Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to drug conspiracy and arson charges. Prior to sentencing, Defendant moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that he did not have the opportunity to personally review certain discovery materials. The district court denied the motion. The district court based its sentencing on the finding that Defendant was a career offender under the sentencing guidelines. One of the predicate offenses supporting Defendant’s career offender designation was a Massachusetts conviction for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, which the court found qualified as a “crime of violence” under the “residual clause” of U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2). The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and (2) Defendant’s sentence was constitutional. View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of bank and wire fraud and unlawful monetary transaction. The trial court imposed a below-Guidelines term of 150 months. The court also entered an order of forfeiture in the amount of $2,966,344.37. This amount included all proceeds Defendant received from the convicted transactions, as well as all proceeds Defendant received from uncharged relevant conduct. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable; and (2) the district court had statutory authority to order the forfeiture of assets related to uncharged relevant conduct. View "United States v. Cox" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued to Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, LLC a certificate of public convenience and necessity for a proposed project. The certificate was subject to filing of proof that Tennessee Gas received all applicable authorizations required under federal law. Tennessee Gas subsequently received from the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MassDEP) conditional certification for its proposed project. Petitioners filed a notice of claim for adjudicatory hearing to appeal the conditional certification. Tennessee Gas opposed the request for a hearing, arguing that once the agency had issued a conditional water quality certification, any further review must be pursued through a petition to the First Circuit. Tennessee Gas then filed suit in the District of Massachusetts seeking to bar MassDEP from engaging in further review. Petitioners filed this petition to preserve review of the conditional certification but asked the Court to reject their petition on the grounds that the Court’s review was premature until MassDEP completed its adjudicatory process. The First Circuit dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because there was no order or action of MassDEP in connection with Tennessee Gas’s application for a water quality certification that the Court could review under 15 U.S.C. 717r(d)(1). View "Berkshire Environmental Action Team, Inc. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co." on Justia Law

The three defendants in these consolidated appeals pleaded guilty to superseding informations charging them with, as relevant to this appeal, conspiring to possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the admission of certain lay opinion testimony was within the ambit of the district court’s discretion; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (3) the record before the district court was insufficient to show the required predicate offenses to support one defendant’s sentence, and therefore, the case must be remanded to afford the parties an opportunity to present evidence concerning that defendant’s prior convictions; and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the remaining two defendants. View "United States v. Dunston" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of drug trafficking. The trial judge sentenced Defendant to 360 months’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the one conspiracy charged, that the district court erred in admitting certain hearsay evidence, and that the district court read testimony back to the jury during deliberations without taking adequate steps to ensure the jury did not place undue weight on what it heard. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction as a member of the conspiracy charged in the indictment and proven at trial; and (2) there were no other reversible errors in the record below. View "United States v. Camacho-Santiago" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the delivery drivers for a Maine dairy company fell within the scope of an exemption from Maine’s overtime law. Specifically at issue was an exemption to the overtime law that covers employees whose work involves the “packing for shipment or distribution of” enumerated food products. The drivers argued that these words referred to the single activity of “packing,” whether the packing was for “shipment” or for “distribution.” The district court granted summary judgment to the dairy company, concluding that “distribution” was a stand-alone exempt activity. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the exemption at issue is ambiguous, and, under Maine law, must be construed in the narrow manner that the drivers favor in order to accomplish the overtime law’s remedial purposes. Remanded. View "O'Connor v. Oakhurst Dairy" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of bank fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud. The district court sentenced Defendant to ninety-three months’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay $532,152 in restitution. The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant’s motion for substitution of counsel; (2) did not deprive Defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to an attorney by allowing Defendant to represent himself at trial; and (3) did not abuse its discretion when it declined to dismiss a juror for potential bias because there was no bias as a matter of law. View "United States v. Kar" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pled guilty to aiding and abetting others in obstructing commerce and the movement of articles and commodities in such commerce by robbery (count one) and aiding and abetting others in the possession of a firearm that was discharged during a robbery (count two). The trial court sentenced Appellant to 120 months as to count one and another 120 months as to count two, to be served consecutively. Appellant appealed, arguing that there was an insufficient factual basis for the court’s acceptance of his guilty plea as to count two. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in accepting Appellant’s guilty plea with regards to count two. View "United States v. Diaz-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Amphastar Pharmaceuticals Inc. and its wholly owned subsidiary (collectively, Amphastar) and Sandoz Inc. were competitors in the U.S. market for generic enoxaparin, an anticoagulant. Momenta Pharmaceuticals Inc. served as Sandoz’s contract laboratory. Amphastar filed a complaint alleging antitrust violations by Sandoz and Momenta based on Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations to the United States Pharmacopeial Convention, a private standard-setting organization charged with ensuring the quality of drugs. Defendants brought an infringement suit against Amphastar, resulting in a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction prohibiting Amphastar from selling enoxaparin. The preliminary injunction was later vacated, but it did prevent Amphastar from selling its generic enoxaparin for approximately three months. Amphastar then filed this suit under the Sherman Act seeking damages for lost profits during the pendency of the TRO and injunction. The district court dismissed the complaint under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which immunizes good-faith petition of government entities from antitrust liability. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in applying Noerr-Pennington. Remanded for the district court to consider Defendants’ other arguments in the first instance. View "Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc v. Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of money laundering. The district court sentenced Defendant to forty-two months of imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in instructing the jury regarding the definition of the term proceeds in section 1957; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (3) there was no plain error in the prosecutor’s statements made in his closing argument; (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings challenged by Defendant; and (5) none of Defendant’s remaining arguments on appeal supported the reversal of his convictions. View "United States v. Rivera-Izquierdo" on Justia Law