Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this declaratory judgment action filed by a professional liability insurer seeking to establish that it had no duty to defend its insured in two state court proceedings, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting the declaratory judgment for the insurer, holding that the district court correctly determined that the claims against the insured in both lawsuits fell outside the professional liability coverage provided by the insurance policy.The insured, a physician, was the defendant in two civil suits filed in state courts in Maine and Maryland. The insured’s ex-wife claimed that the insured used his status as a doctor to obtain her medical records during their deteriorating marriage so that he could harass and embarrass her. The district court concluded that the insurer had no duty to defend the insured in either lawsuit. The First Circuit affirmed after a close review of the policy at issue, holding that the insurer had no duty to defend the insured in either the Maryland or the Maine proceedings. View "Medical Mutual Insurance Co. of Maine v. Burka" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment against Plaintiff, a faculty member, on her claim of retaliation under Title VII and the Maine Human Rights Act against Defendant, the university that employed her, holding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment.In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the university retaliated against her after she complained about sexual harassment by her department chair and supervisor. The alleged retaliatory acts included Plaintiff’s transfer to a new department after obtaining her consent to transfer by making misrepresentations about how the transfer would affect her professional responsibilities. The First Circuit remanded the case, holding that summary judgment was improper because there were genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Defendant misled Plaintiff into transferring departments and as to whether Plaintiff’s transfer was the true reason for her change in teaching assignments. View "Carlson v. University of New England" on Justia Law

The First Circuit dismissed this appeal in part for want of appellate jurisdiction and otherwise affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the underlying action asserting a claim under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. 1350, and common-law claims for negligence and civil conspiracy, holding that this Court lacked jurisdiction to consider two of Defendant's claims on appeal.Plaintiff’s complaint premised jurisdiction both on the ATS and on diversity of citizenship. Plaintiff also invoked the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The district court dismissed the ATS claim for want of subject-matter jurisdiction and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Defendant appealed. The First Circuit held (1) this Court lacked jurisdiction to consider Defendant’s request to purge certain unflattering comments from the district court’s opinion; (2) judicial estoppel barred Defendant’s argument that the district court, even after dismissing the ATS claim, had an alternative basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claim; and (4) this Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Defendant’s claim that the district court erred in declining to grant his first motion to dismiss. View "Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively" on Justia Law

In this consolidated appeal from adversary proceedings challenging an alleged diversion of funds to which Peaje Investments LLC (Peaje) claimed it was entitled, the First Circuit held that Peaje did not hold a statutory lien on certain toll revenues of the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (Authority).The Authority and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico commenced bankruptcy cases under Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. 2101-2241. Peaje, the beneficial owner of $65 million of uninsured bonds issued by the Authority, instituted adversary proceedings alleging that its bonds were secured by a lien on certain Authority toll revenues and that the Authority and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico were diverting funds to which Peaje was entitled under the lien and using them for purposes other than paying the bonds. The First Circuit affirmed the Title III court’s primary grounds for its order denying Peaje’s request for a preliminary injunction and relief from the stay and otherwise vacated and remanded the matter, holding (1) Peaje did not hold a statutory lien on Authority toll revenues; and (2) now that it is clear that Peaje has no statutory lien, the district court’s alternative reasons for denying relief should be reconsidered de novo on an updated record. View "Peaje Investments LLC v. Puerto Rico Highways & Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying the request for relief from a stay of actions against PREPA sought by holders of revenue bonds issued by PREPA (the bondholders), holding that the district court erred in concluding that the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) sections 305 and 306, 48 U.S.C. 2165, 2166, precluded it from granting such relief.PREPA filed for bankruptcy under Title III of PROMESA, which triggered an automatic stay of most actions by creditors against PREPA. The bondholders, who accused PREPA of breaching a promise to seek a rate increase sufficient to cover debt payments, of failing to collect on customer accounts, and of mismanaging operations, asked for relief from the automatic stay in order to file suit to have a receiver appointed to manage PREPA and seek a rate increase sufficient to cover debt servicing. The Title III court denied the bondholders’ request for relief from the automatic stay. The First Circuit vacated the court’s order and remanded the matter for further proceedings, holding (1) the court erred in concluding that PROMESA sections 305 and 306 prohibited it from granting relief; and (2) the record was inadequate to find support upon which to rest the Title III court’s finding that “cause” did not exist under 11 U.S.C. 362(d)(1) to lift the stay. View "Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) v. Ad Hoc Group of PREPA Bondholders" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed in connection with the district court’s revocation of Defendant’s supervised release, holding that Defendant’s sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and that the sentence was substantively reasonable.After he was released from federal custody following a drug trafficking conviction, Defendant pleaded guilty to felony drug possession in state court. The district court revoked Defendant’s supervised release and imposed a sentence of twenty-four months’ imprisonment, concluding that Defendant’s conduct violated his conditions of supervised release. On appeal, Defendant challenged the substantive reasonableness of his sentence and argued that because his drug addiction is a disease, sentencing him to a term of imprisonment for manifesting a condition of his disease was cruel and unusual punishment. The First Circuit disagreed, holding (1) it is not “clear or obvious” that the practice of incarcerating defendants for drug use and possession is unconstitutional; and (2) Defendant’s two-year sentence is not substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Sirois" on Justia Law

In this action brought under the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) the First Circuit denied the petition for review filed by Petitioners, holding that the Surface Transportation Board (STB) did not err by concluding that certain activities at a Grafton & Upton Railroad Company (G&U) facility involving wood pellets qualified as “transportation by rail carrier” and so fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the STB.The Upton, Massachusetts board of selectmen concluded that the ICCTA preempted local regulation of the wood-pellet activities at G&U’s local facility. Petitioners, who lived near the facility, asked the STB for a declaratory order that these activities were not part of “transportation by rail carrier” under ICCTA because they were manufacturing activities, and therefore, there could be no federal preemption of otherwise-applicable state and local regulations. The STB concluded that the complained-about activities qualified as “transportation” under the ICCTA and therefore fell within the STB’s jurisdiction. The First Circuit denied Petitioners’ petition for review, holding that Petitioners failed to show that the STB acted arbitrarily or capriciously, abused its discretion, or otherwise violated the law. View "Del Grosso v. Surface Transportation Board" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence for participating in a conspiracy to bribe an agent of an organization receiving federal funds and of receiving a bribe, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court proceedings.Defendant, a former Puerto Rico Superior Court Judge, was found guilty of both counts by a jury. Defendant was sentenced to sixty months of imprisonment for one count and 120 months of imprisonment for the other count, to be served concurrently. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence supporting Defendant’s convictions; (2) Defendant did not demonstrate that any alleged error in the government’s opening statement and closing argument or in the admission of certain testimony affected his substantial rights or that they impaired the fairness, integrity, or the public reputation of the judicial proceedings; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in upholding a witness’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege; and (4) any claimed sentencing error would be harmless. View "United States v. Acevedo-Hernandez" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellant’s 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition, holding that Appellant’s three prior convictions were Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) predicates, and therefore, Appellant’s sentence as an armed career criminal was proper.On appeal, Appellant argued that his sentence under the ACCA was unconstitutional under Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), Supreme Court precedent decided after his earlier appeal from his conviction was rejected. The First Circuit disagreed, holding that three of Appellant’s convictions qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA’s force clause, and therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing Appellant’s section 2255 petition. View "Lassend v. United States" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s 180-month sentence for conspiracy to possess five kilograms or more of cocaine with intent to distribute, holding that the district court’s failure to impose a downward departure or downward variance was not an abuse of discretion and that Defendant’s sentence was substantively reasonable.After Defendant pleaded guilty to the offense, he sought a downward departure under U.S.S.G. 5H1.4 - as well as a downward variance - arguing that his life would be shortened by a guidelines sentence since prison facilities would be unable to address fully his medical needs. The court imposed a sentence within the guidelines range. The First Circuit affirmed the sentence, holding (1) Defendant’s health condition did not warrant a downward departure; (2) Defendant’s arguments for a downward variance were properly rejected by the district court; and (3) Defendant’s sentence was both “plausibly reasoned and within the universe of reasonable sentences.” View "United States v. Madera-Rivera" on Justia Law