Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves Edgar Reyes-Colón, who was subjected to an involuntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition filed by Banco Popular de Puerto Rico in 2006. The bankruptcy court dismissed the petition in 2016, finding that Banco Popular failed to join the requisite number of creditors. Reyes-Colón subsequently filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs under 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(1) and initiated an adversary proceeding alleging bad faith under 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(2).The bankruptcy court denied Reyes-Colón's motion for attorney's fees, ruling it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction as the motion was filed after the case was closed. Reyes-Colón appealed to the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, which affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, adding that the motion was untimely under local rules requiring such motions to be filed within fourteen days after the issuance of the mandate. Reyes-Colón then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.The First Circuit held that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over post-dismissal § 303(i) motions, as such motions necessarily require post-dismissal jurisdiction. However, the court affirmed the denial of the attorney's fees motion on the grounds that it was untimely, as it was filed 365 days after the mandate issued, far exceeding the fourteen-day limit set by local rules.Regarding the adversary proceeding, Reyes-Colón filed a motion for withdrawal of reference to have the district court adjudicate the case. The district court denied the motion as untimely, conflating the timeliness of the motion for withdrawal with the timeliness of the § 303(i) motion. The First Circuit vacated this decision, clarifying that the timeliness of the motion for withdrawal should be measured from the filing of the adversary proceeding, not the dismissal of the involuntary petition. The case was remanded for further consideration of whether there is cause to withdraw the reference. View "Reyes-Colon v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico" on Justia Law

Eric Cohen, experiencing a psychotic episode, attacked his girlfriend and fled into the cold waters of Portland's Back Cove, where he eventually drowned from hypothermia. His estate sued the City of Portland and several members of its police and fire departments, alleging violations of Cohen's substantive due process rights due to a failure to rescue him from a state-created danger and inadequate crisis intervention training.The United States District Court for the District of Maine dismissed the state-created danger claims against two police officers, Sergeants Christopher Gervais and Michael Rand, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court found that the officers' actions did not create or enhance the danger to Cohen. After discovery, the court granted summary judgment to a firefighter, Ronald Giroux, and the City of Portland. The court concluded that Giroux's actions did not cause Cohen's death and that the City could not be held liable for failure to train its employees since no individual defendant was found to have violated Cohen's constitutional rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's rulings. The appellate court held that neither Gervais nor Rand's actions constituted an affirmative act that created or enhanced the danger to Cohen. The court also found that Giroux's threat did not factually or legally cause Cohen's death. Finally, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the City of Portland, as there was no predicate constitutional violation by any individual defendant to support a failure-to-train claim. View "Cohen v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

The Acting Secretary of Labor filed a lawsuit against F.W. Webb Company, alleging that the company misclassified its Inside Sales Representatives (ISRs) as exempt administrative employees, thereby violating the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) overtime and recordkeeping requirements. Webb, a wholesale distributor of engineering and construction products, employed over 600 ISRs who were responsible for selling products to various customers. The ISRs were classified as exempt from FLSA overtime requirements, despite some working over forty hours a week without receiving overtime pay. The ISRs' duties included interacting with customers, providing quotes, and managing orders, but they did not have managerial responsibilities over other employees.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, finding that the ISRs' primary duty was to make sales, which is directly related to Webb's core business purpose of selling products. The court concluded that the ISRs did not qualify for the administrative exemption under the FLSA because their primary duty was not related to the management or general business operations of Webb. Consequently, the court found that Webb violated the FLSA by failing to pay overtime and maintain proper records for the ISRs.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the ISRs' primary duty was to sell Webb's products, which is directly related to the company's business purpose. The court held that the ISRs did not perform work directly related to the management or general business operations of Webb, and thus, did not qualify for the administrative exemption under the FLSA. The court emphasized that the ISRs' customer service and advisory roles were part of their sales duties and not separate administrative functions. View "Su v. F.W. Webb Company" on Justia Law

Jayne Carbone was convicted of stealing hundreds of thousands of dollars from her elderly uncle, Wayne Kerr, who suffered from Parkinson's disease and cancer. Carbone had access to Kerr's finances as his personal assistant and used this access to transfer funds from his accounts to herself. She was found guilty on all counts after a five-day jury trial in October 2021.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied Carbone's motions to continue the testimonies of two key government witnesses, including Kerr, whose deposition was taken before trial due to his declining health. Carbone argued that the short notice for the deposition did not give her counsel adequate time to prepare. The court also admitted the testimonies of these witnesses over Carbone's objections.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and found Carbone's claims meritless. The court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance motions or in admitting the testimonies. The appellate court noted that Carbone failed to demonstrate specific, concrete ways in which the denial of the continuance resulted in substantial prejudice to her defense. The court also found that the District Court did not err in admitting Kerr's deposition testimony without a competency hearing, as the evidence showed Kerr was competent at the time of his deposition. Additionally, the court ruled that the government's late disclosure of witness Christine Brown's testimony was reasonable under the circumstances and that her testimony was specially relevant to establish Carbone's motive for the theft. The appellate court affirmed Carbone's convictions. View "United States v. Carbone" on Justia Law

The case involves BioPoint, Inc., a life sciences consulting firm, which accused Catapult Staffing, LLC, and Andrew Dickhaut of misappropriating trade secrets, confidential business information, and engaging in unfair trade practices. BioPoint alleged that Catapult, with the help of Dickhaut and Leah Attis (a former BioPoint employee and Dickhaut's fiancée), used BioPoint's proprietary information to recruit candidates and secure business from BioPoint's clients, including Vedanta and Shire/Takeda.The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts handled the initial proceedings. The jury found Catapult liable for misappropriating BioPoint's trade secrets concerning three candidates and two clients, and for tortious interference with BioPoint's business relationship with one candidate. The jury awarded BioPoint $312,000 in lost profits. The judge, in a subsequent bench trial, found Catapult liable for unjust enrichment and violations of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Law (chapter 93A), awarding BioPoint $5,061,444 in damages, which included treble damages for willful and knowing conduct, as well as costs and attorneys' fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court largely affirmed the lower court's findings but reduced the judge's award by $157,068, as it found that BioPoint could not recover both lost profits and unjust enrichment for the same placement. The court also reversed the district court's imposition of joint-and-several liability on Andrew Dickhaut, ruling that he could not be held liable for profits he did not receive. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine Dickhaut's individual liability. View "BioPoint, Inc. v. Dickhaut" on Justia Law

Michel D'Angelo, also known as Karma, appealed the denial of his motion for compassionate release. D'Angelo had been convicted of robbing Kennebunk Savings Bank in Berwick, Maine, in 2012. Disguised and armed with a screwdriver, he threatened to detonate a bomb if the teller set off the alarm, stealing $1,298. His girlfriend, Jennica, assisted by making false 911 calls. D'Angelo pleaded guilty to bank robbery in 2014 and was sentenced to 180 months in prison, designated as a "career offender" due to his extensive criminal history and mental health issues.The U.S. District Court for the District of Maine sentenced D'Angelo, considering his criminal history and mental health problems. His sentence was affirmed on appeal, and subsequent motions, including a motion to vacate his sentence, were denied. D'Angelo later filed for compassionate release, arguing that his sentence would be lower if recalculated under the Supreme Court's decision in Borden v. United States, which affected the classification of his prior offenses. He also cited his mental health issues and poor medical treatment in prison as extraordinary and compelling reasons for release. The district court denied his motion, emphasizing his potential dangerousness and the need to protect the public.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion based on the § 3553(a) factors. The appellate court found that the district court properly considered D'Angelo's criminal history, offense conduct, and potential danger to the community. The court also noted that the district court had acknowledged D'Angelo's revised Guidelines range but found that the § 3553(a) factors did not favor reducing his sentence. View "United States v. D'Angelo" on Justia Law

D'Pergo Custom Guitars, Inc. sued Sweetwater Sound, Inc. for using a photo of D'Pergo's guitar necks on Sweetwater's website. D'Pergo claimed copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, and a violation of the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The district court granted summary judgment to Sweetwater on the trademark claim and to D'Pergo on the copyright claim. A bench trial found in favor of Sweetwater on the CPA claim, and a jury awarded D'Pergo approximately $75,000 in compensatory damages for the copyright claim but did not award any of Sweetwater's profits.D'Pergo appealed the district court's summary judgment on the trademark claim and the bench trial ruling on the CPA claim. D'Pergo also argued that erroneous jury instructions warranted a reversal of the jury's finding that it was not entitled to recover any of Sweetwater's profits. Sweetwater cross-appealed, challenging the copyright damages based on what it claimed was inadmissible expert testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling in favor of Sweetwater on the CPA claim, finding that Sweetwater did not act with the intent required for a CPA violation. However, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Sweetwater on the trademark claim, concluding that D'Pergo's evidence created a genuine issue of fact regarding the trademark's secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion.The court also remanded for a new jury trial on the issue of infringing profits for the copyright claim, finding that the district court's jury instruction on the burden of proof for infringing profits overstated D'Pergo's burden. The court affirmed the district court's refusal to give D'Pergo's proposed "commingling" instruction and upheld the actual damages awarded to D'Pergo, rejecting Sweetwater's challenge to the admissibility of the expert testimony. View "D'Pergo Custom Guitars, Inc. v. Sweetwater Sound, Inc." on Justia Law

An Indonesian national, Jani, sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision affirming an Immigration Judge's (IJ) order that found him ineligible for asylum due to his past provision of material support to a foreign terrorist organization. Jani argued that the agency violated his constitutional due process rights and its own regulations in making this determination.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against Jani in 2003 for overstaying his visa. Jani conceded removability but applied for asylum, claiming persecution as an ethnically Chinese Indonesian. During his asylum application process, Jani admitted to joining Jemaah Islamiya, a terrorist organization, and identifying targets for extortion. The IJ initially granted Jani derivative asylum status based on his wife's successful asylum claim. However, DHS appealed, arguing Jani's ineligibility due to his terrorist affiliations. The BIA remanded the case for further proceedings due to an incomplete transcript of the initial hearing. Subsequent hearings reaffirmed Jani's admissions, leading the IJ to deny asylum and order his removal. The BIA dismissed Jani's appeal, supporting the IJ's findings and rejecting Jani's procedural claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found no due process violation in the IJ and BIA's reliance on the defective 2006 hearing transcript, noting that Jani had ample opportunity to present his case and that the transcript was used appropriately for impeachment. The court also rejected Jani's claim that his derivative asylum status was final, noting that DHS had properly reserved its right to appeal his claim, making the IJ's decision non-final. Consequently, the court denied Jani's petition for review. View "Jani v. Garland" on Justia Law

Michele Tourangeau filed a complaint against her former employer, Nappi Distributors, alleging nine employment-related claims. Nappi moved for summary judgment on all claims, but the District Court denied the motion for all but one claim, leading to a jury trial. The jury found in favor of Nappi on all claims. Tourangeau then filed a motion for a new trial, citing juror bias and errors in jury instructions, which the District Court denied.Tourangeau appealed the District Court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. She argued that the District Court erred in not disqualifying a juror who allegedly displayed bias and failed to answer voir dire questions truthfully. The District Court had previously determined that the juror's conduct and Facebook activity did not demonstrate bias sufficient to warrant disqualification. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the District Court's handling of the juror bias allegations, noting that the District Court had appropriately assessed the juror's behavior and responses.Tourangeau also challenged the jury's verdict on one of her Equal Pay Act (EPA) claims, arguing that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence and that the District Court erred in not giving a specific jury instruction. The appellate court upheld the District Court's decision, finding that Nappi had provided sufficient evidence that the pay differential was based on a business decision unrelated to sex. The court also agreed with the District Court's refusal to give the requested jury instruction, as there was no evidence of a prior illegal practice of gender discrimination in hiring.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment, concluding that there was no reversible error in the handling of the juror bias allegations or the EPA claim. View "Tourangeau v. Nappi Distributors" on Justia Law

Southbridge RE, LLC (Southbridge) executed promissory notes and secured mortgages for two properties in Massachusetts with LendingHome, which later assigned the mortgages to Christiana Trust. However, LendingHome had previously issued blank assignments of the same mortgages to Toorak Capital Partners as security for a private funding agreement. Toorak filled in its name and recorded the assignments after Southbridge defaulted on the mortgages. Christiana Trust conducted foreclosure sales on both properties, which Southbridge contested, arguing that the blank assignments to Toorak broke the chain of title, rendering the foreclosures invalid.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found that the blank assignments to Toorak were void under Massachusetts law and granted summary judgment in favor of Christiana Trust, declaring it had the authority to conduct the foreclosure sales. The court denied Southbridge's motion for summary judgment and defendants' cross-claims for slander of title, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel. Southbridge appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that under Massachusetts law, assignments in blank are void and convey no interest. The court found that Toorak's filling in its name on the blank assignments did not validate them, as Toorak lacked authorization from LendingHome. The court also determined that post-foreclosure affidavits confirming the invalidity of the Toorak assignments were proper and did not contravene state law. Additionally, the court ruled that the foreclosure sale notices did not need to reference the void Toorak assignments, as they were not part of the chain of title. Thus, the foreclosure sales conducted by Christiana Trust were valid. View "Southbridge RE, LLC v. Kiavi Funding, Inc." on Justia Law