Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant pleaded guilty to a single count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The sentencing court, ruling on the basis of circumstantial evidence, attributed constructive possession of six Molotov cocktails to Appellant. That finding increased Appellant’s guideline sentencing range and contributed to his eighty-two-month sentence. Appellant appealed, challenging the constructive possession finding. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that although the evidence of constructive possession was circumstantial, it was convincing, and the district court’s inferences from that evidence were plausible. Therefore, the sentencing court did not clearly err in finding that Appellant constructively possessed the six Molotov cocktails. View "United States v. Nunez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs took out a loan to buy a property in Massachusetts. Plaintiffs executed a mortgage naming the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as the mortgagee and executed a promissory note to Chevy Chase Bank, FSB. Plaintiffs later fell behind on their mortgage. U.S. Bank, which was assigned the mortgage and came into physical possession of the note, conducted a foreclosure sale of the property and purchased the property. Plaintiffs filed suit against U.S. Bank, MERS and other defendants, alleging, inter alia, a claim for a declaratory judgment that the foreclosure was invalid. The district court disposed of the complaint by (1) granting Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss several counts for failure to state a claim; (2) granting summary judgment to U.S. Bank on its counterclaim for possession; and (3) granting summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs’ remaining claims and to U.S. Bank on its counterclaim for deficiency. The First Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the entry of judgment in favor of U.S. Bank on its deficiency claim was in error because U.S. Bank did not comply with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, 17B; and (2) the judgment of the district court was otherwise without prejudicial error. View "Galvin v. U.S. Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances within a protected location. The district court sentenced Appellant to a 235-month incarcerative term, a sentence that was within, but at the top of, the guideline sentencing range. The First Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding (1) Appellant’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary; (2) the court recited an incorrect statutory maximum at the change-of-plea hearing, but the error did not affect Appellant’s substantial rights; (3) the district court gave proper consideration to the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a); and (4) Appellant’s sentence was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Rodriguez-Adorno" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked at a Maine law firm for more than twenty-five years and, for many years, was an equity partner. In 2012, Plaintiff filed a long term disability (LTD) claim with Defendant Standard Insurance Company, the claim administrator and insurer of the employee welfare benefit plan offered by Plaintiff’s law firm to its employees. The plan was insured by an LTD policy, also issued by Defendant and which covered Plaintiff. Defendant told Plaintiff that it would approve her claim and that it would use January 28, 2012 as the disability onset date. This appeal concerned only what disability onset year should be used to calculate Plaintiff’s monthly disability amount, Plaintiff arguing that the onset date was on November 2011. The district court entered judgment for Defendant. The First Circuit reversed, holding that Defendant’s decision to use the 2012 onset date was arbitrary and capricious. Remanded to the district court with direction to order Defendant to award Plaintiff retroactive benefits based on a disability onset date of no later than 2011. View "Doe v. Standard Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this case pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), seeking reimbursement for certain expenses connected with the treatment of her teenage son. The plan administrator, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts HMO Blue, Inc. (BCBS) denied the portions of Plaintiff’s claim that were in dispute in this case. The district court upheld BCBS’s action. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, applying the plain language of the ERISA plan, the clear weight of the evidence dictated a finding that the disputed charges were not medically necessary, as defined in the plan, and therefore were not covered. View "Stephanie C. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts HMO Blue, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant divorced his wife in order to transfer assets fraudulently and avoid some tax liability. The district court set aside the separation agreement as a fraudulent transfer and proceeded to redivide and reallocate certain assets applying Massachusetts law. The government’s tax liens attached directly to any assets allocated to Defendant, but the government argued that its tax liens also attached indirectly to certain assets allocated to Defendant’s wife. This appeal concerned the district court’s allocation of two assets that the district court divided more or less evenly. The First Circuit vacated in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) with regard to funds that were directly traceable to the tax shelter that Defendant used to reduce his taxable income for several years, it was not clear whether the district court considered fourteen factors required by Massachusetts law in order to arrive at an equitable division of the parties’ assets; and (2) the government was not entitled to Defendant’s wife’s half of the proceeds from the sale of property owned by Defendant and his wife in Massachusetts on a lien-tracing theory. Remanded. View "United States v. Baker" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a lawsuit against their insurance carrier (Defendant), claiming that Defendant had incorrectly denied coverage. The case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury’s unanimous verdict was for Defendant. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial after learning that the jury foreperson had a prior felony conviction, arguing that the juror was not qualified to serve on the jury under 28 U.S.C. 1865(b)(5). The district court denied the motion for a new trial, concluding that Plaintiffs had not shown that the juror’s service deprived them of a fundamentally fair trial. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the juror’s inclusion was not fatal to the jury’s verdict, and therefore, the district court properly denied Plaintiffs’ new-trial motion. View "Faria v. Harleysville Worcester Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were a group of current and former federal employees working in non-foreign areas located outside the contiguous United States. In addition to their normal salaries, federal employees working in these areas receive cost-of-living allowances (COLAs). Plaintiff filed a complaint challenging the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) regulations that exclude COLAs from the calculation of retirement and other benefits, alleging that these regulations are discriminatory under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and are arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court dismissed the complaint. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly concluded (1) that Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim was barred by the location-based safe harbor provision of 24 U.S.C. 2000e-2(h); (2) that Plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies as to their disparate treatment claim; and (3) that Plaintiffs’ non-discrimination claims were precluded by the Civil Service Reform Act. View "Rodriguez v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2011, Defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances. In 2015, the district court determined that Defendant had violated the conditions of his supervised release, revoked supervised release, and sentenced Defendant to thirty-six months’ imprisonment. Defendant challenged his sentence on appeal. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, in light of the particular details of Defendant’s criminal history and the seriousness of the violations of the conditions of supervised release, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant, and the sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Vazquez-Vazquez" on Justia Law

In 2005, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that title to the Regatta Club in Newport and the parcel of land on which it was constructed belonged to a group of condominium associations. Thereafter, the operator of the Regatta Club (Operator) voluntarily filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Two of the title-holding associations (together, Associations) filed proofs of claim seeking relief for the Operator’s alleged trespass on their property between 1998 and 2005. The First Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s finding that the Associations had impliedly consented to the Operator’s use and occupancy of the Regatta Club and remanded on the issue of whether there was an implied obligation that the Operator pay the Associations for its use and occupancy of the Club. On remand, the bankruptcy court found (1) there was no such implied-in-fact contract between the parties, and (2) the Associations were not entitled to relief under a theory of unjust enrichment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) no implied-in-fact contract existed between the parties; and (2) the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that inequity would not result if the Operator did not pay the Associations for the use and occupancy of the Regatta Club during the claim period. View "Goat Island South Condominium Ass’n v. IDC Clambakes, Inc." on Justia Law