Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Joyce Toth purchased a Food Sensitivity Test from Target's website and followed the instructions to create an account on Everlywell's website, where she clicked a checkbox indicating that she had read and accepted the terms and conditions. These terms included an arbitration agreement. Toth later received test results that she found confusing and inaccurate, leading her to file a putative class action against Everlywell, alleging deceptive marketing and misuse of personal medical information.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted Everlywell's motion to compel arbitration, holding that Toth had formed a valid "clickwrap" contract by clicking the checkbox. The court found that Everlywell provided reasonable notice of the terms and secured Toth's assent. It also rejected Toth's arguments that the contract lacked consideration, that Everlywell did not provide reasonable notice, and that the contract was illusory or unconscionable.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Toth had received reasonable notice of the terms and had meaningfully assented to them by clicking the checkbox. The court also found that the arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable, noting that the User Agreement incorporated the AAA rules, which delegate issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator. Toth's arguments regarding the unilateral-modification clauses and the alleged unconscionability of the arbitration agreement were deemed insufficient to invalidate the delegation provision. Thus, the court concluded that the arbitration agreement was enforceable, and Toth's claims must be resolved through arbitration. View "Toth v. Everly Well, Inc." on Justia Law

José Santana De la Rosa and José Algarín Pabón filed a lawsuit against Edwin Santana De la Rosa, alleging abuse of process under Puerto Rico law. They claimed that Edwin, who had sued them in Puerto Rico over financial dealings, had changed his domicile to New York after Hurricane Maria in 2017, thus establishing diversity jurisdiction for their federal case. Edwin moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting he was still domiciled in Puerto Rico. The district court ordered jurisdictional discovery, which revealed Edwin's significant ties to both Puerto Rico and New York.The U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico found that although Edwin spent considerable time in New York after the hurricane, José and Algarín failed to prove that Edwin intended to remain there indefinitely. The court noted Edwin's continued ties to Puerto Rico, including his Puerto Rico address on tax returns, a Puerto Rico driver's license, and voter registration. Consequently, the district court granted Edwin's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not clearly err in its determination that Edwin did not intend to change his domicile to New York. The court emphasized that Edwin's continued ties to Puerto Rico, such as his tax filings, driver's license, and voter registration, supported the district court's conclusion. The appellate court also declined José and Algarín's request for an evidentiary hearing, noting that they had not timely requested it during the lower court proceedings. View "Santana de la Rosa v. Santana de la Rosa" on Justia Law

Ken Johansen filed a lawsuit against Liberty Mutual, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). Liberty Mutual had contracted with Digitas, Inc. for marketing services, which included ensuring compliance with legal requirements. Johansen's complaint stemmed from telemarketing calls he received, which were traced back to Spanish Quotes, a subcontractor of Digitas. Liberty Mutual sought indemnification from Digitas under their Master Services Agreement (MSA), which included a warranty and indemnification clause.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts reviewed the case and found that Digitas had breached its contractual duty to indemnify Liberty Mutual. The court partially granted Liberty Mutual's motion for summary judgment, determining that Digitas had violated its warranty by allowing telemarketing practices that led to Johansen's complaint. The court also found that Liberty Mutual had met the preconditions for triggering Digitas's indemnity obligation. However, the court did not determine the damages and closed the case, leading Digitas to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that Digitas breached its warranty and that Liberty Mutual satisfied the preconditions for indemnification. The appellate court concluded that the MSA did not require a finding of actual liability for the indemnity obligation to be triggered. The court also found that Liberty Mutual had provided Digitas with the opportunity to control the defense, which Digitas did not properly assume. The case was remanded for further proceedings to address any remaining issues, including the determination of damages. View "Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Digitas, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves James Harper, who challenged an IRS "John Doe" summons issued to Coinbase, a cryptocurrency exchange, seeking records of numerous customers, including Harper. Harper argued that the IRS's actions violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights and did not meet statutory requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The IRS had issued the summons to investigate potential tax noncompliance among Coinbase users.The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire dismissed Harper's complaint. The court found that Harper lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his Coinbase account information and that the records were Coinbase's property, not Harper's. The court also concluded that the IRS summons was reasonable and that Harper had received constitutionally adequate process. Additionally, the court dismissed Harper's statutory challenge, ruling it was an improper collateral attack on prior district court proceedings that had enforced the summons and found it met statutory standards.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Harper lacked a protectable interest under the Fourth or Fifth Amendment. It held that Harper had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information he voluntarily provided to Coinbase and that the records were Coinbase's property. The court also found that Harper's due process claim failed because he had no protected liberty interest in the confidentiality of his financial information. Finally, the court ruled that the IRS summons was not "final agency action" under the APA, thus not subject to judicial review.The First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Harper's complaint, concluding that Harper's constitutional and statutory claims were without merit. View "Harper v. Werfel" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of coercion and enticement of a minor. The plea agreement included a joint recommendation for a 120-month sentence, which is the statutory minimum, despite the calculated Guidelines sentencing range being significantly higher. The government did not provide an explanation for this recommendation at the sentencing hearing. The district court sentenced the defendant to 292 months in prison, imposed a condition of supervised release prohibiting unsupervised contact with any minor, including his children, and ordered a special assessment and restitution.The defendant appealed, arguing that the government breached the plea agreement by not adequately supporting the recommended sentence and that the sentence and conditions imposed were unreasonable. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed that the government breached the plea agreement by failing to provide a minimal explanation for the recommended sentence, which was necessary given the significant downward variance from the Guidelines range. However, the court concluded that this breach did not constitute plain error and affirmed the length of the sentence as reasonable.The court also upheld the restriction on the defendant's unsupervised contact with his children, finding it reasonably related to the nature of the offense and necessary to protect the community and minors. However, the court vacated the special assessment and restitution orders, remanding these issues to the district court for further consideration. The special assessment was vacated because the district court did not make a finding regarding the defendant's indigency, and the restitution order was vacated because the district court did not find that the victim's mother was a victim within the statutory definition. View "United States v. Acevedo-Osorio" on Justia Law

In February 2013, a correctional officer named Osvaldo Albarati was murdered while driving home from the federal prison where he worked. Oscar Martínez-Hernández, an inmate at the prison, was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for orchestrating the murder. The prosecution argued that Martínez-Hernández, along with another inmate, planned the killing in retaliation for Albarati's efforts to confiscate contraband, including cellphones, from inmates. The defense contended that the evidence was insufficient and that the government had manipulated evidence and allowed false testimony.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico oversaw the trial, which lasted twelve days and included testimony from twenty government witnesses. The defense presented two witnesses. The jury found Martínez-Hernández guilty on all counts, including aiding and abetting the murder of a federal officer, conspiracy to commit murder, murder for hire, and related firearms charges. The defense's motion for a new trial, based on the late disclosure of a prison logbook and other alleged errors, was denied by the district court.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The court also concluded that the late disclosure of the prison logbook did not warrant a new trial, as the logbook's contents did not significantly undermine the overwhelming evidence of Martínez-Hernández's guilt. The court rejected the defense's claims of prosecutorial misconduct and improper admission of hearsay statements, finding no abuse of discretion by the district court. The court affirmed Martínez-Hernández's conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial. View "United States v. Martinez-Hernandez" on Justia Law

Joseph Segrain, an inmate at Rhode Island's Adult Correctional Institutions, filed a civil lawsuit against the Rhode Island Department of Corrections and several correctional officers, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights and various state laws. Segrain claimed that on June 28, 2018, officers used excessive force by executing a leg-sweep maneuver, spraying him with pepper spray, and delaying his decontamination. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers on all claims, leading Segrain to appeal.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island initially reviewed the case. The court found that no reasonable jury could conclude that the officers' conduct constituted an Eighth Amendment violation. It granted summary judgment on the basis that the force used was minimal and necessary to maintain order. The court also dismissed the state law claims, concluding that the officers' actions did not meet the legal standards for battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or excessive force under Rhode Island law.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's judgment regarding the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that Officer Walter Duffy's use of pepper spray violated Segrain's Eighth Amendment rights. It found that a reasonable jury could conclude that Duffy's use of pepper spray was excessive and not in good faith. The court vacated the district court's judgment on the Rhode Island Constitution Article I, Section 8 claim regarding Duffy's use of pepper spray and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the district court's judgment on all other claims, including the leg-sweep maneuver and the delayed decontamination, granting qualified immunity to the officers on those issues. View "Segrain v. Duffy" on Justia Law

A patron at Encore Boston Harbor Casino challenged the casino's practice of redeeming slot-machine tickets. When patrons finish using a slot machine, they receive a TITO ticket, which can be redeemed for cash. The casino offers two redemption options: cashier cages, which provide full cash value, and self-serve kiosks (TRUs), which dispense only bills and issue a TRU ticket for any remaining cents. The TRU ticket can be redeemed at the cashier cage or used in another slot machine. The plaintiff argued that this practice was unfair and deceptive, violating Massachusetts regulations and consumer protection laws.The case was initially filed in Massachusetts state court and then removed to federal court. The district court dismissed the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim, ruling that an adequate legal remedy was available under Chapter 93A. The court later granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the remaining claims, including breach of contract, promissory estoppel, conversion, and unfair and deceptive business practices. The court found that the casino's practice did not violate its internal controls or Massachusetts regulations and that the plaintiff failed to show the practice was unfair or deceptive.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim, agreeing that Chapter 93A provided an adequate legal remedy. The court also upheld the summary judgment on the remaining claims, concluding that the casino's practice of issuing TRU tickets for cents did not violate regulations or constitute unfair or deceptive practices. The court found no evidence that the practice was immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous, and ruled that the plaintiff's common law claims also failed. View "Schuster v. Wynn Resorts Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner, a state prisoner, challenged the dismissal of his federal habeas petition, which alleged violations of his constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The petitioner, along with two accomplices, planned and executed a robbery that resulted in the murder of a pizza delivery driver. The petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and breaking and entering, and was sentenced to life in prison without parole.The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed the petitioner's conviction, rejecting his claims of insufficient evidence, improper admission of redacted statements from a co-defendant, and errors in jury instructions. The SJC found that the evidence was sufficient to support the petitioner's conviction under theories of felony-murder and extreme atrocity or cruelty. It also held that the redacted statements did not violate the petitioner's Confrontation Clause rights and that the trial court's jury instructions were appropriate.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of the habeas petition de novo. The court applied the standards set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which requires deference to state court decisions unless they are contrary to or involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or are based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.The First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the SJC's rulings were not unreasonable. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the petitioner's conviction, the redacted statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause, and the jury instructions were proper. The court also concluded that any errors in the trial court's rulings were harmless and did not prejudice the petitioner. View "St. Jean v. Marchilli" on Justia Law

Alain Glody Cirhuza Badose, a national of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, entered the United States in 2014 on a student visa. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming danger due to his political opinion. In 2019, an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied his claims based on an adverse credibility determination and insufficient nexus between the harm described and a protected ground. While his appeal was pending, Badose married a U.S. citizen and sought to remand his case to the IJ for adjustment of status based on the marriage. The government did not oppose the motion.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied the remand request and affirmed the IJ's removal order, citing Badose's lack of candor and history of lying to immigration officials. The BIA suggested that Badose's marriage was a sham, given its timing after the IJ's denial. Badose argued that the BIA arbitrarily departed from its consistent practice of granting unopposed remand requests and engaged in impermissible factfinding regarding his marriage.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA had indeed arbitrarily departed from its established practice of granting unopposed remand requests and engaged in impermissible factfinding by suggesting Badose's marriage was a sham. The court held that the BIA's actions were an abuse of discretion and vacated the BIA's decision. The court granted Badose's petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA with instructions to remand to the IJ for consideration of Badose's adjustment of status application. View "Badose v. Garland" on Justia Law