Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court revoking Appellant’s supervised release and imposing a statutorily authorized, but above-guidelines, three-year term of imprisonment. On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court improperly shifted the burdens of production and persuasion at his final revocation hearing and that the error required resentencing. The First Circuit held that Appellate knowingly violated the terms of his supervised release, and that, on the record, the manner in which the district court proceeded could not have caused Appellant any improper prejudice. View "United States v. Lopez-Ortiz" on Justia Law

The First Circuit declined to extend the reach of a maritime lien claim to encompass a pre-established purchase cost of items rented by a charterer pursuant to a temporary rental and service contract and affirmed the judgment of the district court limiting the in rem maritime lien claim of Appellant on the arrested ship, the M/V NOVA STAR.Appellant’s claim arose from its agreement with the ship’s charterer to rent linens and other items for the ship’s ferry service. The district court refused to grant Appellant’s maritime lien claim in its entirety and entered judgment for Appellant in the amount of $16,187. The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding (1) the court properly limited the maritime lien to the amount of $16,187; and (2) the court correctly concluded that the inventory remaining in Appellant’s warehouse in Westbrook, Maine was not “delivered” in a manner as to create a maritime lien for its replacement cost according to the default provision of the rental contract. View "Maine Uniform Rental, Inc. v. Nova Star M/V" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence imposed in connection with his conviction for five counts of using facilities of interstate commerce in connection with the hiring of a person to commit a murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1958(a), holding that the indictment was multiplicitous and that the five counts of conviction should be merged.On appeal, the court held (1) the district court did not commit reversible error in allowing certain testimony; but (2) the appropriate unit of prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 1958(a) is a single plot to murder a single individual, not the number of times that the facilities of interstate commerce were used. Therefore, the indictment used the wrong unit of prosecution and, thus, was multiplicitous. View "United States v. Gordon" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment sentencing Appellant to a 168-month term of immurement in connection with his conviction for conspiring to possess five or more kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute. Appellant pled guilty to the offense pursuant to a plea agreement with the government. In sentencing Appellant, the district court imposed a sentence enhancement based largely on Appellant’s admission that he captained the cocaine-laden boat used in the smuggling attempt. In affirming, the First Circuit held (1) the district court did not err in imposing the captain enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(3)(C) because the basis for the enhancement was plausible; and (2) the government did not breach its plea agreement with Appellant. View "United States v. Carbajal-Valdez" on Justia Law

The First Circuit agreed with the judgment of the district court that the facts in this case alleging unlawful monopolization could not subject San Juan Cable LLC, doing business as “OneLink,” to liability under the so-called “sham” exception to the Noerr-Pennington immunity.Puerto Rico Telephone Company (PRTC) sought permission from the Puerto Rico Telecommunications Regulatory Board (TRB) to offer internet protocol television services to Puerto Rico residents. OneLink, which provided cable television service to residents of several municipalities in Puerto Rico, petitioned the TRB and other governmental tribunals and officials, to impede PRTC’s efforts. PRTC eventually obtained the requested permission from the TRB. Thereafter, PRTC filed this antitrust action claiming that OneLink’s interference with its permitting efforts constituted unlawful monopolization and attempted monopolization. The district court granted summary judgment to OneLink, concluding that OneLink’s actions were immune from suit under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which conditionally protects the right to petition the government. On appeal, PRTC argued that the facts could support a finding that OneLink abused its right to petition and could be found liable under the sham exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the facts in this case could not subject OneLink to liability under the sham exception. View "Puerto Rico Telephone Co. v. San Juan Cable LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the denial of Plaintiff’s motion to vacate and order dismissing his lawsuit against Defendants in which Plaintiff alleged a variety of state law violations in connection with a foreclosure action against a property he owned in Nantucket, Massachusetts. The district court, sua sponte, dismissed Plaintiff’s suit for failure to prosecute after Plaintiff’s counsel failed to appear at a motion hearing. Plaintiff’s counsel subsequently filed a motion for relief from the district court order dismissing the case, citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and claiming “mistake, inadvertence, carelessness or excusable neglect.” The district court denied the motion without prejudice. Plaintiff then refiled the motion, but the district court denied it without any further explanation. The First Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the prior order dismissing his case and vacated the order dismissing his case, holding that, where Plaintiff provided the district court with an innocent and undisputed reason for counsel’s absence, dismissal with prejudice was too harsh given the circumstances. View "Keane v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A." on Justia Law

In this civil rights action brought of a Town of Hull police officer, the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim, affirmed the district court’s holding that Plaintiff’s Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 185(b)(3) claim was waived, and vacated the entry of summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s state claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 185(b)(1) and directed the district court to dismiss this claim without prejudice.When Plaintiff, a decade-long veteran of the police department, was passed over for a promotion, he brought suit alleging that the Town of Hull and its then chief of police alleging that Defendants intentionally let his application lapse and did not promote him, in retaliation for exposing the police chief’s professional misconduct. The district court granted summary judgment for the Town. The First Circuit largely affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly held that Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine dispute as to whether the Town’s Board of Selectmen ratified the alleged retaliation; (2) Plaintiff waived his section 185(b)(3) claim; and (3) the court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claim based on section 185(b)(1) of the Massachusetts Whistleblower Act. View "Saunders v. Town of Hull" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the order of the district court granting Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a Network Investigative Technique (NIT) warrant obtained from a magistrate judge in the Eastern District of Virginia, holding that suppression was not warranted where the FBI acted in good faith reliance on the NIT warrant.The FBI in this case installed the NIT software on Playpen, a child pornography website it had taken over and was operating out of Virginia. The NIT effectively travelled to computers that were downloading from the website and then caused those computers to transmit information back to the FBI allowing the FBI to locate the computers. One computer the FBI located in this manner belonged to Defendant, who lived in Massachusetts. Defendant was charged with one count of possession of child pornography. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that the NIT warrant was issued without jurisdiction because the warrant purported to authorize a search of property located outside the federal judicial district where the issuing judge sat. The First Circuit reversed, holding that because the executing officers acted in good faith reliance on the NIT warrant, the exception set forth in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) applied. View "United States v. Levin" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) rejecting Petitioner’s claim for withholding of removal. In her application for relief, Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras, alleged that she had an abusive relationship with her ex-husband. An immigration judge (IJ) concluded that Petitioner’s testimony was not credible and that the abuse compiled in documentary evidence was not sufficiently serious and persistent to warrant relief. The BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal based solely on its ruling that the IJ did not commit clear error in her adverse credibility determination. The First Circuit remanded the matter for further proceedings, holding that, irrespective of the supportability of the adverse credibility finding, remand was required for the BIA to consider Petitioner’s potentially significant documentary evidence. View "Aguilar-Escoto v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated Appellant’s conviction of one count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962, a provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act, holding that a portion of the jury instructions in which the district court incorrectly described what constitutes “racketeering activity” under the Act warranted reversal.On appeal, Appellant argued, among other things, that his conviction must be overturned because of the mistaken instructions that “firearms” constitute “racketeering activity.” The First Circuit concluded that Appellant’s challenge to the jury instructions had merit and thus did not reach his other challenges. The court held that this was the rare case of an unpreserved challenge to a clear and obvious instructional error that met the plain error standard. View "United States v. Latorre-Cacho" on Justia Law