequently, the First Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Vicor Corp. v. FII USA Inc." on Justia Law

Ángel Forteza-García appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j), which criminalizes causing death through the use of a firearm during a crime of violence. Forteza based his petition on United States v. Davis, which held part of the definition of a "crime of violence" in § 924(c) unconstitutionally vague. He argued that his predicate conviction under § 2114(a) did not qualify as a "crime of violence" post-Davis, rendering his § 924(j) conviction unconstitutional.The District Court for the District of Puerto Rico denied Forteza's petition, ruling that his § 2114(a) offense did have the use of force as an element, thus qualifying as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A). The court also noted that any argument about Forteza being an accomplice rather than a principal was foreclosed by precedent. The court denied Forteza a certificate of appealability (COA) on his claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that Forteza's predicate § 2114(a) offense, which involved wounding the victim and placing his life in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon, qualified as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A). The court rejected Forteza's argument that his conviction as an aider and abettor did not meet the force clause requirement, citing binding precedent. The court concluded that the aggravated form of the § 2114(a) offense, as charged, supported Forteza's § 924(j) conviction. View "Forteza-Garcia v. United States" on Justia Law