Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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The First Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed upon Defendant in connection with his conviction for knowing and intentional distribution of a controlled substance, holding that the district court properly denied an offense-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under the sentencing guidelines.During the sentencing proceeding, Defendant stipulated that certain conduct constituted “relevant conduct” within the meaning of USSG 1B1.3. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in refusing to grant him an offense-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility because the disputed conduct was not relevant conduct. The First Circuit disagreed, holding that the district court did not clearly err in refusing to grant Defendant an offense-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. View "United States v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The First Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed upon Defendant in connection with his conviction for knowing and intentional distribution of a controlled substance, holding that the district court properly denied an offense-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under the sentencing guidelines.During the sentencing proceeding, Defendant stipulated that certain conduct constituted “relevant conduct” within the meaning of USSG 1B1.3. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in refusing to grant him an offense-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility because the disputed conduct was not relevant conduct. The First Circuit disagreed, holding that the district court did not clearly err in refusing to grant Defendant an offense-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. View "United States v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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On the merits of the remaining portion of this appeal not dismissed as moot, the First Circuit held that the district court properly struck a local union (“UDEM”) as a plaintiff and dismissed this case brought challenging the validity of an international union’s (“ILA”) decision to place UDEM, one of ILA’s affiliates, into a trusteeship after UDEM opposed ILA’s plan to merge it with other local unions.When UDEM filed suit against ILA, the district court ruled that the trusteeship was lawfully imposed, denied UDEM’s motion for a preliminary injunction against the trusteeship, and struck UDEM as a party on the grounds that it did not have authorization from the trustee to sue ILA. Because the sole plaintiff was stricken, the district court dismissed the complaint. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) UDEM’s appeal from the denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction was moot due to the termination of the trusteeship; and (2) on the merits of the remainder of the appeal, UDEM’s vote to disaffiliate before the ILA placed it in trusteeship was invalid under the ILA constitution, and the trusteeship was legally imposed under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, leaving UDEM without authority to bring this lawsuit absent permission from the trustee. View "Union de Empleados de Muelles de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass’n, AFL-CIO" on Justia Law

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Here, the First Circuit clarified its circuit’s emergency aid doctrine, holding that police officers seeking to justify their warrantless entry into homes need only demonstrate an objectively reasonable basis for believing that a person within the house is in need of immediate aid. See Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009). The court thus modified its previous pronouncements in United States v. Martins, 413 F.3d 139 (1st Cir. 2005), and its progeny, clarifying that police officers need not establish that their belief approximated probable cause that such an emergency existed.In this case, the district court entered judgment for Defendants, police officers and the City of Taunton, concluding that the officers did not commit a Fourth Amendment violation because their conduct fell within the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement. The First Circuit took the opportunity in this case to clarify its emergency aid doctrine to bring its case law in line with Supreme Court precedent. The court then affirmed on the basis that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity and no claim was stated against the City. View "Hill v. Walsh" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions for federal program bribery, lying to a federal agent, and obstructing justice. The court held that, contrary to Defendant’s arguments on appeal, (1) the district court’s jury instructions did not effect a constructive amendment of the indictment on the bribery count; (2) the erroneous inclusion of a unanimity instruction in the jury charge on the particular benefits included within the “stream of benefits” alleged by the government on the bribery count did not prejudice Defendant; and (3) the court did not err in admitting evidence of prior bad acts and adequately instructed the jury about the testimony of immunized cooperating witnesses. View "United States v. Lopez-Cotto" on Justia Law

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In this certified class action brought under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the district court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs failed to adduce evidence necessary to proceed to trial.Plaintiffs sued Fidelity Management Trust Company, the fiduciary for a fund in which Plaintiffs had invested, arguing that Fidelity breached its duties of loyalty and prudence in managing the fund. The district court granted summary judgment for Fidelity, finding that Plaintiffs’ arguments lacked the evidentiary support needed to survive summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court employed the correct legal test in its evaluation of the evidence; and (2) the district court correctly held that Plaintiffs had presented insufficient evidence to proceed to trial on their claims of disloyalty and imprudence. View "Ellis v. Fidelity Management Trust Co." on Justia Law

Posted in: ERISA
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In 1991, Valerio, a citizen of Costa Rica, entered the U.S. without inspection. She was apprehended and placed in deportation proceedings but failed to appear. Valerio's then-boyfriend purchased her a birth certificate and social security card in the name of Rosa Hernandez, a U.S. citizen who lived in Puerto Rico. From 1995-2007, Valerio used Hernandez's identity to secure employment, open lines of credit, purchase cars and a home, and defraud the government of over $176,000 in housing assistance, food stamps, and other welfare benefits. In 2006, Hernandez learned about the fraud. Valerio was apprehended and was found guilty of aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A and three counts of mail fraud. 18 U.S.C. 1341. After Valerio served her sentence, DHS reopened Valerio’s deportation proceeding but mistakenly stated that she was subject to removal. An IJ denied her applications for asylum and withholding of removal, finding the conviction for aggravated identity theft a "particularly serious crime" under section 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). Following a remand, the BIA concluded that in deportation and removal proceedings alike, its longstanding multi-factor "Frentescu" framework for determining whether a nonaggravated felony qualifies as a "particularly serious crime" remains the same, and again found Valerio ineligible for withholding. The First Circuit agreed. The nature and circumstances of Valerio's crime were fully and properly considered." View "Valerio-Ramirez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit remanded this immigration case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) due to its insufficient explanation of why the least culpable conduct prohibited under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, 2 is morally reprehensible, and why the statute’s requirement of “malice,” as construed by Massachusetts courts, qualifies the crime as a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT).Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, was charged as removable. Petitioner denied his removability and, in the alternative, requested several forms of relief. Petitioner was previously convicted of the crime of Massachusetts arson. The immigration judge (IJ) concluded that Petitioner’s Massachusetts crime was categorically a CIMT. The IJ also found Petitioner ineligible for relief from removal on the basis that he failed to prove that his conviction was not an aggravated felony. The BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal in an opinion that replicated the IJ’s reasoning. The First Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review, vacated the BIA’s opinion, and remanded for further proceedings for the reasons set forth above. View "Rosa Pena v. Sessions" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision upholding the Commissioner’s notice of deficiency against Transupport, Inc. The notice of deficiency reduced Transport’s cost of goods sold, reduced deductions it took for compensation paid to four employee-shareholders, and assessed a twenty percent accuracy-related penalty for tax years 2006 through 2008.This was the Tax Court’s second opinion in this case, the first of which addressed whether Transupport committed fraud. The First Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision in Transupport II, as to which this appeal was taken, holding that the Tax Court (1) did not make errors of law or err in its findings of fact when upholding the notice of deficiency’s adjustment to deductions Transupport took for compensation paid to the employee-shareholders; (2) did not clearly err in determining Transupport’s gross profit percentage with regard to the cost of goods sold; and (3) did not clearly err in applying the accuracy-related penalty. View "Transupport, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, holding that the seizure of contraband in Defendant’s undershorts did not violate the “plain feel” doctrine.During a pat-down incident to a Terry stop, a Drug Enforcement Administration agent discovered a softball-sized object stashed in Defendant’s undershorts. The agent arrested Defendant under the suspicion that the object was contraband. A subsequent search of Defendant’s person confirmed the agent’s suspicion that the object contained controlled substances. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the search and seizure were reasonable, and thus, Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. View "United States v. Rasberry" on Justia Law