Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction for carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2119. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s actions were sufficient to allow a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant actually intended to cause harm if that were necessary to steal the car; (2) the district court did not err by admitting Defendant’s confession and finding that it was voluntarily given; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a proposed supplemental jury instruction; and (4) Defendant failed to preserve his challenge to the admission of an in-court witness identification. View "United States v. Diaz-Rosado" on Justia Law

Municipal ordinances banning coal combustion residuals from landfills were preempted by Puerto Rico Environmental Quality Board’s approval of the disposal.AES Puerto Rico, a coal-fired power plant owner, claimed that two municipal (Humacao and Peñuelas) ordinances banning the approved handling of "coal combustion residuals" (CCRs) were preempted by federal and Commonwealth law and violated various provisions of the federal and Puerto Rico constitutions. The Puerto Rico Environmental Quality Board (EQB) had authorized disposal of coal ash at the El Coquí and Peñuelas Valley landfills within those municipalities. The district court granted summary judgment for the municipalities on AES's federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the Commonwealth claims. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the local ordinances may not be enforced to the extent they directly conflict with Commonwealth law as promulgated by the EQB. View "AES Puerto Rico, L.P. v. Trujillo-Panisse" on Justia Law

First Circuit rejects Double Jeopardy challenge to second indictment for cocaine smuggling.On August 15, 2013, Díaz was indicted in the Southern District of Florida for his role in planning and organizing a maritime smuggling operation involving over 1,000 kilograms of cocaine. Five days later, Díaz was indicted in the District of Puerto Rico -- for his role in planning and organizing a maritime smuggling operation involving over 1,000 kilograms of cocaine. The First Circuit rejected his argument that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred his prosecution on the Puerto Rico charges because the Florida charges already encompass the conduct for which he was indicted in Puerto Rico. While the places involved and the two statutory provisions under which Díaz was charged were the same, the lower court concluded that the conspiracies charged in the two indictments were separate ones insofar as the conduct charged in the two indictments involved distinct time periods, personnel, and evidence. View "United States v. Diaz-Rosado" on Justia Law

First Circuit rejects civil rights claims relating to retention of property in car towed for an evidentiary search.Chelmsford police located Denault’s 2000 Nissan parked in Testa’s Lowell driveway. Denault, the suspect in a crime, was in custody. Testa was the mother of Denault's children. The officers had Denault's car towed and secured a warrant. Days later, they executed the warrant; having determined that the car did not contain evidence, they released it to Christopher's Towing. The officers had no contact with Denault. They did not supply, and Christopher's Towing did not request, Denault’s contact information. Testa repeatedly tried to recover the car and her belongings, particularly child booster seats. Testa claims that officers refused to discuss returning the car or its contents unless Testa agreed to be questioned in connection with the Denault investigation; they never informed her that they had released the car. Three months later, Denault's mother showed Tesla a Notice of Abandoned Vehicle sent to Denault's last known address, indicating a lien of $4797.82 for towing, storage, and processing. Neither Testa nor Denault could pay. They sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. They ultimately prevailed on a common-law conversion claim against one officer for $2225. The First Circuit affirmed, noting the “confusing” record and that the plaintiffs had waived claims relating to the initial seizure. View "Denault v. Ahern" on Justia Law

A plaintiff may not bring claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1981 against state actors, including defendants sued in their official capacities as government officials.The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff's section 1981 claims against employees of the City of Boston. Plaintiff, who represented the estate of her late father, challenged her father’s termination from his employment with the Department of Public Works. The district court dismissed the section 1981 claims, concluding that section 1981 provides no implied private right of action for damages against state actors. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Jett v. Dallas Independent School District compelled the result reached by the district court. View "Buntin v. City of Boston" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the revocation of his supervised release and the imposition of a term of imprisonment of twenty-four-months. During Defendant’s period of supervised release for his conviction of conspiracy to bring unauthorized aliens into the United States without going through an authorized port of entry, U.S. Coast Guard personnel interdicted Defendant’s boat off the coast of the Dominican Republic and discovered cocaine. Defendant was then charged with importing and conspiracy to import and possess, with intent to distribute, controlled substances on board a vessel subject to United States jurisdiction. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in admitting hearsay evidence in the form of two Coast Guard officers’ statements; and (2) did not err in finding that Defendant violated his supervised release terms. View "United States v. Bueno-Beltran" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the sentence imposed for his conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm. After Appellant pleaded guilty to the offense, the district court sentenced him to ten years, the statutory maximum. The First Circuit affirmed the sentence, holding (1) the offense-level increases were not invalid under any of the arguments set forth by Appellant; (2) Appellant’s sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable; and (3) Appellant’s claim that his lawyer erred by not advising him to back out of his plea agreement was not appropriately raised on direct review. View "United States v. Lasalle-Gonzalez" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of this putative class action alleging violations under sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The district court concluded that the initial amended complaint failed to meet the heightened pleading requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). Thereafter, the court denied Plaintiffs’ subsequent motion to vacate the judgment and for leave to file a second amended complaint to include purportedly new evidence. The First Circuit held, on de novo review, that (1) the initial amended complaint failed to plead particularized facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter, as required by the PSLRA; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to vacate the judgment and for leave to file a second amended complaint. View "In re Biogen Inc. Securities Litigation" on Justia Law

The First Circuit held that the five-day grace period outlined in 20 C.F.R. 422.210(c) does not apply to final decisions on remand where the individual does not file any written exceptions to the administrative law judge's decision and the Appeals Council does not assume jurisdiction of the case.Plaintiff applied for Title II disability benefits with the Social Security Administration. On remand, an ALJ issued a partially favorable decision on Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff did not file any written exceptions to the ALJ’s decision, and the Appeals Council did not review the ALJ’s decision. Therefore, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. Plaintiff then filed a civil action challenging the ALJ’s decision on remand. The Commissioner moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim as untimely. The district court ruled against Plaintiff and dismissed her complaint for being untimely filed. Plaintiff appealed, asking the First Circuit to hold that the five-day grace period outlined in section 422.210(c) applies to final decisions on remand. The First Circuit declined Plaintiff’s request, holding that Plaintiff cannot apply the five-day grace period under section 422.210(c) to save her civil claim from being untimely. View "Walker-Butler v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

While they were investigating a suspected drug-trafficking operation, federal DEA agents made a warrantless entry into an apartment that, as it turned out, served as a stash house for a second, more substantial, drug-trafficking operation. Defendant, a participant in the second drug-trafficking operation, was charged with conspiring to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence gathered from the apartment. The district court denied the motion, concluding that probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the record supported the district court’s determination that the combination of probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the DEA agents’ warrantless entry into the apartment. View "United States v. Almonte-Baez" on Justia Law