Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Nieves and two other men traveling on a Puerto Rico highway pulled alongside a car stopped at a traffic light. Nieves exited the vehicle, carrying "a long pointed tip object" to the driver's side of the car. He ordered the driver to get out. When she did not immediately comply, he opened the driver's side door, yanked the driver from her seat, and pushed her toward the highway lane divider. Nieves drove away in her car. The vehicle in which he arrived fled. Hours later, reports surfaced of three armed individuals disassembling a matching vehicle in Canóvanas. Police responded and took both men into custody. Their investigation confirmed that the car was the vehicle carjacked hours earlier. Nieves, arrested the following day, waived his constitutional rights, admitted to participating in the carjacking, and was charged under 18 U.S.C. 2119(1). Nieves pled guilty; the government agreed to recommend a sentence in "the middle range of the applicable guideline," with no stipulation as to criminal history category. His 60-month sentence exceeded by nine months the top of the guidelines range and by 14 months the government's recommendation. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court abused its discretion by considering unreliable evidence (statement by a codefendant concerning the reasons for disassembling the stolen car), by varying upward based on information already factored into the guidelines range, and by ignoring "the significant mitigating factor" of his youth. View "United States v. Nieves-Mercado" on Justia Law

In 2011, while serving a four-year probation sentence for a robbery, Llanos-Falero conspired to rob Banco Santander de Puerto Rico. His associate drew police away with a bogus 911 call while Llanos-Falero drove two others to the bank. They entered with a loaded 12-gauge shotgun, and stole approximately $38,813 of FDIC-insured deposits. A bank employee activated the bank's silent alarm; the two associates were arrested about 10 minutes after the start of the robbery. Before being charged, Llanos-Falero committed other offenses and was sentenced by a Puerto Rico court to one year and nine months of imprisonment for two counts of domestic violence, and, for illegal possession of a submachine gun, to seven addition years. Llanos-Falero was indicted for the federal crimes in 2014, while serving his Puerto Rico sentences. He entered a plea and was sentenced to 137 months of imprisonment for bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), 2113(d), and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), to run consecutively to the Puerto Rico sentences. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the sentencing judge failed to make the proper inquiry into the effects of Llanos-Falero's medication on his competence to enter a plea and failed to warn Llanos-Falero that his federal sentence might be imposed consecutively with his Puerto Rico sentences, and that the consecutively imposed federal sentence was unreasonable. View "United States v. Llanos-Falero" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced Appellant to thirty-six months’ imprisonment to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release. The applicable sentencing guidelines range recommended a term of imprisonment of twelve to eighteen months. The First Circuit affirmed Appellant’s sentence, holding (1) the district court did not obviously violate Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(h) when it decided to impose a sentence above the guidelines sentencing range, nor did the manner in which it proceeded affect Appellant’s substantial rights; (2) the district court’s decision to impose a sentence of thirty-six months’ imprisonment followed by a three-year term of supervised release was not unreasonable; and (3) Appellant waived his argument that judicial bias warranted recusal. View "United States v. Santini-Santiago" on Justia Law

O.M. was a student of the Falmouth School Department. O.M.’s mother, Ms. M. argued that her daughter’s individualized education program (IEP) specified that Falmouth would instruct O.M. using a Specialized Program Individualizing Reading Excellence (SPIRE) system during her third-grade year, and because Falmouth did not provide O.M. with the SPIRE instruction, the School Department violated O.M.’s right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE) as guaranteed under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The district court entered judgment in favor of Ms. M. The First Circuit reversed, holding that O.M.’s IEP did not mandate that Falmouth use SPIRE, and therefore, the School Department neither breached the terms of the IEP nor denied O.M. a FAPE by omitting such instruction. View "M v. Falmouth School Department" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of five counts of drug trafficking and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. Appellant was sentenced to a term of sixty-three to seventy-eight months. The First Circuit affirmed Appellant’s conviction and sentence, holding (1) the totality of the circumstances here did not present the rare case where any government misconduct was sufficiently blatant, outrageous, or egregious to warrant the dismissal of Appellant’s indictment; (2) the trial court adequately inquired into the existence and extent of any prejudice Appellant suffered after at least two jurors viewed a text message on his phone and effectively mitigated any prejudice suffered by Appellant; and (3) the district court did not err when it refused to decrease Appellant’s offense level during sentencing. View "United States v. Therrien" on Justia Law

Appellant entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana. After a disposition hearing, the district court sentenced Appellant to a fifty-month term of immurement. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court plainly erred in conversing off the record with the probation officer during sentencing without apprising Appellant of the substance of these conversations. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of his sentencing proceeding would have been different but for the two off-the-record conversations between the sentencing judge and the probation officer. View "United States v. Bramley" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to participating in a conspiracy to import one or more kilograms of heroin into the United States and to launder the proceeds of that activity. Defendant was sentenced to 262 months in prison. On appeal, Defendant argued that the government violated the plea agreement during the sentencing hearing and that his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance during the plea negotiations and at the sentencing hearing. The First Circuit (1) affirmed the sentence, holding that there was no breach of the plea agreement; and (2) dismissed the ineffective assistance of counsel claim without prejudice to its reassertion in a collateral proceeding, as there was no reason to make an exception in this case to the rule that this Court does not review ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal. View "United States v. Marin-Echeverri" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Puerto Rico’s Insurance Commissioner (Defendant), claiming that Defendant eliminated her job as a director within the Office of the Insurance Commissioner on account of her political affiliation. The district court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as Plaintiff’s federal discrimination claims for damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief. In so holding, the court rejected Defendant’s argument that her qualified immunity defense entitled her to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s federal damages claim. The First Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and remanded for further proceedings, holding that a reasonable official in Defendant’s position could have understood the First Amendment not to protect Plaintiff against politically motivated removal from her job. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Lopez-Erquicia v. Weyne-Roig" on Justia Law

Appellants sought arbitration with BBVA Securities of Puerto Rico, Inc. and one of its securities brokers, asserting several claims under both federal and Puerto Rico law. An arbitration panel issued an award denying Appellants’ claims. Appellants then filed a complaint in the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance requesting that the court vacate or modify the arbitration award, seeking relief under the Puerto Rico Arbitration Act. Defendants removed the case to the U.S. District Court of the District of Puerto Rico, arguing that the district court had federal question jurisdiction and also had supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Appellants moved to remand the case to Puerto Rico state court for lack of jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion after applying the look-through approach and determining that the underlying statement of claim alleged federal claims. The district court subsequently confirmed the award. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the look-through approach was the correct test in this case; (2) federal jurisdiction existed; and (3) the district court did not err in refusing to vacate the award and in confirming it. View "Ortiz-Espinosa v. BBVA Securities of Puerto Rico, Inc." on Justia Law

Southeast Hospitals Group was formed through a merger of three hospitals, one of which had a union workforce. The union’s collective bargaining agreement granted union members a hiring preference when filling union positions. Southcoast, however, adopted a policy that grants nonunion employees a similar hiring preference for nonunion positions. The union commenced this action by filing an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board’s Regional Director. The Regional Director then filed a complaint with the Board, arguing that the policy unlawfully discriminates against union members. The Board concluded that the policy was invalid because it was not supported by a legitimate and substantial business justification and ordered Southcoast to rescind the policy and provide affirmative relief to affected employees. The First Circuit vacated the Board’s decision, holding that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Remanded. View "Southcoast Hospitals Group v. NLRB" on Justia Law