Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant was employed by Appellees as a social worker when she suffered a work-related injury. Appellant sued Appellees, alleging that they failed to accommodate her disability in violation of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, concluding that Appellant did not qualify as a disabled individual under the ADA and that she was one responsible for the breakdown in communications concerning her accommodations. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly found that Appellees could not be held liable for their failure to accommodate because Appellant was responsible for the breakdown in communications. View "Ortiz-Martinez v. Fresenius Health Partners PR, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute in excess of 280 grams of cocaine base and aiding and abetting in the possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The district court sentenced Appellant to a top-of-the-range incarcerative term on count one and the mandatory minimum incarcerative term on count two. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively. On appeal, Appellant challenged his sentence. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in its choice of a criminal history category; and (2) the district court did not misapply the sentencing guidelines in determining that Appellant’s sentence should be imposed consecutively to his undischarged state sentence. View "United States v. Roman-Diaz" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit racketeering, conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering, and other charges related to his membership in a crime syndicate. Defendant appealed, raising fifteen claims of error. The First Circuit affirmed, holding, inter alia, (1) Defendant failed to meet his burden of showing grand jury abuse by the government; (2) the government did not improperly join certain charges; (3) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (4) there was no violation of Defendant’s right to conflict-free counsel; (5) the district court did not violate Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to participate in his own defense; (6) the district court did not violate Defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause; (7) there was no evidentiary error; (8) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (9) Defendant failed to show plain error in his claims of prosecutorial misconduct; and (10) the court properly sentenced Defendant. View "United States v. Ponzo" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of ammunition. The district court found that Defendant’s prior convictions for resisting arrest and assault and battery of a police officer (ABPO) subjected Defendant to an enhancement of his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). In so finding, the judge stated that he felt bound by First Circuit precedent: United States v. Carrigan, United States v. Weekes, and United States v. Dancy. The First Circuit affirmed in part and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress ammunition that was obtained pursuant to a search warrant; (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress statements he made to police during a station house interview; and (3) because Carrigan and Weekes have been called into question by the Supreme Court, and because Dancy relied upon a portion of 18 U.S.C. 924(e) that has since been deemed unconstitutionally vague, the questions previously determined by those cases of whether the Massachusetts offenses of resisting arrest and ABPO qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA must be returned. View "United States v. Faust" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and two other named plaintiffs filed a putative class action suit against defendants in a Massachusetts state court. Defendants successfully sought removal of the suit to a federal district court. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to most, but not all, of Plaintiff’s claims. At Plaintiffs’ urging, the court remanded the case to state court. Plaintiff filed a notice appealing the remand order, followed by a brief devoted to challenging the interlocutory order that dismissed most of his claims. The First Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that Plaintiff waived his right to appeal because, if the order of remand was a final judgment, it was a final judgment to which Plaintiff affirmatively acquiesced without clearly reserving the right to appeal any ruling that may have merged into that judgment. View "Doran v. J. P. Noonan Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought actions for civil liability under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act against four defendants. As to three defendants - Ashvinkumar Patel, Simal Patel, and Bijal, Inc. - the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Bijal, Inc. and the Patels, holding (1) the allegations and inferences in the complaint sufficed as plausible support for pleading statutory violations by the Patel defendants in their own right and as agents for renting out Bijal’s motel space, and by Bijal in consequence of the Patels’ agency; and (2) therefore, the district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss and in denying reconsideration. View "Ricchio v. McLean" on Justia Law

In 2007, removal proceedings were initiated against Petitioner. An immigration judge (IJ), however, deemed Petitioner to be a U.S. citizen. In 2016, Petitioner was convicted of a drug felony, and a second IJ ordered Petitioner removed. The IJ denied Petitioner’s motion to terminate removal proceedings on the basis of the prior IJ’s determination that Petitioner was a U.S. citizen. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal, agreeing that res judicata was inapplicable in the context of an administrative proceeding where doing so would “frustrate[] Congressional intent.” The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) the applicability of res judicata becomes immaterial before this Court because of the jurisdictional limitation imposed by the Immigration and Nationality Act; (2) Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving that he is a United States citizen; and (3) accordingly, the jurisdictional bar in 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2) (C) applies and precludes judicial review of the final order of removal against Petitioner. View "Miranda v. Sessions" on Justia Law

This was the First Circuit’s second set of appeals involving the automatic stay provision of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA). Here, the parties disputed whether four claims included in Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint were within the scope of PROMESA’s temporary stay. Plaintiffs conceded that the majority of their claims were subject to the stay, but the district court allowed the suit to proceed on the four counts at issue, all of which were purportedly brought under various provisions of PROMESA. On appeal, Appellants challenged this ruling. The First Circuit reversed the district court’s holding that the PROMESA stay did not apply to Plaintiffs’ first, second, third, and twelfth causes of action, as the claims at issue plainly constituted attempts to exercise control over revenues of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. View "Lex Claims, LLC v. Garcia-Padilla" on Justia Law

Pumpernickel Express, Inc. carried automotive parts from warehouses in Mansfield, Massachusetts to Toyota dealerships in the region. Pumpernickel’s drivers were represented by a Union. Lily Transportation Corporation later obtained the portion of Pumpernickel’s business that involved distributing parts for Toyota. Lily hired many of Pumpernickel’s former employees, including drivers. The Union demanded that Lily recognize it as the drivers’ bargaining representative. Lily refused. Thereafter, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge, alleging that Lily’s refusal to bargain violated the National Labor Relations Act. The administrative law judge found that, in distributing for Toyota, Lily was a “successor employer” to Pumpernickel, and therefore, Lily was required to recognize and bargain with the Union. The National Labor Relations Board affirmed and ordered Lily to recognize and bargain with the Union. The Board then asked the First Circuit to enforce its order over Lily’s objection. The First Circuit granted the Board’s application for enforcement of its bargaining order, holding that the Board did not err in relying on UGL-UNICCO Service Co.’s successor bar doctrine. View "NLRB v. Lily Transportation Corp" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and possession with intent to distribute more than twenty-eight grams of cocaine base. Appellant was sentenced to 132 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Appellant challenged his sentence, arguing that the district court improperly applied a two-level enhancement, which applies when “[t]he defendant committed [the relevant] offense as part of a pattern of criminal conduct engaged in as a livelihood.” The First Circuit affirmed Appellant’s sentence, holding that the district court was justified in concluding that the two prongs of the criminal livelihood enhancement were satisfied. View "United States v. Gordon" on Justia Law