Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court for Defendant’s convictions for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and illegal possession of a machine gun. The district court sentenced Defendant at the top of the Guidelines range to fifty-seven months’ imprisonment. The First Circuit held (1) the district court did not err in applying a two-level enhancement pursuant to United States Guidelines Manual 3C1.2 for reckless endangerment while fleeing from law enforcement; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing electronic monitoring and a curfew as conditions of Defendant’s supervised release; and (3) Defendant failed to demonstrate that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Vega-Rivera" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s revocation sentence, holding that the district court did err in fashioning the sentence.While on supervised release following his term of imprisonment for a 2002 federal drug felony conviction, Defendant committed a second drug felony in 2014. Defendant was sentenced to up to 120 months’ imprisonment for that drug offense. In a separate proceeding, Defendant’s term of supervise release was revoked and replaced with a thirty-six month prison sentence, to be served consecutively to the 120-month sentence imposed on him for the new drug offense. Defendant challenged only his sentence on appeal. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Defendant’s sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Mulero-Algarin" on Justia Law

The Attorney General has the discretion to cancel the removal of a non-permanent resident alien if the alien, among other things, has ten years of continuous physical presence in the United States. At issue here was whether, for purposes of the “stop-time” rule, an alien’s period of continuous physical presence ends when the alien is served a notice to appear that does not contain the date and time of the alien’s initial hearing. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) answered this question in the affirmative in Matter of Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644 (B.I.A. 2011). In the instant case, Petitioner conceded removability but sought relief in the form of cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1), arguing that the notice to appear had not stopped the continuous residency clock because it was defective where it did not include the date and time of his hearing. An Immigration Judge ordered Petitioner removed. The BIA affirmed, concluding that the notice to appear was effective under the stop-time rule. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA’s decision in Camarillo was entitled to Chevron deference. Therefore, Petitioner was unable to demonstrate the requisite ten years of physical presence and was thus ineligible for cancellation of removal. View "Pereira v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of his untimely motion to reopen removal proceedings based on changed conditions. Petitioner, a Mexican national, conceded a charge of removability under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) but denied the charges. Petitioner later applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. An immigration judge denied the petition. The BIA denied Petitioner’s appeal. More than three years later, Petitioner moved to reopen removal proceedings, arguing that his petition to reopen should be granted because the conditions in his home country had deteriorated and intensified. The BIA denied Petitioner’s motion to reopen. The First Circuit concluded that the BIA properly exercised its discretion and found that Petitioner failed to demonstrate changed conditions. View "Sanchez-Romero v. Sessions" on Justia Law

In this action brought by two individuals (Relators) under the False Claims Act (FCA) and various state analogues, the First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of the complaint. The district court concluded that Relators failed to plead false claims under either the FCA or the state-law versions of the FCA with the particularity required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The First Circuit held (1) the complaint was correctly dismissed to the extent it relied on the alleged falsity of statements made by the product manufacturer in securing approval from the FDA to market a hip-replacement device; but (2) the district court erred in dismissing the complaint to the extent to rested on allegations that the manufacturer sold latently defective versions of its FDA-approved product on unsuspecting doctors who sought government reimbursement for defective products, as Relators’ complaint was sufficient to survive a Rule 9(b) motion to dismiss. View "Nargol v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant to concurrent prison terms of 108 months for his convictions for conspiring to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute twenty-eight grams or more of mixtures containing cocaine and cocaine base and for possessing with intent to distribute a substance containing bk-MDEA, or ethylene. The court held (1) the district court did not err when it refused to strike from the presentence investigation report paragraphs ten and eighty-three, which referenced information given by a cooperating source who claimed Defendant also was involved in purchasing firearms; and (2) the sentence imposed was reasonable. View "United States v. Murchison" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc. alleging that the “comparison prices” on Kohl’s price tags were entirely fictional and selected to mislead consumers about the quality of the products sold by Kohl’s. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that Kohl’s had improperly obtained money from her and other Massachusetts consumers in violation of Massachusetts statutory and common law. Plaintiff requested that a court order Kohl’s to restore this money and enjoin the store from continuing to violate Massachusetts law. The First Circuit (1) affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for damages and injunctive relief and her common law claims for fraud, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment for the reasons stated in Shaulis v. Nordstrom, Inc., No. 15-2354, slip op. at 5-32 (1st Cir. July 26, 2017), also decided today; and (2) affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, holding that the district court did not err in denying the motion. View "Mulder v. Kohl's Department Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint against Nordstrom, Inc. alleging that Nordstrom had improperly obtained money from her and other Massachusetts consumers and requesting that a court order Nordstrom to restore this money and enjoin Nordstrom from continuing to violate Massachusetts law. Plaintiff’s claims were based on her purchase of a cardigan sweater for $49.97 at a Nordstrom Rack outlet store in Boston, Massachusetts. The sweater’s price tag listed both the purchase price and a higher “Compare At” price of $218. Plaintiff claimed that the sweater was never sold for $218 but, rather, that Nordstrom uses the “Compare At” price tags to mislead consumers about the quality of its items. On appeal, Plaintiff challenged the dismissal of her Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A claim and her common law claims for fraud, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) because Plaintiff did not adequately allege that she suffered a legally cognizable injury, her Chapter 93A claims for damages and injunctive relief were both properly dismissed; and (2) the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s remaining claims. View "Shaulis v. Nordstrom, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the decision of Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determining that the Massachusetts crime of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon (ABDW) is categorically a crime involving mural turpitude under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The effect of the BIA’s opinion was to render Petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal. Petitioner had pleaded guilty to one count of Massachusetts ABDW, after which the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. Petitioner applied for cancellation of removal. The immigration judge (IJ) denied relief, concluding that Massachusetts ABDW is categorically a CIMT because of the presence of an aggravating element - the use of a dangerous weapon. The BIA agreed with the IJ. The First Circuit remanded the case for further consideration, as there were too many questions about the BIA’s thinking on the mental state required for a Massachusetts reckless ABDW conviction for the court to review the BIA’s CIMT determination. View "Coelho v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ third amended complaint in this federal-sector employment discrimination case in which Plaintiffs invoked “extravagant” theories of liability. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged deprivations of their First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and sought damages under the Bivens doctrine, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of FBN, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). The complaint also proffered claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The district court dismissed the complaint and entered judgment in Defendants’ favor, ruling that Plaintiffs could not dodge the preclusive effect of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) and Title VII by “creatively” pleading causes of action. The First Circuit agreed with the district court, holding that Plaintiffs’ theories ran “headlong into an impenetrable barrier” forged by the CSRA and Title VII. View "Gonzalez v. Otero" on Justia Law