Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint against Nordstrom, Inc. alleging that Nordstrom had improperly obtained money from her and other Massachusetts consumers and requesting that a court order Nordstrom to restore this money and enjoin Nordstrom from continuing to violate Massachusetts law. Plaintiff’s claims were based on her purchase of a cardigan sweater for $49.97 at a Nordstrom Rack outlet store in Boston, Massachusetts. The sweater’s price tag listed both the purchase price and a higher “Compare At” price of $218. Plaintiff claimed that the sweater was never sold for $218 but, rather, that Nordstrom uses the “Compare At” price tags to mislead consumers about the quality of its items. On appeal, Plaintiff challenged the dismissal of her Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A claim and her common law claims for fraud, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) because Plaintiff did not adequately allege that she suffered a legally cognizable injury, her Chapter 93A claims for damages and injunctive relief were both properly dismissed; and (2) the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s remaining claims. View "Shaulis v. Nordstrom, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the decision of Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determining that the Massachusetts crime of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon (ABDW) is categorically a crime involving mural turpitude under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The effect of the BIA’s opinion was to render Petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal. Petitioner had pleaded guilty to one count of Massachusetts ABDW, after which the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. Petitioner applied for cancellation of removal. The immigration judge (IJ) denied relief, concluding that Massachusetts ABDW is categorically a CIMT because of the presence of an aggravating element - the use of a dangerous weapon. The BIA agreed with the IJ. The First Circuit remanded the case for further consideration, as there were too many questions about the BIA’s thinking on the mental state required for a Massachusetts reckless ABDW conviction for the court to review the BIA’s CIMT determination. View "Coelho v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ third amended complaint in this federal-sector employment discrimination case in which Plaintiffs invoked “extravagant” theories of liability. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged deprivations of their First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and sought damages under the Bivens doctrine, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of FBN, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). The complaint also proffered claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The district court dismissed the complaint and entered judgment in Defendants’ favor, ruling that Plaintiffs could not dodge the preclusive effect of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) and Title VII by “creatively” pleading causes of action. The First Circuit agreed with the district court, holding that Plaintiffs’ theories ran “headlong into an impenetrable barrier” forged by the CSRA and Title VII. View "Gonzalez v. Otero" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for Defendant on Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. Plaintiff, a South Carolina resident, brought this diversity suit against Defendant, a Puerto Rico company, alleging that Defendant breached his employment agreement by unilaterally terminating it early. Plaintiff sought damages for unpaid base salary and anticipated commissions on real estate sales. The district court found that Plaintiff’s employment was void because Plaintiff was effecting real estate broker duties without a license under Puerto Rico law. The First Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that summary judgment was inappropriate where it was disputed whether Defendant was aware that Plaintiff did not have a broker’s license at any relevant time and whether some of the work Plaintiff performed and intended to perform was permissible without a broker’s license. View "Farthing v. Coco Beach Resort Management, LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that Defendant’s prior convictions in Massachusetts state court for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon (ABDW) were not convictions for a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to ninety-six months’ imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence after following and adopting the reasoning of Bennett v. United States, slip op. at 54 (1st Cir. July 5, 2017), holding that Massachusetts reckless ABDW is not a violent felony under ACCA’s so-called “force clause.” View "United States v. Windley" on Justia Law

Although the First Circuit identified in this case an unsettled question about the scope of a waiver-of-appeal provision, the court assumed, without deciding, that the waiver was inapplicable in this instance. After reaching the merits of the appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court resentencing Appellant to concurrent sentences of 120 months’ imprisonment and 151 months’ imprisonment. Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Appellant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of two firearms, distribution of cocaine base, and distribution of heroin. The agreement included a provision waiving Appellant’s right to appeal as long as the court sentenced him within the applicable guideline sentencing range. On appeal, the government argued that this appeal was barred by the waiver-of-appeal provision contained in the agreement. The First Circuit held that even if the appeal waiver did not extend to resentencing and Appellant had not forfeited his right to contest the waiver, the record disclosed no grounds upon which to vacate Appellant’s new sentence. View "United States v. Angiolillo" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed this diversity action against Fundacion Damas, Inc. and Banco Popular de Puerto Rico alleging (1) Fundacion was the owner and operator of Hospital Damas, (2) Fundacion committed medical malpractice under Articles 1892 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, and (3) Fundacion and Banco Popular committed negligence by mismanaging funds of a trust. The district court granted Banco Popular’s motion to dismiss count three and Fundacion’s motion for summary judgment on counts one and three. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to present the court with a developed argument that was convincing enough to disturb the judgment of the district court. View "Vargas-Colon v. Fundacion Damas, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in a Massachusetts court. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Appellant’s conviction and sentence and declined to grant collateral relief. Appellant later pursued a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied Appellant’s petition. On appeal, Appellant argued that his trial was unconstitutionally unfair because the Commonwealth failed to turn over evidence that the Commonwealth’s chief witness was given inducements in exchange for favorable testimony and because the Commonwealth suborned the witness’s perjurious testimony to the contrary. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that no inducements were given and that the prosecution did not suborn perjury. View "Jackson v. Marshall" on Justia Law

The arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law and did not exceed his powers in concluding that the dispute in this case could not be arbitrated as a matter of law.Plaintiff Mountain Valley Property, Inc. (MVP) purchased a comprehensive insurance package (the program) from Applied Underwriters, Inc. (AU). As part of the program, MVP entered into a reinsurance participation agreement with Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Co., Inc. (AUCRA) that contained a mandatory arbitration clause and a Nebraska choice-of-law clause. MVP later filed a complaint against AU, AUCRA, and Applied Risk Services, Inc. (collectively, Applied) alleging breach of contract and various tort claims arising from its participation in the program. The district court referred the claims against AUCRA to arbitration. The arbitrator concluded that the dispute could not be arbitrated as a matter of law due to the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the Nebraska Uniform Arbitration Act. AUCRA unsuccessfully moved to vacate the arbitration award under the FAA and to transfer the case to the District of Nebraska. Applied appealed from the denial of the motion to vacate. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law and did not exceed his powers. View "Mountain Valley Property, Inc. v. Applied Risk Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In this business dispute, Plaintiff K’s Merchandise Mart, Inc. challenged orders by the district judge granting summary judgment for Defendants William Weinstein and Frank Morton and requiring Plaintiff to pay Defendants $35,000 in sanctions. The First Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rulings but vacated the sanctions order and remanded for reconsideration of the sanctions matter, holding (1) summary judgment was properly granted on Plaintiff’s claims for fraudulent inducement, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of contract; and (2) the judge erred when he ordered sanctions against Plaintiff rather than against its attorneys. View "Eldridge v. Gordon Brothers Group, LLC" on Justia Law