Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In November 2004, Julio Rodríguez-Méndez participated in a carjacking in Puerto Rico while possessing a firearm. He was first prosecuted in a Puerto Rico Commonwealth court for robbery of a motor vehicle and carrying a weapon without a license, to which he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to twelve years in prison. Subsequently, a federal grand jury indicted him on three counts related to the same carjacking, including unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Rodríguez pleaded guilty to the felon-in-possession count, and the other charges were dismissed. He was sentenced to 216 months in prison, partly due to being classified as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).Rodríguez filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to vacate his conviction on double jeopardy grounds and to challenge his ACCA enhancement. The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico denied his motion, holding that double jeopardy did not apply and that his prior convictions for motor vehicle robbery qualified as ACCA predicates.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Rodríguez's double jeopardy claim, stating that the federal felon-in-possession offense and the Commonwealth firearm offense are separate offenses under the Blockburger test, as each requires proof of an element that the other does not. However, the court agreed with Rodríguez that his prior convictions under Article 173B of the Puerto Rico Penal Code did not qualify as ACCA predicates. The court found that the statute's definition of "intimidation" was broader than the ACCA's requirement for violent felonies, as it included threats against property, not just persons.The First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Rodríguez's double jeopardy claim but reversed the denial of his § 2255 motion regarding the ACCA enhancement, vacating his sentence and remanding for resentencing. View "Rodriguez-Mendez v. United States" on Justia Law

Mary E. Buscone, a Chapter 13 debtor, appealed an order rejecting her objection to a proof of claim for a Massachusetts state-court judgment owed to Ann Tracy Botelho. In a previous Chapter 7 bankruptcy, Botelho sought a determination that her judgment against Buscone was excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(4). Due to discovery abuse by Buscone and her counsel, the bankruptcy court entered a default judgment for Botelho. In her current Chapter 13 bankruptcy, Buscone objected to Botelho's proof of claim on the same grounds as before and argued that the interest rate and accrual date prescribed by Massachusetts state law should not apply to the judgment.The bankruptcy court overruled Buscone's objection, and the district court affirmed. Buscone then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The appellate court reviewed the bankruptcy court's findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. The court also reviewed the application of issue preclusion and determinations of post-judgment interest rates without deference.The First Circuit rejected Buscone's arguments. It held that she was precluded from raising the same affirmative defense to Botelho's proof of claim that she asserted in her motion to dismiss Botelho's adversary proceeding in the Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The court applied an exception to the actual-litigation requirement for issue preclusion, noting that the default judgment in the Chapter 7 proceeding was entered as a sanction for Buscone's misconduct. The court also held that the post-judgment interest on the state-court judgment debt should accrue at the rate set by Massachusetts law from the date of the state-court judgment's entry. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Buscone v. Botelho" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Kelechi Collins Umeh, was involved in a conspiracy to commit bank fraud. From June 2018 to January 2020, Umeh participated in a scheme that defrauded over 30 victims of more than $1.3 million through various online scams, including romance scams, advance fee scams, and business email compromise scams. Umeh, a Nigerian national, used fake passports to open bank accounts under false identities, into which the fraudulently obtained funds were deposited. He then withdrew the proceeds, with nearly $550,000 attributed to accounts he controlled.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts initially handled the case. Umeh was arrested in July 2022 and, after his initial appearance, requested appointed counsel. He later entered into a plea agreement, waiving indictment and pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud. The plea agreement detailed the maximum penalties, potential immigration consequences, and the government's sentencing recommendations. During the change-of-plea hearing, the district court conducted a colloquy with Umeh, confirming his understanding of the plea agreement and the rights he was waiving.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Umeh argued that errors during the change-of-plea colloquy rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary. However, the court found that any procedural shortcomings did not affect Umeh's decision to plead guilty. The court noted that Umeh was informed of his rights and the consequences of his plea through the plea agreement and his initial appearance. The court concluded that Umeh's substantial rights were not affected and affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Umeh" on Justia Law

The case involves Jean Carlos Marrero-Burgos, who pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. Marrero was arrested after police received a tip and found him with a modified Glock pistol, ammunition, and drugs in a house in Bayamón, Puerto Rico. The police also recovered a significant amount of ammunition and drugs from the house.Following his arrest, Marrero was temporarily detained, and a Grand Jury indicted him on four counts. He initially pleaded not guilty but later entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to two counts. The parties jointly recommended a ninety-month sentence, but the district court imposed a 108-month sentence, citing the dangerous nature of the firearm, the amount of ammunition, and community-based concerns such as gun violence in Puerto Rico.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Marrero argued that the district court's sentence was based on erroneous factfinding and undue reliance on community-based characteristics. The appellate court found no clear error in the district court's finding that Marrero possessed the ammunition. The court also held that the district court did not give undue weight to community-based characteristics and that the upward variance was justified based on the dangerousness of the firearm and other factors.The First Circuit affirmed the district court's 108-month sentence, finding it both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The court emphasized that the district court had considered a mix of individualized and community-based factors in arriving at the sentence. View "United States v. Marrero Burgos" on Justia Law

The case involves Jorge Mercado-Cañizares, who was serving a term of supervised release after a prison sentence for armed robbery. On March 3, 2021, while on supervised release, Mercado was stopped by police in Ponce, Puerto Rico, for a seatbelt violation. During the stop, officers found a modified Glock pistol capable of automatic fire and additional ammunition in his possession. Mercado was arrested, and further search revealed more ammunition and cannabis at his apartment.The United States Probation Office petitioned for revocation of Mercado's supervised release, and he was charged with possession of a machinegun and possession of a firearm and ammunition by a prohibited person. At the revocation hearing, the district court imposed a sixty-month sentence, the statutory maximum, which was an 82% upward variance from the Guidelines range of twenty-seven to thirty-three months. Mercado's counsel objected to the sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable.Subsequently, Mercado reached a plea agreement on the new charges, pleading guilty to possession of a machinegun. The district court imposed a forty-eight-month sentence, a 30% upward variance from the Guidelines range of thirty to thirty-seven months, citing the dangerous nature of machineguns, the quantity of ammunition, a policy disagreement with the Guidelines, and community-based statistics on gun violence in Puerto Rico. Mercado's counsel again objected to the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated the sixty-month revocation sentence, finding it procedurally flawed due to insufficient explanation for the upward variance. However, the court affirmed the forty-eight-month sentence for the § 922(o) charge, finding the amount of ammunition sufficient to support the upward variance. View "United States v. Mercado-Canizares" on Justia Law

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought a civil enforcement action against Commonwealth Equity Services, LLC, alleging that from 2014 to 2018, Commonwealth failed to adequately disclose potential conflicts of interest related to its revenue-sharing agreement with National Financial Services, LLC (NFS). The SEC claimed this omission violated Sections 206(2) and (4) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and SEC Rule 206(4)-7. Commonwealth's representatives, who provided investment advice to clients, were unaware of the revenue-sharing arrangement, which the SEC argued created a conflict of interest by incentivizing Commonwealth to direct clients to higher-cost mutual fund share classes that generated revenue-sharing income.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted the SEC's motion for summary judgment on liability, finding that Commonwealth's disclosures were inadequate as a matter of law and that the firm acted negligently. The court also denied Commonwealth's cross-motion for summary judgment and its motion to reconsider. Subsequently, the district court entered final judgment against Commonwealth, ordering disgorgement of $65,588,906 in revenue-sharing income, $21,185,162 in prejudgment interest, and a civil penalty of $6,500,000. The court struck Commonwealth's expert declaration proposing an alternative disgorgement calculation and adopted the SEC's proposed amount.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and the disgorgement order, remanding for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the issue of materiality should have been decided by a jury, as reasonable minds could differ on whether the additional disclosures would have significantly altered the total mix of information available to investors. The court also found that the SEC had not adequately shown a reasonable approximation or causal connection between Commonwealth's profits and the alleged violations, and that the district court must consider whether Commonwealth is entitled to deduct its expenses from any disgorgement awarded. View "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Commonwealth Equity Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Kalel Martínez-Bristol was indicted on June 24, 2021, for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and for possession of a machinegun. At the time, he was on federal supervised release for a 2011 drug conspiracy conviction. He pled guilty to the felon-in-possession charge on September 9, 2022. The presentence report identified the firearm as a pistol with a machinegun conversion device. Martínez did not object to the report. On February 6, 2023, he was sentenced to 46 months' imprisonment for the felon-in-possession conviction.The District Court for the District of Puerto Rico also addressed the supervised release violation. The government argued it was a Grade A violation due to the machinegun, while Martínez argued for a Grade B violation. The court initially granted a continuance for further evidence. At the continued hearing, the government presented evidence that the firearm was a machinegun, which Martínez did not cross-examine. The court determined it was a Grade A violation and sentenced Martínez to 15 months' imprisonment, consecutive to his other sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Martínez waived any appeal regarding his felon-in-possession conviction and sentence by not briefing those issues. He argued that his due process and confrontation rights were violated in the revocation hearing, but the court found no error. The court noted that Martínez had the evidence months before the hearing and did not object. The court affirmed the judgments, finding the government's evidence sufficient to establish the firearm as a machinegun. View "United States v. Martinez-Bristol" on Justia Law

A Salvadoran national filed two petitions for review of decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The first petition challenges the BIA's January 2024 decision upholding the denial by an Immigration Judge (IJ) of his applications for withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The second petition challenges the BIA's March 2024 denial of his motion to reopen his administrative proceedings to seek a continuance or administrative closure while his U visa petition is pending.The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against the petitioner in May 2022 for entering the United States without inspection. An immigration court found him removable and designated El Salvador as the country of removal. The petitioner applied for asylum, withholding of removal under the INA, and protection under the CAT. The IJ denied his applications, finding that his proposed particular social group (PSG) was not cognizable and that he failed to establish a sufficient likelihood of harm if removed to El Salvador. The BIA vacated and remanded for further findings, but the IJ again denied relief. The BIA dismissed the appeal, affirming the IJ's findings.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA may have endorsed the IJ's use of an improper "ocular visibility" standard in evaluating the social distinction of the petitioner's proposed PSG. The court also noted ambiguity in the BIA's analysis regarding the scope of the petitioner's PSG. Consequently, the court granted the first petition, remanded for further proceedings, and dismissed the second petition as moot. The petitioner may renew his applications for withholding of removal and CAT protection on remand. View "Alvarez Mendoza v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Samantha Pike, a licensed alcohol and drug treatment counselor employed by Wellspring, Inc., worked at Maine's Adult Treatment and Recovery Court (TRC) in Penobscot County. Charles Budd, Jr., the presiding judge overseeing TRC, made unwelcome sexual advances towards Pike during an out-of-state conference and continued this behavior upon returning to Maine. Pike filed a § 1983 action against Budd, alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause due to a hostile work environment.The United States District Court for the District of Maine dismissed Pike's claim, granting Budd qualified immunity. The court reasoned that case law did not clearly establish that Budd's conduct would violate the Equal Protection Clause in this context, particularly given Pike's status as a private employee rather than a state employee. The district court also noted that Budd likely was not acting under color of state law during the conference.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Pike plausibly alleged a violation of her equal protection right to be free from a hostile work environment. The court determined that Budd's conduct, both at the conference and in his chambers, was sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the conditions of Pike's employment. The court also found that it was clearly established that a state actor creating a hostile work environment violates the Equal Protection Clause, regardless of the plaintiff's employment status. Consequently, the First Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Pike v. Budd" on Justia Law

In 2019, New Hampshire filed two lawsuits in state court against 3M Company and other chemical companies, alleging that they produced defective PFAS products, negligently marketed them, and concealed their toxicity, leading to widespread contamination of the state's natural resources. One lawsuit sought damages for PFAS from aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF), while the other sought damages for non-AFFF PFAS contamination. The latter, referred to as the "Non-AFFF Suit," is the subject of this appeal.The Non-AFFF Suit proceeded in state court, and over the next three years, the court dismissed some of New Hampshire's claims. In August 2021, New Hampshire filed a second amended complaint. In December 2021, New Hampshire disclosed over 200 sites allegedly contaminated with non-AFFF PFAS. In April 2022, 3M removed the case to federal court, arguing that the contamination involved MilSpec AFFF PFAS, which it produced for the U.S. military, thus invoking the federal officer removal statute. New Hampshire moved to remand the case, and the district court agreed, citing that 3M's removal was untimely and did not meet the federal officer removal statute requirements.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that it had appellate jurisdiction. The court assumed, without deciding, that the alleged commingling of MilSpec AFFF PFAS and non-AFFF PFAS satisfied the nexus requirement for federal officer removal. However, it found that 3M's removal was untimely. The court determined that New Hampshire's filings in 2019 and 2020 provided sufficient information for 3M to ascertain removability, starting the 30-day removal clock well before 3M filed for removal in April 2022. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's decision to remand the case to state court. View "New Hampshire v. 3M Company" on Justia Law