Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Janine Cavalcanti Viana Guedes and her husband, Jose Mauricio Oliveira Guedes Jr., entered the United States on B-2 nonimmigrant visas in 2017. Viana Guedes later applied for an F-1 student visa, and her husband received derivative beneficiary status. In 2019, Viana Guedes filed an I-140 petition for an EB-2 classification and sought a National Interest Waiver (NIW) to bypass the job offer requirement. USCIS initially approved her I-140 petition and NIW but later denied her adjustment of status application, citing misrepresentations and non-compliance with visa requirements.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the appellants' case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court found that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) and the Supreme Court's decision in Patel v. Garland precluded judicial review of the USCIS's denial of their adjustment of status applications and the alleged revocation of Viana Guedes' I-140 petition and NIW.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) barred judicial review of the USCIS's denial of the adjustment of status applications. Additionally, the court found that the alleged revocations of the I-140 petition and NIW were unreviewable under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), as these decisions were within the discretion of the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed the appellants' claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Viana Guedes v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Kimberly A. Ripoli, a decorated veteran, claimed she experienced gender-based discrimination when terminated from her role as Associate Director of the Rhode Island Office of Veterans Affairs (OVA). She sued the State of Rhode Island, Department of Human Services, Office of Veterans Affairs under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and various Rhode Island statutes. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State on all claims.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island granted summary judgment for the State, dismissing Ripoli's claims of gender-based discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. Ripoli did not address the district court's adverse rulings on her retaliation or hostile work environment claims in her appeal, leaving those rulings intact.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated the district court's order on Ripoli's disparate treatment claims, finding that she had established a prima facie case of discrimination and raised genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the State's reasons for her termination were pretextual. The court noted that Ripoli presented evidence suggesting her role was not redundant, that the reorganization was not driven by budgetary constraints, and that she was replaced by a less-qualified heterosexual male. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment on Ripoli's retaliation and hostile work environment claims, as she did not pursue these on appeal. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Ripoli v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

The petitioners, Fidel Angel Lopez Quinteros, Evelyn de Los Angeles Polanco Ortiz, and their minor child A.A.L.P., are natives and citizens of El Salvador. They were issued Notices to Appear by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 2021, charging them with being present in the United States without admission or parole. The petitioners conceded their removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). A.A.L.P. was listed as a derivative beneficiary on Lopez's application. The petition for review challenges only the denial of their asylum applications.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Lopez and Polanco's testimonies credible but denied their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. The IJ concluded that the gang's threats were motivated by financial gain rather than the petitioners' membership in particular social groups. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision on asylum and withholding of removal and deemed the CAT claims waived as they were not meaningfully challenged.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied the petitioners' claim that the BIA erred by not remanding to correct the hearing transcript, as this issue was not exhausted before the BIA. The court also found no merit in the petitioners' contention that the agency failed to engage in a proper mixed-motive analysis. However, the court held that the BIA's finding of no nexus between Polanco's persecution and her familial relationship to Lopez was not supported by substantial evidence. The court concluded that Polanco's family status was a central reason for the gang's threats against her. Consequently, the court denied the petition in part, granted it in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Lopez-Quinteros v. Garland" on Justia Law

Chrisma Felin Mondzali Bopaka, a citizen of the Republic of the Congo, entered the United States without valid entry documents on August 23, 2018. He sought asylum, withholding of removal (WOR), and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming persecution based on his political opinion and family membership. Bopaka alleged that his family was targeted due to his father's opposition to the government, and he feared harm if returned to the Congo.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Bopaka not credible due to numerous inconsistencies and omissions in his testimony, declaration, and documentary evidence. The IJ denied his applications for asylum, WOR, and CAT protection, concluding that Bopaka failed to meet his burden of proof. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, finding no error in the adverse credibility determination and insufficient corroborating evidence. The BIA also denied Bopaka's motions to remand and reopen, citing a lack of new, material evidence that could change the outcome.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA's decision. The court found substantial evidence supporting the IJ's and BIA's adverse credibility determination, noting significant inconsistencies and omissions in Bopaka's accounts. The court also agreed with the BIA's assessment that the new evidence presented in the motions to remand and reopen was insufficient to alter the previous findings. Consequently, the petitions for review were denied. View "Mondzali Bopaka v. Garland" on Justia Law

Steven Fustolo purchased a rental investment unit in Boston, Massachusetts, in 2009, taking out a mortgage with Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as nominee for Union Capital Mortgage Business Trust. The mortgage was reassigned six times, and Fustolo defaulted on the loan. He sought a declaratory judgment that the current holders, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation as Trustee of SCRT 2019-2 (the Trust) and Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS), had no right to foreclose because they did not validly hold the mortgage or the accompanying promissory note. Fustolo also claimed defamation, slander of title, unfair business practices, violation of Massachusetts's Debt Collection Act, and a violation of Regulation X of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) by SPS.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed Fustolo's claims, except for one count challenging the adequacy of a notice letter, which was later settled. The court found that the Trust validly held both the mortgage and the note, and that Fustolo's state law claims hinged on the incorrect assertion that the Trust did not have the right to foreclose. The court also dismissed the RESPA claim, stating that Fustolo failed to specify which provision of RESPA was violated and that SPS had responded to his notice of error.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that the Trust validly held the mortgage and the note, as the note was indorsed in blank and in the Trust's possession. The court also found that MERS had the authority to assign the mortgage despite Union Capital's dissolution. Additionally, the court ruled that Fustolo's RESPA claim failed because challenges to the merits of a servicer's evaluation of a loss mitigation application do not relate to the servicing of the loan and are not covered errors under RESPA. View "Fustolo v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc." on Justia Law

Jorge Baez sued BayMark Detoxification Services, Inc., alleging disability discrimination under Massachusetts law, claiming BayMark Detox was his former employer. Baez was repeatedly informed that he had sued the wrong party but did not amend his complaint in time. BayMark Detox moved for summary judgment, asserting it was never Baez's employer. Baez then requested to amend his complaint to name the correct employer, but the district court granted summary judgment to BayMark Detox, denied Baez's Rule 60(b) motion for relief, and ordered Baez to pay costs.Baez initially worked for Community Health Care, Inc. (CHC), which was acquired by BayMark Health Services, Inc. (BHS). During the COVID-19 pandemic, Baez worked from home but was later terminated after an audit revealed billing errors. Baez filed a discrimination complaint against BayMark Detox, which was removed to federal court. BayMark Detox, a separate entity from CHC, stated it never employed Baez. The district court set a deadline for amending pleadings, which Baez missed.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment to BayMark Detox, finding no evidence that BayMark Detox was Baez's employer. The court denied Baez's request to amend his complaint, citing his failure to show good cause for the delay. The court also denied Baez's Rule 60(b) motion, rejecting the argument that Massachusetts procedural rules should apply. The court awarded costs to BayMark Detox.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings, agreeing that Baez failed to name the correct employer and did not demonstrate good cause for amending his complaint late. The court also upheld the award of costs to BayMark Detox. View "Baez v. BayMark Detoxification Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Renee Sevelitte and the Estate of Joseph F. Sevelitte dispute the entitlement to the proceeds of a life insurance policy Joseph purchased during his marriage to Renee. Massachusetts law automatically revokes a spouse's beneficiary status upon divorce unless specific exceptions apply. The life insurance policy named Renee as the beneficiary, but the policy did not address the effect of divorce on beneficiary status. Renee and Joseph's divorce agreement included provisions about life insurance policies but did not explicitly state that Renee would remain the beneficiary of the policy in question.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment to the Estate, determining that Renee could not establish that any exceptions to the automatic revocation applied. Renee appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that its previous decision did not determine that the divorce agreement satisfied the statutory exceptions but only that it was plausible. The court emphasized that Renee needed to provide evidence to support her claim that the divorce agreement intended to maintain her beneficiary status. The Estate presented evidence, including an affidavit from Joseph's divorce attorney and an expert report, indicating that the divorce agreement did not intend to retain Renee's beneficiary status.The First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Renee failed to present any evidence to create a genuine dispute about the intended meaning of the divorce agreement. Therefore, the court held that the Estate was entitled to the proceeds of the life insurance policy. View "Sevelitte v. The Guardian Life Insurance Company of America" on Justia Law

In 2016, Rhode Island enacted the RhodeWorks Act, which imposed tolls on tractor-trailers crossing thirteen bridges within the state. The toll revenue was intended for the replacement, reconstruction, operation, and maintenance of these bridges. The tolls were subject to three statutory caps: a truck could not pay more than once in each direction, more than $40 per day, or more than $20 for a single through trip from Connecticut to Massachusetts. The American Trucking Associations and several trucking companies challenged the tolls, arguing they violated the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce and failing to fairly approximate use of the bridges.The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island permanently enjoined the tolls, finding that they discriminated against interstate commerce and did not fairly approximate use. The court concluded that the tolls' application solely to tractor-trailers and the statutory caps each violated the dormant Commerce Clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed that the statutory caps on tolls were unconstitutional because they disproportionately benefited in-state over out-of-state tractor-trailers, thus discriminating against interstate commerce. However, the court held that the tolls' application solely to tractor-trailers did not violate the fair-approximation test, as it was not wholly unreasonable for Rhode Island to rely on studies showing that tractor-trailers caused the most damage to the bridges.The First Circuit concluded that the unconstitutional caps were severable from the rest of the statute. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for the entry of judgment consistent with its opinion. View "American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Rhode Island Turnpike and Bridge Authority" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Elvin Torres-Estrada, was charged in a superseding indictment with conspiring to distribute controlled substances and other related offenses. Plea negotiations began, and the government offered a plea deal allowing Torres-Estrada to request a 188-month sentence. However, one of his attorneys, Ramón Garcia, advised him to counteroffer for a lower sentence and assured him that he could negotiate a better deal. This advice conflicted with the recommendations of Torres-Estrada's other attorneys, who believed the government's offer was favorable and urged him to accept it promptly.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially handled the case. Torres-Estrada followed Garcia's advice, leading to a series of counteroffers and negotiations that ultimately did not result in a more favorable plea deal. Instead, Torres-Estrada later signed a consolidated plea agreement for a 264-month sentence, with the government allowed to argue for 288 months. The district court sentenced him to 288 months. Torres-Estrada filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, which the district court denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court examined whether Garcia's advice and actions constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under the standards set by Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper. The court found that while Garcia's conduct was problematic, it did not meet the threshold for constitutionally deficient performance. Additionally, the court concluded that Torres-Estrada failed to demonstrate that he would have accepted the government's original plea offer but for Garcia's advice. Therefore, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of sentencing relief. View "Torres-Estrada v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Luther C. Parente and Eric L. Stewart sued the Rhode Island Department of Corrections (RIDOC) and its staff for failing to properly treat their preexisting medical conditions. They alleged various federal and state constitutional, statutory, and common law bases for relief, including a claim under the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act of 1990 (RICRA). The plaintiffs claimed that RIDOC's medical and correctional staff failed to meet their medical needs, resulting in harm and discrimination.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island denied RIDOC's motion for summary judgment on Eleventh Amendment grounds as to the RICRA claim. The district court held that Rhode Island's general waiver of sovereign immunity under the State Tort Claims Act applied to RICRA claims, reasoning that discrimination actions under RICRA sounded in tort. RIDOC appealed this decision, arguing that the district court erred in holding that violations of civil rights under RICRA were subject to the general waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and determined that there was a "special reason" to certify the underlying state-law issue to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The appellate court noted that the question of whether RICRA claims are "actions of tort" under the State Tort Claims Act is a matter of state law that has not been definitively resolved by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Therefore, the First Circuit certified the question to the Rhode Island Supreme Court to determine whether discrimination claims under RICRA are covered by the general waiver of sovereign immunity under the State Tort Claims Act. The First Circuit retained jurisdiction over the issue pending resolution of the certified question. View "Parente v. Lefebvre" on Justia Law