Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed filed a qui tam action against a corporation and its subsidiary, both of whom manufacture and market medical devices, alleging that Defendants violated the False Claims Act in selling two particular medical devices to hospitals that seek reimbursement from the federal government through, for example, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Through two subsequent amendments, both with permission of the court, Plaintiff added several defendants and retooled his claims. Plaintiff then requested leave to amend fourth amended complaint. The district court applied the “good cause” standard from Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) to that request and struck the amended complaint. The First Circuit originally held that the district court should have evaluated Plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint under the standard set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). On remand, the district court concluded that Plaintiff’s desired amendment failed under that standard. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s request for leave to file his fourth amended complaint was properly denied as futile because none of the claims in Plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint was adequately pled. View "D'Agostino v. EV3, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2010, Petitioner pleaded guilty to several charges in connection with a drug-trafficking enterprise. The district court sentenced Petitioner to a ten-year term of immurement. Thereafter, Petitioner moved to correct the sentence. The district court denied the motion, ruling that the charges to which Petitioner had pleaded guilty barred him from receiving a shorter sentence. In 2012, Petitioner filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255 on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The magistrate judge set an evidentiary hearing limited to Petitioner’s claim that his then-attorney never told him about a nine-year plea offer. During the hearing, the magistrate judge heard conflicting testimony. The judge found the attorney’s version of events to be generally “consistent and credible” and, based on these findings, denied the section 2255 motion. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the magistrate judge’s determination was not clearly erroneous. View "Rivera-Rivera v. United States" on Justia Law

In the 1945 case Crespo v. United States, the First Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. 2421(a), which prohibits transportation of an individual “in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States” for purposes of prostitution or other unlawful sexual activity, applies to transportation that occurs solely within Puerto Rico. Since that case was decided, Puerto Rico has transformed from a United States territory to a self-governing Commonwealth. Defendant, who transported a woman within Puerto Rico with the intent to engage in sexual activity that was criminal under Puerto Rico law, dismissed the indictment against him, arguing that transportation occurring solely within Puerto Rico no longer violates section 2421(a). The district court agreed with Defendant and dismissed the indictment. The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the indictment, holding that section 2421(a) does not extend to illicit transportation that occurs solely within Puerto Rico and instead reaches only transportation “in interstate or foreign commerce” with respect to the island. View "United States v. Maldonado-Burgos" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of making false statements in a passport application, aggravated identity theft, and use of a falsely-obtained Social Security account number to obtain benefits. The district court sentenced Defendant to an aggregated sentence of thirty-six months of imprisonment. Defendant appealed, challenging his sentence. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly applied the four-level enhancement as to the making false statements in a passport application count; and (2) Defendant’s argument challenging his conviction for aggravated identity theft is foreclosed by binding circuit precedent. View "United States v. Nolte" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, was arrested and charged with removability on the basis that he had remained in the United States beyond the six months permitted by his visa. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that certain documents were obtained as the result of an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment. An immigration judge denied the motion to suppress, concluding that Petitioner did not present a prima facie case that the search and seizure leading to his arrest amounted to an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that, like the BIA, the Court need not decide whether there was any Fourth Amendment violation because, even if there were, the violation was not egregious. View "Corado-Arriaza v. Lynch" on Justia Law

On three occasions, Defendant sold heroin to a person surreptitiously cooperating with the federal government. Defendant was charged with three counts of possessing heroin with intent to distribute. A jury subsequently found Defendant guilty on all three counts. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in refusing to charge the jury on entrapment; (2) the district court did not plainly err in directing defense counsel to follow through on counsel’s volunteered commitment to advise the prosecutor about Defendant’s intent to mention entrapment in his opening statement; (3) Defendant was not prejudiced by the Government’s delayed disclosure of certain evidence; and (4) Defendant was lawfully sentenced as a career offender. View "United States v. Montoya" on Justia Law

Defendants, who previously served as high-ranking officials in the Massachusetts Office of the Commissioner of Probation (OCP), were convicted for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) violations, RICO conspiracy, and mail fraud based on their roles in a hiring scheme at the OCP. The First Circuit reversed the convictions and ordered the entry of judgments of acquittal, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions because the Government failed to demonstrate the the conduct of these Massachusetts state officials satisfied the appropriate criminal statutes. Specifically, the Government overstepped its authority in using federal criminal statutes to police the hiring practices of Defendants. View "United States v. Tavares" on Justia Law

While working at a subsidiary of General Dynamics Corporation (GDC), Plaintiff participated in GDC’s long-term disability (LTD) plan, which was funded and administered by Aetna Life Insurance Company. Plaintiff became disabled in 2003 and applied for plan benefits. Aetna approved her claim until 2010, when it began offsetting Plaintiff’s monthly LTD benefits by her gross Social Security income. Plaintiff sued Aetna and GDC, alleging that Aetna breached its fiduciary duty and seeking a declaration that her past and future LTD benefits should be offset against the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits she was awarded minus any income taxes she was assessed on those benefits. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, thus affirming Aetna’s interpretation of the plan’s offset provision. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the plan permits Aetna to offset LTD benefits by the gross amount of SSDI benefits; and (2) the district court did not err in denying discovery. View "Troiano v. Aetna Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Appellant brought a qui tam action against Cyberonics, Inc. alleging that Cyberonics violated the False Claims Act (FCA) and related state statutes by promoting medically unnecessary replacements of batteries in nerve stimular devices, which resulted in patients and medical providers filing false claims for reimbursement from government health care programs. The district court dismissed all but two of Appellant’s claims, including the FCA allegations, for failure to state a claim. Thereafter, the district court denied Appellant’s request for leave to file a second amended complaint on the basis of undue delay. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s first amended complaint did not satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)’s particularity requirement, and therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing the first amended complaint; and (2) Appellant did not meet his burden of providing a valid reason for his delay, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for leave to amend. View "Hagerty v. Cyberonics, Inc." on Justia Law

Pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code, taxpayers receive credits against owed U.S. income tax for money paid to a foreign country for “taxable international business transactions of economic substance.” Some banks have engaged in transactions that generate a foreign tax credit in order to take advantage of the U.S. deductions. In this case, the IRS began disallowing the claim for foreign tax credits sought by Sovereign Bancorp, Inc., later acquired by Santander Holdings USA, Inc. (together, Sovereign), a U.S. taxpayer, and, in 2008, began imposing accuracy-related penalties. Sovereign brought suit to obtain a refund from the IRS, the amount of which was approximately $234 million in taxes, penalties, and interest. The transaction at issue complied on its face with then-existing U.S. statutory and regulatory requirements. The government opposed the refund, arguing that the transaction failed the common law economic substance test. The district court awarded summary judgment to Sovereign, concluding that the transactions had economic substance. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the government was entitled to summary judgment in its favor as to the economic substance of the transaction at issue. View "Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law