Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Escobar Larin v. Garland
Jose Rodolfo Escobar Larin, a native and citizen of El Salvador, sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision that affirmed the denial of his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Escobar also petitioned for review of a separate BIA ruling that denied his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had issued Escobar a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability for being present in the U.S. without being admitted or paroled. Escobar filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal, claiming a well-founded fear of persecution in El Salvador due to his mental illness and opposition to gang authority.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Escobar credible but denied his claims, determining that his asylum application was untimely and that he failed to meet the requirements for withholding of removal and CAT protection. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that Escobar did not demonstrate extraordinary or changed circumstances to excuse the late filing of his asylum application. The BIA also found that Escobar did not establish a likelihood of persecution or torture if returned to El Salvador.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA erred in its interpretation of the changed-circumstance exception to the one-year filing deadline for asylum applications. The court vacated and remanded the BIA's ruling on Escobar's asylum claims, withholding of removal claims, and CAT claim for further proceedings. The court also affirmed the denial of Escobar's motion to reopen, concluding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in that decision. View "Escobar Larin v. Garland" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Immigration Law
Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc. v. Department of the Interior
The case involves the approval process for a large-scale commercial offshore wind energy facility located on the Outer Continental Shelf, fourteen miles south of Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket. The plaintiffs, consisting of commercial fishing entities and a nonprofit organization, challenged the federal government's approval of the project, citing violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, which included various federal departments and agencies, as well as the business entity responsible for the wind project. The court found that the plaintiffs' ESA claims were non-justiciable due to lack of standing and mootness, as the initial biological opinion had been superseded by a new one. The court also ruled that the plaintiffs were outside the zone of interests protected by the NEPA and the MMPA, and that the Alliance had failed to show that the Corps' issuance of the CWA Section 404 permit was arbitrary or capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court's rulings de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgments, agreeing that the plaintiffs lacked standing for their ESA claims and that the claims were moot. The court also upheld the district court's zone-of-interests rulings regarding the NEPA and MMPA claims. Additionally, the court found that the Corps' decision to issue the CWA permit was not arbitrary or capricious and that the BOEM's approval of the project under the OCSLA was lawful. The appellate court concluded that the plaintiffs' arguments did not demonstrate that the BOEM had acted arbitrarily or capriciously in approving the project. View "Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc. v. Department of the Interior" on Justia Law
Beijing Abace Biology Co., Ltd. v. Zhang
Beijing Abace Biology Co., Ltd. (Abace) filed a lawsuit against Dr. Chunhong Zhang and MtoZ Biolabs, Inc. (MtoZ) after Dr. Zhang, a former employee, co-founded MtoZ, a company providing similar services to Abace. Abace claimed that Dr. Zhang breached her contract and fiduciary duty, and that MtoZ tortiously interfered with Abace's business. Dr. Zhang had signed several employment-related agreements, including non-compete clauses, while working for Abace. The dispute centered on whether these non-compete agreements were enforceable under Chinese law.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Zhang and MtoZ, concluding that Dr. Zhang did not fall within the categories of employees subject to non-compete agreements under Chinese law. The court found that Dr. Zhang was neither senior management nor senior technical personnel, and did not have access to trade secrets or confidential information that would justify a non-compete restriction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that under Chinese law, non-compete agreements are enforceable only against senior management, senior technical personnel, or employees with access to trade secrets. The court found no evidence that Dr. Zhang held a senior management or technical role, or that she had access to trade secrets. Consequently, the non-compete agreements were unenforceable, and the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Zhang and MtoZ was upheld. View "Beijing Abace Biology Co., Ltd. v. Zhang" on Justia Law
United States v. Andruchuk
The defendant, Ronald Andruchuk, purchased 169 firearms over five months in 2021 while struggling with drug addiction. He falsely attested on federal forms that he did not use illicit drugs. Neighbors complained about bullets flying dangerously close to their homes, and on February 24, 2022, police witnessed bullets flying above their heads from Andruchuk's property. He was arrested for violating a state law against firing ammunition in a compact area. A federal investigation led to a search of his home, where agents found 219 unsecured firearms, gun paraphernalia, and over 25,000 rounds of ammunition. Andruchuk was charged with making false statements during firearms purchases and possession of a firearm by an unlawful user of a controlled substance.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island accepted Andruchuk's guilty plea to two counts of making false statements and one count of possession of a firearm by an unlawful user of a controlled substance. In exchange, the government agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and recommend a sentence at the low end of the guideline range. Andruchuk waived his right to appeal if the sentence was within or below the guideline range determined by the court. The court calculated a guideline range of sixty-three to seventy-eight months and sentenced him to sixty-three months.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Andruchuk argued that the district court erred in calculating the guideline range and that this error invalidated his appellate waiver. The Court of Appeals upheld the waiver, finding it was knowing and voluntary, and dismissed the appeal. The court also dismissed Andruchuk's ineffective assistance of counsel claim as premature, noting it could be raised in a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. View "United States v. Andruchuk" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Diaz-Valdez v. Garland
Gleysi Idalia Diaz-Valdez, a Guatemalan national, entered the United States in May 2019 and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, citing persecution by gang members in Guatemala. An immigration judge (IJ) denied her requests on August 6, 2021. Diaz attempted to appeal the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) by sending her Notice of Appeal via FedEx's next-day delivery service on September 4, 2021, expecting it to arrive by the September 7 deadline. However, FedEx delivered the package on September 8, resulting in the BIA summarily dismissing her appeal as untimely.Diaz then requested the BIA to accept her late filing, arguing that FedEx's failure to deliver on time warranted equitable tolling of the appeal deadline. The BIA construed her request as a motion to reconsider its summary dismissal but denied the motion, stating that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Diaz had delivered the appeal to FedEx on September 4 and that the federal holiday was not an extraordinary circumstance.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court found that the BIA applied the incorrect legal standard by disregarding the representation of Diaz's counsel and failing to consider supporting evidence, such as the FedEx label and tracking information. The court also held that the BIA abused its discretion by not applying its own precedent from Matter of Morales-Morales, which allows for equitable tolling when a guaranteed delivery service fails to fulfill its guarantee.The First Circuit granted Diaz's petition, vacated the BIA's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, instructing the BIA to reevaluate Diaz's diligence and the extraordinary circumstances under the correct legal standards. View "Diaz-Valdez v. Garland" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Immigration Law
Colony Place South, Inc. v. Volvo Car USA, LLC
Two Massachusetts-based Volvo dealers filed a lawsuit against Volvo Car USA, Volvo Car Financial Services, and Fidelity Warranty Services, alleging violations of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93B. The dispute centers on Volvo-branded Prepaid Maintenance Program (PPM) contracts, which allow customers to prepay for future maintenance services at a discounted rate. Fidelity administers these contracts, which the dealers sell to their customers. The dealers claimed that the defendants were underpaying them for the parts and labor costs incurred in servicing these PPM contracts.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts heard cross-motions for summary judgment from both parties. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that entities like Fidelity are not regulated by the relevant provisions of Chapter 93B. The court denied the dealers' motion for summary judgment, leading the dealers to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision, but for a different reason. The appellate court held that the dealers' sale and service of the Volvo PPM are not franchise obligations under Chapter 93B. The court found that the Retailer Agreement between the dealers and Volvo USA did not obligate the dealers to sell or service the Volvo PPM. The court also noted that the dealers had the discretion to sell various financial products, including the Volvo PPM, and that servicing the PPM was not a material term of the Retailer Agreement. Therefore, Chapter 93B did not require Fidelity to reimburse the dealers at the statutory rates. View "Colony Place South, Inc. v. Volvo Car USA, LLC" on Justia Law
Milk Industry Regulatory Office v. Ruiz Ruiz
A Puerto Rico agency, the Milk Industry Regulatory Office (ORIL), revoked a dairy farmer's license and ordered him to sell his milk production quota rights. When the farmer, Luis Manuel Ruiz Ruiz, failed to comply, ORIL planned to auction the quota rights. Ruiz, who had filed for Chapter 12 bankruptcy in 2015, argued that the auction violated the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code.The bankruptcy court enjoined ORIL from auctioning the quota without court permission, finding that the planned auction violated the automatic stay. The court granted partial summary judgment to Ruiz, determining that ORIL's actions were not protected by the police power exception. ORIL appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, which affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, agreeing that the police power exception did not apply.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that ORIL's plan to auction Ruiz's milk quota fell within the police power exception to the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). The court reasoned that the auction was part of enforcing a judgment obtained in an action to enforce ORIL's regulatory power, which is not a money judgment. The court emphasized that ORIL's actions were aimed at protecting public health and welfare by regulating milk production and distribution, rather than advancing a pecuniary interest.The First Circuit reversed the judgments of the bankruptcy and district courts, directing judgment in favor of ORIL. The court concluded that ORIL's planned auction did not violate the automatic stay and was protected by the police power exception. View "Milk Industry Regulatory Office v. Ruiz Ruiz" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Bankruptcy, Government & Administrative Law
U.S. v. Millette
In 2016, Kevin Millette was charged with possession of child pornography, having 24,277 images and 1,022 videos. He admitted to a lifelong problem with child pornography and pleaded guilty, receiving a 120-month prison sentence followed by seven years of supervised release. In December 2020, after serving about sixty-one months, he was granted compassionate release with several special conditions, including a prohibition on unsupervised contact with minors. In August 2023, a probation officer found Millette's teenage daughter in his bedroom while his approved supervisor, his mother, was outside. Millette initially lied about the sleeping arrangements but later admitted to sleeping in the same room as his daughter without supervision.The United States District Court for the District of Maine held a revocation hearing in September 2023. The court found that Millette violated the condition prohibiting unsupervised contact with minors, noting that his conduct was a clear violation given his criminal history and the purpose of the condition. The court sentenced him to two months' imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release, reimposing the same special condition.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Millette argued that the phrase "in the presence of" in the special condition was ambiguous and that the district court erred in finding a violation and reimposing the condition. The Court of Appeals found no error, holding that the condition was clear and that Millette's conduct constituted a violation. The court also found that reimposing the condition was justified given Millette's history and ongoing risk to minors. The court affirmed the revocation of Millette's supervised release and the reimposition of the special condition. View "U.S. v. Millette" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
United States v. Bailey
In this case, the defendant, Dominick Bailey, pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). This was Bailey's third conviction for the same offense, with previous convictions in 1997 and 2006. In 2019, Bailey was involved in a guns-for-drugs transaction, where he admitted to possessing firearms despite his felon status. He was arrested in Boston with multiple firearms in his possession. Bailey pleaded guilty without a plea agreement during a virtual proceeding.The District Court for the District of Massachusetts sentenced Bailey to eighty-seven months of imprisonment, departing upward from the advisory sentencing guideline range due to Bailey's extensive criminal history. Bailey objected to the sentencing departure in the district court.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Bailey challenged the indictment, the voluntariness of his guilty plea, the procedural aspects of his sentencing, and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. The appellate court reviewed Bailey's claims, applying plain error review to unpreserved claims and abuse of discretion to preserved claims.The First Circuit found no plain error in the district court's determination that Bailey's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, despite Bailey's mental health conditions and medication use. The court also found that the district court did not err in its explanation for the upward departure, noting that Bailey's criminal history was extensive and warranted a higher sentence for public protection and deterrence. The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the eighty-seven-month sentence was reasonable given Bailey's persistent criminality and the seriousness of the offense. View "United States v. Bailey" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
US Ghost Adventures, LLC v. Miss Lizzie’s Coffee LLC
US Ghost Adventures, LLC (Ghost Adventures) operates a bed and breakfast at the Lizzie Borden House in Fall River, Massachusetts, offering ghost tours and related activities. Ghost Adventures holds federal trademarks for the name "Lizzie Borden" and a hatchet logo. Miss Lizzie's Coffee LLC (Miss Lizzie's) opened a coffee shop next to the Lizzie Borden House, using the Lizzie Borden story in its marketing, including a hatchet logo and references to being "The Most Haunted Coffee Shop in the World." Some visitors mistakenly believed the two businesses were affiliated.Ghost Adventures sued Miss Lizzie's in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts for trademark infringement and unfair competition, seeking a preliminary injunction to stop Miss Lizzie's from using the "Lizzie Borden" name and hatchet logo. The district court denied the preliminary injunction, finding that Ghost Adventures failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. The court determined that the key element in any infringement action is the likelihood of confusion, which Ghost Adventures did not demonstrate. The court found that Miss Lizzie's hatchet logo and use of the name "Lizzie" were not similar enough to Ghost Adventures' trademarks to cause confusion.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the hatchet logos were dissimilar and that Miss Lizzie's reference to "Lizzie" was to the historical figure, not the trademark. The court also found that any consumer confusion was due to the proximity of the businesses and their common reliance on the Lizzie Borden story, not the similarity of their marks. The court concluded that Ghost Adventures did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, and the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "US Ghost Adventures, LLC v. Miss Lizzie's Coffee LLC" on Justia Law