Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a review petition filed by Mariela Gricelda Chun Mendez and her minor son, natives and citizens of Guatemala. They sought review of the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which upheld the Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The petitioners had fled Guatemala due to violence between their village and the neighboring municipality over land and water rights.The BIA had affirmed the IJ's findings that Chun Mendez did not establish extraordinary circumstances to excuse the late filing of her asylum application and that she did not demonstrate membership in the particular social group (PSG) she had defined for the agency. The court, after a careful review of the case, denied the petition.Chun Mendez claimed she was a member of the PSG of "communal landowners of Ixchiguán, Guatemala that refused to cooperate with criminal gangs." However, she conceded that she did not communally own the land. The court agreed with the government that Chun Mendez failed to exhaust her claim of imputed membership in the PSG before the BIA.Additionally, Chun Mendez alleged that the IJ and BIA failed to meaningfully assess her asylum and withholding of removal claims based on her race as an indigenous woman of Mam descent. However, the court found these race-based claims unexhausted, as Chun Mendez did not raise any race-based claim before the BIA. Consequently, the court denied the petition for review. View "Chun Mendez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The defendant, Roy Sastrom, was serving a term of supervised release, a condition of which was modified by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The court directed Sastrom, upon his release from federal custody, to report directly to a psychiatric hospital in Connecticut, as per his civil commitment order. This case was later transferred to the District of Connecticut. Sastrom appealed, arguing the Massachusetts district court abused its discretion by modifying his supervised release conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit determined that despite the transfer, it retained jurisdiction to review the pre-transfer order. However, the court recognized that Sastrom's case had already proceeded in Connecticut and that the Massachusetts court no longer had authority over his supervised release. Consequently, the court asserted it could not simply remand the case for reassessment of the supervised release conditions.The court concluded that although it had the power to grant relief, the controversy was so attenuated that considerations of prudence and comity for coordinate branches of government counseled the court to withhold relief. The only possible remedy would require significant judicial resources and provide only a remote benefit to Sastrom. Therefore, the court declined to grant this remedy and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "United States v. Sastrom" on Justia Law

A Puerto Rican company, Caribe Chem, filed a lawsuit against a Florida company, Southern Agricultural Insecticides, and two Puerto Rican entities. The case was initially non-removable to federal court due to lack of complete diversity among parties. After the Puerto Rican defendants were dismissed from the lawsuit based on the statute of limitations, Southern attempted to remove the case to federal court, citing now-complete diversity of parties. Caribe objected, and the district court ruled in Caribe's favor, ordering the case to be remanded to Commonwealth court. Southern appealed the remand order.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's remand order. The court adopted the voluntary/involuntary rule, which states that a lawsuit initially lacking complete diversity can acquire it when all non-diverse parties are dismissed from the action. However, if the non-diverse defendants are dismissed without the plaintiff's acquiescence, the lawsuit is generally not removable. The court ruled that the dismissal of the non-diverse defendants was involuntary since it was over Caribe's objections. The court also stated that the plaintiff's decision not to appeal the dismissal does not make the dismissal voluntary. The court reaffirmed that the voluntary/involuntary rule precludes removal where non-diverse defendants are dismissed without plaintiff's voluntary action. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of Southern's motion to set aside the judgment under Rule 60. View "Caribe Chem Distributors, Corp. v. Southern Agricultural Insecticides, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal, heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, centered on the constitutionality of Massachusetts' Law 80, which retroactively provided immunity to higher education institutions for monetary damages due to actions taken in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs, students at Boston University (BU), had sued the university for breach of contract and unjust enrichment following BU's transition to remote learning during the Spring 2020 semester. They contended that they had paid for in-person instruction and services, which BU failed to provide.The lower court ruled in favor of BU, holding that the university was entitled to the defense of impossibility as it had to comply with COVID-19 emergency orders. On appeal, the court was required to consider whether the retroactive application of Law 80 to the case violated the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.The appellate court found that Law 80 served reasonable public interests related to public health, safety, future compliance, and economic consequences beyond the control of the universities. The court also determined that the plaintiffs' alleged implied contract rights did not constitute vested rights. Furthermore, the court noted that the scope of Law 80 was appropriately limited and did not excessively burden the plaintiffs.Consequently, the court held that Law 80 does not violate due process and affirmed the lower court's judgment, ruling in favor of BU. The court did not need to consider the merits of the lower court's decision to exclude the plaintiffs' expert witness's testimony. View "Dutra v. Trustees of Boston University" on Justia Law

In 2010, Ángel M. Ayala-Vázquez was indicted and convicted on multiple drug-related charges, including conspiring to possess with intent to distribute and aiding and abetting the possession of with intent to distribute over 280 grams of cocaine base. He was sentenced in 2011 to life imprisonment. In 2021, Ayala filed a motion to reduce his sentence under the First Step Act and for compassionate release due to his hypertension and obesity making him vulnerable to COVID-19.The District Court denied Ayala's motion, concluding that he was ineligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act because his sentences were imposed "in accordance with" the amendments made by the Fair Sentencing Act. The court also rejected his request for compassionate release, finding that Ayala failed to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling reasons to warrant such relief. Moreover, the court determined that Ayala posed a danger to other persons and the community.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the court affirmed the District Court's decision. It concluded that Ayala was indeed convicted of offenses involving 280 grams or more of cocaine base, and his life sentences were in accordance with the Fair Sentencing Act. Therefore, he was not eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. As for the compassionate release, the court found no abuse of discretion in the District Court's evaluation of Ayala's health conditions and perceived danger to the community. View "United States v. Ayala-Vazquez" on Justia Law

The case involves Joseph A. Jakuttis, a former officer and detective in the Dracut Police Department, who also served as a Task Force Officer for the federal Drug Enforcement Administration's Cross Borders Initiative. Jakuttis brought multiple federal and state claims against the Town of Dracut, certain Dracut police officers, and members of the federal law-enforcement task force. He alleged that he was demoted and faced retaliation after reporting serious criminal activities implicating two Dracut police officers, which he learned from a confidential drug informant.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Jakuttis's Bivens claims against Michael V. O'Hanlon and Richard P. Poirier, Jr., and his §1983 claim against the Town of Dracut, David J. Chartrand Jr., and Demetri Mellonakos. The court ruled that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, as they could have reasonably thought that Jakuttis was speaking as part of his official duties rather than as a private citizen when he reported the misconduct, thus not clearly violating his First Amendment rights.The court also affirmed the dismissal of Jakuttis's state-law tort claims against Poirier, as Poirier was deemed to be acting within the scope of his federal employment during the relevant times. However, the court remanded the Massachusetts Whistleblower Act claim against the Town of Dracut and the Intentional Interference with Advantageous Economic Relationship claim against Chartrand and Mellonakos to the District Court. The court reasoned that these state-law claims should be resolved by a state court due to reasons of comity. View "Jakuttis v. Town of Dracut" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit examined an appeal against a district court's refusal to issue a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of a Rhode Island law banning certain large-capacity ammunition magazines. The plaintiffs, a group of gun owners and a registered firearms dealer, argued that the law infringed upon their Second Amendment rights, as well as their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.The Court of Appeals, however, upheld the district court's decision. It noted that the law did not impose a significant burden on the right of armed self-defense, as it did not prevent gun owners from owning other forms of weaponry or ammunition, and the banned magazines were rarely used in self-defense situations. Furthermore, the court found that the law was consistent with a longstanding tradition of regulating firearms in the interest of public safety.The court also rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the law was retroactive and vague, violating their Fourteenth Amendment rights. It concluded that the law was not retroactive as it did not impose new liability on past actions, and it was not unconstitutionally vague as individuals of ordinary intelligence could understand what it prohibited. The court also found that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their Fifth Amendment claims, as the law did not effect a physical or regulatory taking of their property. View "Ocean State Tactical, LLC v. Rhode Island" on Justia Law

In 1990, Mac Hudson and Charles Hughes were tried for charges relating to a shooting incident which resulted in the death of one person and injury of another. After being convicted, their verdict was reversed by the Massachusetts Appeals Court for unrelated reasons and a retrial was ordered.During the second trial in 1997, issues arose regarding the jury selection process and the admission of certain witness testimonies. The judge reduced the number of jurors from sixteen to fifteen, which Hudson claimed prejudiced his use of peremptory challenges. Furthermore, key witness Kimbrough, who recanted his testimony from the first trial, was deemed unavailable to testify. His previous testimony was, however, read into the record. Hudson argued that his right to due process was violated by these actions. Despite these objections, Hudson was again convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for second-degree murder, among other charges.Following unsuccessful appeals in state court, Hudson petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, arguing that his right to due process was violated during his trial. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of Hudson's petition. The court found that the Massachusetts Appeals Court's rulings on Hudson's claims were not contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. View "Hudson v. Kelly" on Justia Law

This case involves an appeal from plaintiffs Sara Halsey and Susan Kiralis-Vernon against Fedcap Rehabilitation Services, Inc. The plaintiffs were participants in a state program, Additional Support for People in Retraining and Employment - Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (ASPIRE-TANF), for which Fedcap was a contract agency. The plaintiffs allege that Fedcap failed to correctly administer the program and fulfill its obligations, including informing them of available services and support, processing their requests for benefits, and engaging in an interactive process to evaluate their requests for reasonable accommodations. Kiralis-Vernon also alleges that a Fedcap employee verbally assaulted her due, in part, to her race.The U.S. District Court for the District of Maine dismissed the case, reasoning that the plaintiffs were required to first pursue an administrative remedy before the Department of Health and Human Services as required by Maine law. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims related to Fedcap’s administration of the ASPIRE-TANF program, agreeing that under Maine law, the plaintiffs had to first seek administrative review before bringing these claims to court.However, the appellate court vacated the dismissal of Kiralis-Vernon's claim of racial discrimination, ruling that this claim did not fall within the same jurisdiction and expertise of the Department, and thus, was not subject to the same requirement for administrative review. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this claim. View "Halsey v. Fedcap Rehabilitation Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Sara Esteban-Garcia, a native and citizen of Guatemala and an indigenous woman of Mam descent, petitioned for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) which affirmed an immigration judge's order denying her application for asylum and claim for withholding of removal under sections 208 and 241(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Esteban-Garcia had fled Guatemala after a man she had been romantically involved with, along with his friends, demanded she become a prostitute or sell drugs to earn money for them. The immigration judge and the BIA found that Esteban-Garcia had failed to establish a nexus between the harm she experienced and a statutorily protected ground. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the record did not compel a contrary conclusion. It noted that the petitioner consistently stated the reason why her alleged persecutors wanted her to become a prostitute and drug seller was so that they could benefit financially, which is not a protected ground. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review. View "Esteban-Garcia v. Garland" on Justia Law