Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case involves a dispute over the "Pollo Picú" trademark used in the sale of fresh chicken. Productos Avícolas del Sur, Inc. (PAS) sold chicken under this trademark until 2011, when financial difficulties forced the company to stop. In 2016, To-Ricos, Ltd. (To-Ricos) applied to register the Picú mark, believing PAS had abandoned it. PAS opposed the application, leading To-Ricos to seek a declaratory judgment in federal district court to establish its ownership of the mark. The district court granted summary judgment for To-Ricos, concluding that PAS had abandoned the mark.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico found that PAS had not used the Picú mark for at least three consecutive years, establishing a prima facie case of abandonment. PAS argued that its financial difficulties and ongoing litigation with its bank excused its nonuse of the mark and that it intended to resume use. However, the district court determined that PAS did not provide sufficient evidence of intent to resume use within the statutory period and thus granted summary judgment in favor of To-Ricos.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that PAS failed to rebut the presumption of abandonment. PAS's attempts to sell the mark in 2012, its 2014 settlement agreement with the bank, and its 2017 licensing agreement with IMEX did not demonstrate an intent to resume use of the mark within the relevant statutory period. The court emphasized that mere explanations for nonuse or vague intentions to resume use are insufficient to rebut the presumption of abandonment. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, establishing To-Ricos as the rightful owner of the Picú mark. View "To-Ricos, Ltd. v. Productos Avicolas del Sur, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2006, Lisa Wilson's late husband, Mason, purchased a home in Coventry, Rhode Island, financing it with a $150,000 mortgage. Both Mason and Lisa signed the mortgage agreement, but only Mason signed the promissory note. The mortgage agreement included covenants requiring the "Borrowers" to defend the title, pay property taxes, and discharge any superior liens. In 2007, Deutsche Bank acquired the mortgage and note. Mason defaulted on the mortgage payments, and the Wilsons failed to pay property taxes, leading to a tax sale in 2014. Birdsong Associates bought the property and later obtained a court decree extinguishing Deutsche Bank's mortgage lien. Birdsong then sold the property to Coventry IV-14, RIGP, which eventually sold it to Dunkin Engineering Solutions, LLC, a company formed by Mason's parents. After Mason's parents' deaths, Lisa became the sole owner of Dunkin.Deutsche Bank sued Lisa, Mason, and Dunkin in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, alleging breach of the mortgage covenants and seeking equitable relief. The district court granted summary judgment to Lisa and Dunkin, finding that the mortgage agreement had been extinguished by the 2016 court decree and that Deutsche Bank had no remaining contractual rights. The court also rejected Deutsche Bank's equitable claims, concluding that there was no evidence of a scheme to benefit Lisa and Mason and that no benefit had accrued to Dunkin or Lisa from Deutsche Bank's payments.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the mortgage agreement did not unambiguously bind Lisa to the covenants, and thus, Deutsche Bank could not enforce those covenants against her. The court also found that Deutsche Bank failed to establish a fiduciary or confidential relationship necessary for its equitable claims and that Deutsche Bank's payments did not unjustly enrich Dunkin or Lisa. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Federal agents executed a search warrant at Corey Donovan's rural property in New Hampshire, discovering a shotgun, ammunition, and modified oil filters suspected to be homemade silencers. Donovan, a convicted felon, was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. His girlfriend, Kelley Finnigan, claimed ownership of the shotgun but invoked her Fifth Amendment right when called to testify.The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire denied Donovan's motion to grant Finnigan immunity and allowed her to invoke a blanket Fifth Amendment privilege. The court also permitted the introduction of evidence related to Donovan's prior arrest and possession of non-firearm weapons, offering to provide limiting instructions if requested during the trial. Donovan did not object to the lack of contemporaneous limiting instructions or the final jury instructions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed Donovan's appeal, which challenged the district court's decisions on Finnigan's Fifth Amendment invocation, the lack of limiting instructions, and the application of a sentencing enhancement for the modified oil filters. The appellate court found no clear or obvious error in allowing Finnigan to invoke her Fifth Amendment right, as her testimony could reasonably incriminate her. The court also determined that Donovan waived his right to challenge the lack of limiting instructions by failing to object during the trial.Regarding the sentencing enhancement, the appellate court upheld the district court's finding that the modified oil filters qualified as homemade silencers under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25). The court affirmed Donovan's conviction and sentence, concluding that the evidence supported the application of the sentencing enhancement. View "US v. Donovan" on Justia Law

Jaden Brown, a pregnant inmate at Cumberland County Jail, was transported to Maine Medical Center for childbirth. During her hospital stay, correction officers Daniel Haskell and Sam Dickey were present in her room. Brown alleged that Haskell and Dickey observed her naked body during medical procedures and the delivery of her baby, which she claimed violated her Fourth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the District of Maine denied Haskell and Dickey's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the officers' observations of Brown's naked body were more than inadvertent, occasional, casual, or restricted. The court also ruled that such observations, if they occurred, would constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed the appeal in part, stating it lacked jurisdiction to consider the officers' argument that they did not observe Brown's naked body, as this was a factual dispute. The court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment, holding that if the officers did observe Brown's naked body, it would constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. The court emphasized that a search does not require deliberate intent to inspect a naked body and that such observations could violate clearly established law. View "Brown v. Dickey" on Justia Law

A physician in Puerto Rico, Dr. Jaime Salas Rushford, had his board certification suspended by the American Board of Internal Medicine (ABIM) after ABIM concluded that he had improperly shared board exam questions with his test prep instructor. ABIM sued Salas Rushford for copyright infringement in New Jersey. Salas Rushford counterclaimed against ABIM and several ABIM-affiliated individuals, alleging that the process leading to his suspension was a "sham."The counterclaims were transferred to the District of Puerto Rico, where the district court granted ABIM's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied Salas Rushford leave to amend his pleading. The court found that Salas Rushford failed to state a claim for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and tort claims against the ABIM Individuals. The court also dismissed his Lanham Act claim for commercial disparagement.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Salas Rushford's claims. It held that ABIM had broad discretion under its policies to revoke certification if a diplomate failed to maintain satisfactory ethical and professional behavior. The court found that Salas Rushford did not plausibly allege that ABIM acted with bad motive or ill intention, which is necessary to state a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under New Jersey law.The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Lanham Act claim, noting that Salas Rushford failed to allege actual consumer deception or intentional deception, which is required to state a claim for false advertising. Finally, the court upheld the district court's denial of leave to amend the complaint, citing undue delay and lack of a concrete argument for why justice required an amendment. View "American Board of Internal Medicine v. Salas-Rushford" on Justia Law

The case involves Alam & Sarker, LLC, a convenience store in New Bedford, Massachusetts, which was disqualified from participating in the federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) by the United States Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (FNS). The FNS's decision was based on data indicating irregular SNAP transactions at the store, including a high number of back-to-back transactions and unusually large purchases, which suggested trafficking in SNAP benefits.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of the FNS. The court found that the transaction data provided sufficient evidence of trafficking and that the store failed to rebut this inference with significantly probative evidence. The Market's opposition, which included customer statements and inventory records, was deemed insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the FNS's reliance on SNAP transaction data was appropriate and that the Market did not provide adequate evidence to counter the strong inference of trafficking. The court also rejected the Market's procedural due process claim, noting that the de novo hearing in the district court cured any potential procedural deficiencies at the administrative level. The court concluded that the Market received all the process that was due and upheld the permanent disqualification from SNAP. View "Alam & Sarker, LLC v. US" on Justia Law

In May 2021, a police officer in Goffstown, New Hampshire, observed a vehicle driving without headlights. When the officer attempted to stop the vehicle, the driver, later identified as Brian Elliott, fled, leading to a high-speed chase. Elliott eventually stopped and fled on foot, during which he allegedly pointed a firearm at the officer and threatened to shoot. Elliott was later apprehended, and a search revealed firearms, ammunition, and fentanyl in his possession.A federal grand jury in the District of New Hampshire indicted Elliott on four counts, including drug and firearm charges. Elliott pled guilty to three counts in exchange for the dismissal of one count and a sentencing recommendation within the guideline range. The district court accepted the plea agreement and, after a hearing, applied a six-level enhancement for assaulting a police officer during the offense. The court found the officer's testimony credible and calculated a guideline range of 108 to 135 months, ultimately sentencing Elliott to 120 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed Elliott's appeal, which challenged the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. Elliott argued that the district court erred in applying the enhancement and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. The First Circuit found no clear error in the district court's credibility determination regarding the officer's testimony and upheld the application of the enhancement. The court also held that the 120-month sentence was substantively reasonable, given the seriousness of the offense and Elliott's criminal history. Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "US v. Elliott" on Justia Law

Eucineia Soares da Silva Pazine, a Brazilian national, sought asylum in the United States, claiming she faced persecution from her husband, Lucas Luiz Pazine, and his associates. She testified that her husband was abusive, both physically and emotionally, and that after she left him and returned to Brazil with their children, she continued to receive threats from his cousin Dulce and his lawyers. These threats included surveillance and attempts to coerce her into giving up custody of her children and her property.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found her testimony credible but denied her asylum claim, stating that the abuse she suffered in the United States did not qualify as persecution under asylum law, which requires harm to occur in the applicant's home country. The IJ also concluded that the threats from Dulce and the lawyers were motivated by a personal dispute over custody and property, not by her membership in a particular social group (PSG) such as "Brazilian Women." Consequently, the IJ denied her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's decision, agreeing that there was no nexus between the harm she feared and a protected ground under asylum law. The BIA found no clear error in the IJ's determination that the threats were related to a personal dispute rather than her membership in a PSG. The BIA also declined to address her new "pattern or practice" theory of persecution, as it was not raised before the IJ.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and denied the petition for review. The court found that substantial evidence supported the agency's no-nexus finding, concluding that the threats from Dulce and the lawyers were primarily motivated by personal disputes over custody and property, not by her gender or membership in a PSG. The court also noted that the BIA correctly applied the "one central reason" standard in its analysis. View "Pazine v. Garland" on Justia Law

Carlos Gonzalez's residence was searched by the government for evidence of an illegal pill-making operation. Gonzalez moved to suppress the evidence found during the search, arguing that the search warrant was based on stale information and lacked probable cause. The district court agreed, finding that the facts supporting the search warrant were too old and that the affidavit was so bare bones that no reasonable officer could have relied on it. The court noted that the mastermind of the operation had moved out months earlier, there was little suspicious activity afterward, and the equipment was portable.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted Gonzalez's motion to suppress the evidence. The court concluded that the information in the affidavit was too stale to support probable cause and that the connection between the residence and any recent criminal activity was extremely thin. The court also determined that the good-faith exception did not apply because the affidavit was too conclusory and lacked sufficient detail to justify reliance on the warrant.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court decided to bypass the probable-cause determination and focused on whether a reasonable officer could have relied on the warrant in good faith. The court found that a reasonable officer could have believed that the pill-making operation was still ongoing at the residence, given the long-standing nature of the operation, the continued ownership of the house by the mastermind, and the involvement of Gonzalez and his girlfriend. The court vacated the district court's ruling on the motion to suppress and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "US v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Jonathan Mullane, a law student intern at the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) in 2018, was terminated from his position due to ex parte communications with a law clerk regarding a pro se case he had filed. Subsequently, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rescinded an internship offer to him. Mullane requested documents related to his termination from both the DOJ and SEC under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Privacy Act. He claimed that the agencies did not conduct adequate searches and improperly withheld documents. The agencies moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted their motions in full.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of the DOJ and SEC, dismissing Mullane's claims. Mullane appealed the district court's decision regarding the DOJ, arguing that the DOJ's search for documents was inadequate and that the district court erred in holding that the Privacy Act imposes a jurisdictional exhaustion requirement. Mullane also challenged the district court's denial of his requests for pre-dismissal discovery.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the DOJ conducted an adequate search for documents under FOIA, as the search was reasonably calculated to discover the requested documents. The court also found that Mullane had waived any argument against the district court's conclusion that the Privacy Act's exhaustion requirements are jurisdictional. Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the DOJ, dismissing Mullane's FOIA and Privacy Act claims. View "Mullane v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law