Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A woman from Peru entered the United States in 2013 without valid documents and was later placed in removal proceedings. She conceded removability but sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, primarily based on years of physical and sexual abuse she experienced from her former partner, Mauro. She described a lengthy relationship characterized by escalating violence, failed police protection, and threats involving their child. De La Cruz claimed she was persecuted due to her membership in several proposed social groups, mostly linked to her status as a Peruvian woman in various familial or social configurations, and she submitted evidence about gender-based violence in Peru.The Immigration Judge found De La Cruz credible and her asylum application timely but denied all forms of relief. The judge concluded that the abuse she suffered was not on account of a statutorily protected ground, but rather arose from personal disputes within the relationship. As such, the judge found no sufficient nexus between the harm and the protected grounds necessary for asylum or withholding of removal, and determined her fear of future torture was speculative and unsupported for CAT relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the Immigration Judge applied the correct legal standards and did not clearly err in the factual findings.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case, applying substantial evidence review to factual findings and de novo review to legal conclusions. The court held that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that there was no nexus between the harm suffered and a protected ground, and agreed that the fear of future torture was too speculative to warrant CAT protection. Accordingly, the petition for review was denied. View "De La Cruz-Quispe v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was an employee of the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority and a former member of the relevant labor union. In 2016, he attempted to resign from the union and objected to the continued deduction of union dues from his wages, arguing that compelled dues for non-bargaining activities violated his First Amendment rights. The employer and union, acting under Puerto Rican law and the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, denied his requests, continued to deduct dues, and the plaintiff filed suit seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico presided over the initial proceedings. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees overruled Abood v. Detroit Board of Education and invalidated mandatory union payments by nonmembers in the public sector, the employer and union ceased deducting dues from the plaintiff. The union then sought to deposit the amount withheld after his resignation, plus interest and nominal damages, with the court. The District Court ultimately granted the union’s request to deposit funds and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims as moot, reasoning that he had received all requested relief. The plaintiff’s subsequent motion to alter or amend the judgment was denied, with the court stating he was entitled to the deposited funds.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the appeal. The First Circuit found that the plaintiff was entitled to the funds deposited by the union, rejecting the argument that there was no judgment awarding him monetary relief. However, the court determined that the issue of whether the plaintiff could seek prevailing party attorneys’ fees—potentially affecting mootness—had not been fully addressed below. The First Circuit remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings on that issue, while retaining jurisdiction over the appeal. View "Cruz v. UIA" on Justia Law

A Haitian national, Jonalson Dor, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2007. In August 2018, he pled guilty in Massachusetts state court to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute under Massachusetts law. At that time, both state and federal law included "hemp" in the definition of "marijuana." In December 2018, Congress amended the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to exclude "hemp" from its definition of "marijuana." The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Dor in 2019, originally based on earlier marijuana convictions. Those convictions were later vacated, and in 2023, DHS amended its charges, basing Dor’s removability on his 2018 conviction.An Immigration Judge in Boston denied Dor’s motion to terminate the proceedings, holding that the relevant version of the CSA was the one in effect at the time of the criminal conviction, not at the time of removal. The judge found Dor removable under the INA’s controlled substance provision. Dor appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the IJ’s decision on March 18, 2025, agreeing that the time of conviction was the controlling point for determining if a state conviction matches the federal controlled substance definition.Reviewing the case de novo, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered whether the definition of a “controlled substance” under the INA should reference the CSA as it existed at the time of conviction or at the time of removal proceedings. The court joined other circuits in holding that the relevant CSA definition is the one in effect at the time of conviction. Because Dor’s 2018 conviction categorically matched the federal definition then in force, the court denied his petition for review and upheld the removal order. View "Dor v. Bondi" on Justia Law

This case involves allegations of Medicare fraud under the False Claims Act (FCA) against MD Labs, an independent clinical laboratory. Between 2017 and 2019, OMNI Healthcare, a medical practice, sent MD Labs nearly 600 requests for PCR urinary tract infection (UTI) tests, which are more costly than traditional bacterial urine culture (BUC) tests. OMNI, acting on the instruction of its owner, directed staff to order only PCR tests, even when providers had requested BUC tests, with the admitted intention of building a Medicare fraud case against MD Labs. There is no evidence MD Labs knew of OMNI's intentions; MD Labs simply received and processed test orders submitted by physicians.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts reviewed the case after discovery and cross-motions for summary judgment. OMNI alleged that MD Labs “knowingly” submitted false claims to Medicare by seeking reimbursement for medically unnecessary PCR tests. MD Labs argued it was entitled to rely on the ordering physician’s determination of medical necessity and that it lacked the required scienter for FCA liability. The district court granted summary judgment to MD Labs, finding that OMNI had not produced sufficient evidence that MD Labs “knowingly” submitted false claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held, as a matter of first impression in the circuit, that a laboratory generally may rely on a doctor’s order as evidence that a test is medically necessary for FCA purposes, absent evidence of fraud or other improper conduct by the lab. OMNI failed to present evidence that MD Labs had actual knowledge, was deliberately indifferent, or recklessly disregarded the medical necessity of the tests ordered. Accordingly, summary judgment was affirmed for MD Labs on all federal and state claims. View "United States, ex rel. Omni Healthcare Inc. v. MD Spine Solutions LLC" on Justia Law

A medical device company that manufactures spinal devices was indicted, along with its CEO and CFO, for allegedly paying bribes to surgeons through a sham consulting program in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute. The indictment claimed the surgeons did not provide bona fide consulting services, but were paid to use and order the company’s devices in surgeries covered by federal health care programs. The company’s CFO, who is not a shareholder but is one of only two officers, allegedly calculated these payments based on the volume and value of surgeries performed with the company’s devices. During the development of the consulting program, the company retained outside counsel to provide legal opinions on the agreements’ compliance with health care law, and those opinions were distributed to the surgeons.After the grand jury returned the indictment, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts addressed whether the CFO’s plan to argue at trial that the involvement of outside counsel negated his criminal intent would effect an implied waiver of the company’s attorney-client privilege. The district court initially found that if the CFO or CEO invoked an “involvement-of-counsel” defense, it would waive the corporation’s privilege over communications with counsel. Following dismissal of charges against the company, the district court focused on whether the officers collectively could waive the privilege, concluded they could, and ruled that the CFO’s planned defense would constitute an implied waiver, allowing disclosure of certain privileged communications to the government. The district court stayed its order pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the district court’s waiver order and remanded. The Court of Appeals held that (1) the record was insufficient to determine whether the CFO alone had authority to waive the company’s privilege, and (2) not every involvement-of-counsel defense necessitates a waiver. The appellate court directed the district court to reassess the issue in light of changed circumstances and to consider less intrusive remedies before finding an implied waiver. View "United States v. SpineFrontier, Inc." on Justia Law

A Colombian man and his family fled to the United States after a violent criminal gang, the Gulf Clan, repeatedly threatened their lives to coerce his support. The threats began after he opened a bakery and escalated to in-person confrontations. Upon receiving an armed threat at his business, he reported the incidents to local police, who responded by stationing a guard at his bakery and blocking threatening phone lines. While in-person threats ceased, the family continued to receive telephonic threats from different numbers. Fearing for their safety, they left Colombia and entered the United States, where they sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.An Immigration Judge found that while the man’s testimony was credible, he failed to establish that the Colombian government was unwilling or unable to protect him from the private gang’s threats. The judge determined that the police had taken meaningful action, including posting a guard and blocking calls, and that the government was both willing and able to provide protection. As a result, the requests for asylum and withholding of removal were denied. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the denial, agreeing with the Immigration Judge’s assessment that the Colombian authorities had demonstrated willingness and ability to protect the family.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case, applying the substantial evidence standard to the agency’s factual findings. The court held that the record supported the agency’s conclusion that the Colombian government was able to protect the family, even if it could not provide absolute security. The court denied the petition for review, finding no error in the agency’s determination or its procedural handling of the case. View "Restrepo Castano v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The defendant participated in two robberies of massage businesses in Massachusetts, roughly an hour apart, alongside two co-defendants. During both incidents, firearms were displayed and used to intimidate victims, and in the course of the robberies, the victims were physically restrained and money and phones were stolen. After the crimes, the defendant was apprehended, and the investigation linked him and his co-defendants to the robberies through various forms of evidence, including testimony from an accomplice and the victims.Following his arrest, the defendant pled guilty in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts to two counts of Hobbs Act robbery and aiding and abetting. At sentencing, the district court applied enhancements to his guideline offense level based on findings that firearms were possessed and otherwise used during the robberies, and that the use of firearms by the co-defendants was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. The court relied on the presentence investigation report, testimony from a co-defendant’s trial over which the same judge presided, and other evidence. The defendant objected to the enhancements, arguing the government had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that use of firearms was foreseeable and that the weapons were real firearms as defined by the guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the appeal, applying an abuse of discretion standard to procedural challenges and clear error to factual findings. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding it was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that firearms would be possessed and otherwise used during the robberies, nor in concluding that real firearms were involved. The court found the evidence sufficient to support both enhancements and affirmed the defendant’s 78-month sentence. View "United States v. Tang" on Justia Law

John Kenney, a resident of Florida, sought to obtain a retail cannabis license in Rhode Island as a social equity applicant. He argued that, as a recipient of a social equity cannabis license in the District of Columbia and someone with nonviolent marijuana convictions in Maryland and Nevada, he would otherwise qualify under Rhode Island’s Cannabis Act. Kenney challenged two provisions of the Act: the requirement that all license applicants must be Rhode Island residents or entities controlled by Rhode Island residents, and the definition of “social equity applicant,” which, according to Kenney, only recognizes nonviolent marijuana offenses eligible for expungement under Rhode Island law.After Kenney filed an amended complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, the defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On February 6, 2025, the district court dismissed the case on ripeness grounds, reasoning that the Cannabis Control Commission had not yet promulgated final rules for retail cannabis licenses, and thus the court could not adjudicate the claims. The case was dismissed without prejudice, and Kenney appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the appeal. Following the Commission’s issuance of final rules for retail cannabis licenses, effective May 1, 2025, the appellate court determined that the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of ripeness. The First Circuit held that Kenney’s claims were not moot and that he had standing to pursue them. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal order and remanded the case for prompt consideration of the merits of Kenney’s constitutional challenges, instructing the district court to rule at least forty-five days before the Commission issues retail licenses. View "Kenney v. Rhode Island Cannabis Control Commission" on Justia Law

A cannabis entrepreneur based in California sought to challenge specific provisions of Rhode Island’s Cannabis Act, which governs the licensing of retail cannabis businesses. The Act requires applicants for all retail cannabis business licenses to be Rhode Island residents or entities with a principal place of business in Rhode Island and majority ownership by Rhode Island residents. It also establishes criteria for “social equity applicants,” reserving certain licenses for individuals with past marijuana-related convictions eligible for expungement or for those who have resided in disproportionately impacted areas. The plaintiff, not a Rhode Island resident, intended to apply for a license but alleged that these requirements violated the dormant Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island dismissed the plaintiff’s action without prejudice, concluding that her claims were not ripe for judicial review. The court cited several cases but provided no substantive analysis, noting that the Commission had yet to promulgate final rules and regulations for licensing and declining to speculate on the timeline for their adoption. This order was issued just before the public comment period on the proposed regulations closed.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing on ripeness grounds. The appellate court determined that the claims were ripe, not moot, and that the plaintiff had standing to bring the suit. The court found that the plaintiff faced imminent harm under the statutory requirements and that judicial intervention was warranted. The First Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for prompt consideration of the plaintiff’s constitutional claims, instructing the lower court to issue its rulings before the planned issuance of retail cannabis licenses. View "Jensen v. Rhode Island Cannabis Control Commission" on Justia Law

Federal law enforcement agents, posing as a 14-year-old girl named "Rolianas," engaged in online communications with the defendant, who responded to an ad the agents posted on a casual encounters section of Craigslist. Over a series of emails, texts, and phone calls spanning several days, the defendant initiated and sustained contact, despite being told early in the exchange that "Rolianas" was 14. He sent sexually suggestive messages and photos and made plans to meet, including discussions of sexual activity and bringing condoms.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico conducted a jury trial, where the defendant was convicted of attempted transportation of a minor for criminal sexual activity under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) but acquitted of attempted sexual enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The defendant requested a jury instruction on the entrapment defense, arguing that the government induced him to commit the offense. The district judge denied that request, concluding that the defendant had not met the threshold of producing evidence of both government inducement and lack of predisposition.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed de novo whether the district court erred in refusing the entrapment instruction. The court found that the government’s conduct did not rise to the level of inducement, as the agents merely provided an opportunity for the defendant to commit the crime, and the defendant pursued the illegal activity after being informed of the purported minor’s age. The court held that the evidence did not support the defense of entrapment and affirmed the conviction, concluding that the district judge properly denied the entrapment instruction. View "United States v. Medina-Ortiz" on Justia Law