Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In October 1, 2021, Sean J. Trahan pleaded guilty to possession and knowing access with intent to view child pornography, violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The district court sentenced him to 126 months' imprisonment, applying a sentencing enhancement based on Trahan's prior state conviction for possession of "visual material of child depicted in sexual conduct," which the court determined required a ten-year mandatory minimum under § 2252A(b)(2).The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts initially reviewed the case. Trahan objected to the imposition of the mandatory minimum, arguing that his prior state conviction did not qualify under § 2252A(b)(2) because the state statute criminalized more conduct than the federal statute. He also challenged the imposition of a consecutive six-month sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3147 for an offense committed while on pretrial release, arguing it violated the Sixth Amendment. The district court rejected these arguments and sentenced Trahan to 126 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the phrase "relating to" in § 2252A(b)(2) has a broadening effect, meaning that a state conviction need not be an exact match with the federal definition of child pornography to trigger the mandatory minimum. The court found that Trahan's prior state conviction was sufficiently related to the federal definition to warrant the enhancement. Additionally, the court rejected Trahan's Alleyne challenge, concluding that any error in imposing the consecutive sentence under § 3147 was harmless because there was overwhelming evidence that Trahan committed the offense while on pretrial release. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's 126-month sentence. View "United States v. Trahan" on Justia Law

Henry Donaldo Gonzalez-Arevalo, a native and citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States without authorization in 2003, returned to Guatemala in 2010, and reentered the U.S. without authorization in 2012. He was detained by immigration officials in January 2012. An asylum officer conducted a credible fear interview and determined that Gonzalez-Arevalo had established a credible fear of persecution in Guatemala. He feared harm from the relatives of the man who murdered his father and uncle, as they believed Gonzalez-Arevalo was responsible for the man's incarceration. The Department of Homeland Security served him with a Notice to Appear in immigration court, charging him with removability as a noncitizen not in possession of a valid entry document.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Gonzalez-Arevalo credible but denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ determined that his experiences in Guatemala did not rise to the level of persecution and that his proposed particular social group (PSG) was not cognizable. The IJ concluded that his fear of retribution over personal matters was not a basis for asylum, as the attacks were motivated by vengeance for the incarceration of the murderers, not on account of a statutorily protected ground. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that Gonzalez-Arevalo did not show that a protected ground was or would be at least one central reason for his persecution.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA's decision. The court found that substantial evidence supported the agency's finding that Gonzalez-Arevalo's family membership was incidental or subordinate to his persecutors' desire for vengeance. The court concluded that Gonzalez-Arevalo failed to establish a nexus between his harm and a protected ground, thus denying his petition for review. View "Gonzalez-Arevalo v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves The Satanic Temple, Inc. (TST), an atheistic organization that venerates Satan, which sued the City of Boston. TST alleged that Boston's failure to invite it to give an invocation before City Council meetings violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the Free Exercise Clause of the Massachusetts Constitution. TST also argued that the district court abused its discretion by issuing a protective order preventing the deposition of Michelle Wu, a former City Councilor and current Mayor of Boston.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of Boston and denied TST's cross-motion for summary judgment. The court found that TST had not shown that Boston's legislative prayer practice violated the Establishment Clause or the Massachusetts Free Exercise Clause. The court also ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion by issuing a protective order preventing TST from deposing Mayor Wu.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that TST had not demonstrated that Boston's legislative prayer practice, either on its face or as applied, violated the Establishment Clause or the Massachusetts Free Exercise Clause. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the protective order preventing the deposition of Mayor Wu. The appellate court emphasized that Boston's practice of selecting invocation speakers based on their contributions to the community was constitutional and did not show evidence of religious discrimination. View "Satanic Temple, Inc. v. City of Boston" on Justia Law

Fesnel Lafortune, a Haitian national, entered the U.S. on a B-2 visitor visa in 2008 and overstayed. In 2019, he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud and aggravated identity theft, receiving a combined prison sentence of 31 months. Following his convictions, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged him with removability due to his lack of lawful status and his conviction for an aggravated felony involving fraud exceeding $10,000.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Lafortune removable and denied his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Lafortune, appearing pro se, requested continuances to find counsel, which were denied. He admitted to the allegations and expressed fear of returning to Haiti. The IJ ruled him ineligible for asylum and other protections, citing his conviction as a particularly serious crime. Lafortune appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which remanded the case for him to secure counsel. On remand, the IJ again denied his requests for continuances and upheld the original decision. Lafortune, now with counsel, appealed again to the BIA, which dismissed his appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the BIA's decision, agreeing that Lafortune's conviction for conspiracy to commit bank fraud constituted a particularly serious crime, making him ineligible for withholding of removal. The court also found no error in the IJ's and BIA's handling of Lafortune's CAT claim, concluding that he failed to demonstrate a particularized risk of torture by or with the acquiescence of Haitian officials. The petition for review was denied. View "Lafortune v. Garland" on Justia Law

Nathan Reardon, the appellant, pleaded guilty in 2022 to five counts of bank fraud related to fraudulent loan applications for pandemic-relief funds. He was sentenced to five concurrent twenty-month terms of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. The First Circuit previously vacated a special condition of his supervised release that banned him from self-employment due to inadequate explanation. On remand, the district court provided a fuller explanation and retained the condition. Reardon’s supervised release began on July 7, 2023, but within six weeks, the probation office filed a petition to revoke it, citing multiple violations, including failure to provide financial information, engaging in self-employment, and incurring new credit charges without approval.The United States District Court for the District of Maine held a preliminary hearing and found probable cause for the violations, leading to Reardon's detention. At the revocation hearing, Reardon did not contest the violations. The district court calculated a guideline sentencing range of three to nine months and ultimately imposed a nine-month term of imprisonment followed by twenty-five months of supervised release. The court noted the immediacy and flagrancy of Reardon’s violations and his disregard for the conditions of his release.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court found no procedural error, noting that the district court had adequately considered the relevant statutory sentencing factors and addressed the mitigating factors presented by Reardon. The court also held that the nine-month sentence was substantively reasonable given the nature and circumstances of Reardon’s violations. View "United States v. Reardon" on Justia Law

In November 2020, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) was alerted by the Puerto Rico Police Department to a potential child exploitation case involving a sixteen-year-old female victim. HSI agents executed an arrest warrant for the appellant and seized various electronic devices, including his cellular phones, which contained numerous videos of him sexually abusing the victim. The appellant was charged with producing child pornography, possessing child pornography, and transporting a minor for criminal sexual activity. He entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to producing child pornography and transporting a minor, while the possession charge was dismissed.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico accepted the plea agreement and ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI). The PSI recommended guideline sentencing ranges of up to thirty years for producing child pornography and life imprisonment for transporting a minor. The appellant objected to a five-level enhancement for engaging in a pattern of prohibited sexual conduct, arguing it would create a sentencing disparity among similarly situated defendants in Puerto Rico. The district court rejected this argument, noting that sentencing disparity considerations primarily target national disparities and that the cases cited by the appellant were not comparable. The court sentenced the appellant to 292 months in prison for each count, to be served concurrently, and deferred ruling on a $15,000 restitution claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found the appellant's claim of sentencing disparity unpersuasive, noting that the district court had appropriately considered both national and local disparities and found the cited cases dissimilar. The court also dismissed the appellant's challenge to the restitution order for lack of jurisdiction, as the appellant had not filed a notice of appeal following the amended judgment that included the restitution award. The judgment of the district court was affirmed in part and dismissed in part without prejudice. View "United States v. Gonzalez-Rivera" on Justia Law

Carl Langston was convicted of possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the felon-in-possession statute. Langston argued that this statute is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment as applied to him, given his prior convictions for theft and drug trafficking under Maine law. He also challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a police stop and several sentencing decisions.The United States District Court for the District of Maine denied Langston's motion to suppress, finding that the police stop was based on reasonable suspicion. Langston then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. At sentencing, the district court applied a four-level enhancement for possessing a firearm during a felony assault on an officer and denied Langston a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, citing his conduct during pretrial release.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed Langston's claims. The court held that Langston's Second Amendment challenge failed under the plain-error standard because it was not "clear" or "obvious" that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him. The court noted that the Supreme Court has consistently referred to felon-in-possession laws as "presumptively lawful."The court also upheld the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, agreeing that the totality of the circumstances gave rise to reasonable suspicion for the police stop. Additionally, the court found no plain error in the application of the sentencing enhancement for felony assault on an officer and ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in relying on hearsay evidence to conclude that Langston violated his pretrial release conditions. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of the acceptance-of-responsibility credit, noting the similarities between Langston's conduct at the time of his arrest and during his pretrial release.The First Circuit affirmed Langston's conviction and sentence. View "US v. Langston" on Justia Law

The case involves Edgar Reyes-Colón, who was subjected to an involuntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition filed by Banco Popular de Puerto Rico in 2006. The bankruptcy court dismissed the petition in 2016, finding that Banco Popular failed to join the requisite number of creditors. Reyes-Colón subsequently filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs under 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(1) and initiated an adversary proceeding alleging bad faith under 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(2).The bankruptcy court denied Reyes-Colón's motion for attorney's fees, ruling it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction as the motion was filed after the case was closed. Reyes-Colón appealed to the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, which affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, adding that the motion was untimely under local rules requiring such motions to be filed within fourteen days after the issuance of the mandate. Reyes-Colón then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.The First Circuit held that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over post-dismissal § 303(i) motions, as such motions necessarily require post-dismissal jurisdiction. However, the court affirmed the denial of the attorney's fees motion on the grounds that it was untimely, as it was filed 365 days after the mandate issued, far exceeding the fourteen-day limit set by local rules.Regarding the adversary proceeding, Reyes-Colón filed a motion for withdrawal of reference to have the district court adjudicate the case. The district court denied the motion as untimely, conflating the timeliness of the motion for withdrawal with the timeliness of the § 303(i) motion. The First Circuit vacated this decision, clarifying that the timeliness of the motion for withdrawal should be measured from the filing of the adversary proceeding, not the dismissal of the involuntary petition. The case was remanded for further consideration of whether there is cause to withdraw the reference. View "Reyes-Colon v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico" on Justia Law

Eric Cohen, experiencing a psychotic episode, attacked his girlfriend and fled into the cold waters of Portland's Back Cove, where he eventually drowned from hypothermia. His estate sued the City of Portland and several members of its police and fire departments, alleging violations of Cohen's substantive due process rights due to a failure to rescue him from a state-created danger and inadequate crisis intervention training.The United States District Court for the District of Maine dismissed the state-created danger claims against two police officers, Sergeants Christopher Gervais and Michael Rand, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court found that the officers' actions did not create or enhance the danger to Cohen. After discovery, the court granted summary judgment to a firefighter, Ronald Giroux, and the City of Portland. The court concluded that Giroux's actions did not cause Cohen's death and that the City could not be held liable for failure to train its employees since no individual defendant was found to have violated Cohen's constitutional rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's rulings. The appellate court held that neither Gervais nor Rand's actions constituted an affirmative act that created or enhanced the danger to Cohen. The court also found that Giroux's threat did not factually or legally cause Cohen's death. Finally, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the City of Portland, as there was no predicate constitutional violation by any individual defendant to support a failure-to-train claim. View "Cohen v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

The Acting Secretary of Labor filed a lawsuit against F.W. Webb Company, alleging that the company misclassified its Inside Sales Representatives (ISRs) as exempt administrative employees, thereby violating the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) overtime and recordkeeping requirements. Webb, a wholesale distributor of engineering and construction products, employed over 600 ISRs who were responsible for selling products to various customers. The ISRs were classified as exempt from FLSA overtime requirements, despite some working over forty hours a week without receiving overtime pay. The ISRs' duties included interacting with customers, providing quotes, and managing orders, but they did not have managerial responsibilities over other employees.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, finding that the ISRs' primary duty was to make sales, which is directly related to Webb's core business purpose of selling products. The court concluded that the ISRs did not qualify for the administrative exemption under the FLSA because their primary duty was not related to the management or general business operations of Webb. Consequently, the court found that Webb violated the FLSA by failing to pay overtime and maintain proper records for the ISRs.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the ISRs' primary duty was to sell Webb's products, which is directly related to the company's business purpose. The court held that the ISRs did not perform work directly related to the management or general business operations of Webb, and thus, did not qualify for the administrative exemption under the FLSA. The court emphasized that the ISRs' customer service and advisory roles were part of their sales duties and not separate administrative functions. View "Su v. F.W. Webb Company" on Justia Law