Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit upheld the finding of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that Petitioner was eligible for removal because third-degree larceny under Connecticut law is an aggravated felony. Removal proceedings were commenced against Petitioner on the basis that his conviction was for a “theft offense” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43) (G) and was therefore an “aggravated felony” that rendered him eligible for removal. The BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. The First Circuit upheld the BIA’s decision, holding that Petitioner’s Connecticut conviction is a conviction for a “theft offense” because the range of conduct sufficient to sustain a conviction for third-degree larceny under Connecticut law is not broader than that which constitutes a “theft offense” under the Immigration and Nationality Act. View "De Lima v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress certain evidence, including a loaded firearm found when law enforcement searched Defendant’s home.Defendant pleaded guilty to being a prohibited person in knowing possession of a firearm or ammunition, reserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress. The First Circuit held (1) the protective sweep of Defendant’s residence was not lawful in light of the circumstances surrounding Defendant’s arrest; and (2) therefore, the evidence that was recovered during and following the sweep should have been excluded as the illegal fruit of that sweep. View "United States v. Delgado-Perez" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the method and manner in which synthetic cathinone alpha-pyrrolidinopentiophenone (alpha-PVP), a drug not listed in the relevant tables incorporated in the sentencing guidelines, is converted into its equivalent for sentencing purposes. Here, the district court used a conversion metric grounded in its finding that methcathinone is the drug referenced in the sentencing guidelines that is most closely related to alpha-PVP. The court then imposed a downwardly variant sentence of seventy-two-months’ imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) any error in the district court’s application of the sentencing guidelines was harmless; and (2) the sentencing court did not clearly err in determining that methcathinone was the controlled substance referenced in the sentencing guidelines that corresponds most closely to alpha-PVP. View "United States v. Giggey" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of extortion under color of official right. Defendant was the former chief of police of the town of Lee, Massachusetts. The conviction stemmed from Defendant’s act of taking money from individuals accused of running a “house of ill repute” in return for a promise to halt their prostitution prosecution. Defendant appealed, arguing that the jury verdict must be overturned because he did not coerce the individuals into paying up, and without proof of coercion, he could not be guilty of extortion. The First Circuit disagreed, holding (1) where the government presents evidence that the government official received a payment under color of official right, it need not prove that the official induced the payment through fear; and (2) the government was not required to show that Defendant originated the idea for the payment rather than simply capitalizing on an idea suggested by one of those individuals. View "United States v. Buffis" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence of sixty months in prison and the restitution schedule set by the district court. After Defendant pled guilty to tax fraud, the district court sentenced Defendant to the highest possible sentence under the plea agreement entered into by the parties. After a separate restitution hearing, the district court ordered that Defendant pay almost $23 million in restitution. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) this court assumes appellate jurisdiction over all of Defendant’s claims; (2) Defendant’s sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable; and (3) the district court correctly rejected Defendant’s argument that his illegal scheme was not the but-for cause of investors’ losses. View "United States v. Olson" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence in this criminal case. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm. The parties stipulated that the government would recommend a sentence at the middle of the applicable guideline range and that the applicable guideline range was thirty to thirty-seven months. The district court, however, imposed a sixty-month sentence, varying from the applicable guidelines range. Defendant appealed, challenging both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. The First Circuit rejected Defendant’s arguments, holding that the district court did not commit procedural or substantive error. View "United States v. Pagan-Walker" on Justia Law

A creditor appealed a bankruptcy court’s decision to deny a creditor’s motion to appoint a trustee for the bankruptcy estate to replace the debtor in possession of that estate. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling. The First Circuit also affirmed, holding (1) the bankruptcy court did not err in determining that appointment of a trustee was not justified under 11 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1); and (2) the bankruptcy court did not err in finding that the appointment of a trustee would not be in the interests of creditors - the standard for appointment of a trustee under 11 U.S.C. 1104(a)(2). View "United Surety & Indemnity Co. v. Lopez-Munoz" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions, rendered after a jury trial, and sentences for conspiring to defraud the United States, stealing government property, and making material false statements in an application for disability benefits. The charges arose from a fraudulent scheme to obtain disability benefits from the Social Security Administration. The court held (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict; (2) any error in the admission into evidence of certain photos printed from Defendant’s Facebook page was harmless; and (3) the district court did not commit plain error in fashioning Defendant’s sentence. View "United States v. Dominguez-Figueroa" on Justia Law

The First Circuit summarily affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims that HSBC could not foreclose on their property under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, 14 and that the mortgage encumbering their property was obsolete by operation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, 33. Plaintiffs borrowed money from a lender to purchase property. Plaintiffs executed a promissory note and mortgage identifying Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as the mortgagee. MERS later assigned the mortgage to HSBC Bank USA, N.A. After Plaintiffs defaulted on their loan HSBC provided notice of a foreclosure sale. Plaintiffs sued HSBC and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the mortgage servicer, to enjoin the sale. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction and granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The First Circuit agreed that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim, substantially for the reasons articulated by the district court. View "Hayden v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that, under Puerto Rico law, Caribbean Seaside Heights Properties, Inc.’s suit for breach of contract against Erikon LLC, its former investment partner, was barred by a release that Seaside had executed earlier in Erikon’s favor. In 2006, the parties executed an agreement to sell their real estate project. As part of that agreement, Seaside and Erikon each agreed to execute releases in favor of the buyer and in favor of each other. When Erikon later refused to pay Seaside reimbursement for expenses Seaside had purportedly incurred in connection with the project, Seaside initiated this suit. The district court granted summary judgment for Erikon, finding the release both valid and applicable. The First Circuit summarily affirmed, holding that the release executed by Seaside provided Erikon with a defense against this action, substantially for the reasons articulated by the district court. View "Caribbean Seaside Heights Properties v. Erikon LLC" on Justia Law