Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Dionel Guía-Sendeme was involved in a venture to smuggle 135 kilograms of cocaine from the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico. He was recruited to move gasoline tanks onto a boat, initially believing it was for smuggling undocumented individuals. Upon learning it was for drug smuggling, he agreed to participate for $10,000. Guía and another individual, Abel, operated the vessel. Abel received a GPS device, a compass, phone numbers, and a handgun. They were informed that a second vessel would monitor for law enforcement. After transferring drugs from the second vessel and loading more drugs at another location, Guía agreed to accompany Abel to Puerto Rico for an additional $10,000. Upon arrival, law enforcement seized the drugs, and Guía was apprehended while Abel escaped.Guía was indicted on four counts related to drug trafficking and pleaded guilty to all counts without a plea agreement. The U.S. Probation Office recommended against a mitigating role adjustment and for a firearm enhancement. The district court adopted these recommendations, calculating an advisory guideline sentencing range of 108 to 135 months but imposed a 72-month sentence after granting a downward variance. Guía objected to the sentence, but the court stated it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the objections.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in its mitigating role analysis by not properly identifying the universe of participants involved in the criminal activity and failing to compare Guía's conduct to that of other participants. The appellate court vacated Guía's sentence and remanded for resentencing, instructing the district court to reconsider the mitigating role adjustment. The appellate court upheld the firearm enhancement, finding sufficient evidence that Guía knew his coconspirator possessed a firearm. View "US v. Guia-Sendeme" on Justia Law

A Massachusetts law prohibits the sale, transfer, or possession of assault weapons and large capacity feeding devices. Joseph R. Capen, a Massachusetts resident, and the National Association for Gun Rights challenged the law, claiming it violates the Second Amendment. They sought a declaratory judgment and preliminary and permanent injunctions against the law's enforcement.The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The court found that the law is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of regulating dangerous and unusual weapons, which are not typically used for self-defense. The court also found that the law's restrictions on large capacity magazines are supported by historical precedents of regulating items that pose a significant public safety threat.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the Massachusetts law's restrictions on assault weapons, specifically the AR-15, are consistent with historical regulations that aimed to protect public safety by restricting particularly dangerous weapons. The court also found that the law's restrictions on large capacity magazines are supported by historical analogues and do not impose a significant burden on the right to self-defense. Therefore, the plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. View "Capen v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The defendant, John Volungus, a convicted pedophile, was conditionally released from civil commitment under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006. The Act allows for the involuntary civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons in federal custody. Volungus, who had been in federal prison for child-sex crimes, was civilly committed in 2012. In 2022, the facility's warden certified that Volungus would not be sexually dangerous if released under a prescribed regimen of care. The district court ordered his conditional release with specific conditions and a prescribed regimen of treatment.The district court's conditional-release order included numerous conditions, some of which Volungus objected to, arguing that the court exceeded its authority by imposing conditions beyond the prescribed treatment regimen and requiring him to pay for certain costs. The district court denied his objections and his motion to dismiss the government's motion to revoke his conditional release for alleged violations of the conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Adam Walsh Act allows judges to impose conditions beyond the prescribed regimen of treatment, provided they are related to the individual's mental illness and the safety of the public. The court also rejected Volungus's argument that the district court lacked authority to require him to pay for certain costs associated with his release conditions. The court affirmed the district court's conditional-release order, finding that the additional conditions and cost requirements were within the court's authority and aligned with the Act's purpose of protecting the public from sexually dangerous individuals. View "US v. Volungus" on Justia Law

In 1982, Lesley Phillips purchased an apartment in Cambridge, Massachusetts, assuming a preexisting mortgage. Phillips' spouse, Linda Pinti, was added to the deed in 2005. In 2008, Pinti and Phillips refinanced with a $160,000 promissory note and mortgage from Emigrant Mortgage Company (EMC). They defaulted on the note in 2009, and EMC initiated foreclosure proceedings. In 2012, EMC mistakenly issued a discharge of the mortgage, which Pinti recorded in 2015 after a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision voided the foreclosure sale.EMC filed a federal action in 2016 to strike the discharge, but the court dismissed it, ruling EMC was not the mortgagee. Emigrant Residential, LLC (Emigrant) then filed a new action in 2019. The district court granted summary judgment for Emigrant, striking the discharge and rejecting Pinti's counterclaims. Pinti appealed, contesting the district court's rulings on standing, the discharge, unclean hands, restoration to the status quo, and her Chapter 93A claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Emigrant had standing as the holder of the note, which was sufficient under Article III. The court found no genuine dispute that the discharge was a mistake, supported by EMC's policies and the fact that the note was never returned to Pinti. The court also ruled that Emigrant was entitled to equitable relief, rejecting Pinti's arguments of unclean hands and the inability to restore the status quo. Finally, the court upheld the dismissal of Pinti's Chapter 93A claim as time-barred. View "Emigrant Residential LLC v. Pinti" on Justia Law

Héctor Maldonado-Maldonado was involved in an altercation with a senior corrections officer (SCO) at the Metropolitan Detention Center Guaynabo in August 2020. During a routine lockdown, the SCO noticed Maldonado was not in his cell and found contraband (an extra pillow). When the SCO removed the pillow, Maldonado returned, yelled profanities, and punched the SCO. Maldonado and his cellmate, Miguel Santana-Avilés, then assaulted the SCO, causing bodily injuries. Maldonado was indicted and charged with assaulting a federal officer. He entered a plea agreement proposing a sentencing calculation resulting in a Total Offense Level (TOL) of 13.The probation officer prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) with a different guidelines calculation, applying the "aggravated assault" guideline and recommending a TOL of 24. Maldonado objected to the PSR, arguing that the facts did not support the aggravated assault guideline. The government’s sentencing memorandum and the prosecutor at the hearing advocated for a higher sentence, including a four-point enhancement for "serious bodily injury," which was not part of the plea agreement. The district court adopted the PSR’s calculation and sentenced Maldonado to 78 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The government conceded that it breached the plea agreement by advocating for a higher enhancement and not adhering to the agreed-upon sentencing range. The court agreed that the breach was clear and obvious, affecting Maldonado’s substantial rights and the fairness of the proceedings. The court vacated Maldonado’s sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different judge, emphasizing that the fault lay with the prosecutor, not the sentencing judge. View "United States v. Maldonado-Maldonado" on Justia Law

The defendant, Carlos Vázquez-Narvaez, pleaded guilty to one count of possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The probation office calculated a guideline sentencing range of fifty-one to sixty-three months of imprisonment and five years to life of supervised release. However, the district court sentenced Vázquez to time served (twenty-one days) and seven years of supervised release. The government appealed, arguing that the sentence was substantively unreasonable due to a lack of a plausible sentencing rationale.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico accepted Vázquez's guilty plea and agreed with the probation office's guideline calculation. Despite this, the court imposed a significantly lower sentence than the guideline range, citing Vázquez's cooperation, compliance with bail conditions, and participation in specialized treatment for sex offenders. The court also noted that Vázquez had no direct contact with the victims and did not produce or entice child pornography. The government objected, arguing that the sentence was too lenient given the seriousness of the offense and the potential for sentencing disparities.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court did not adequately explain its basis for the extraordinary downward variance. The appellate court emphasized that the district court's rationale focused almost exclusively on Vázquez's post-arrest conduct and potential for rehabilitation, without sufficiently addressing the seriousness of the offense, the need for general deterrence, or the potential for sentencing disparities. The First Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, requiring a more thorough and comprehensive explanation for any significant variance from the guideline range. View "United States v. Vazquez-Narvaez" on Justia Law

Petitioners, a husband and wife from Guatemala, sought review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision upholding the Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of their applications for cancellation of removal. They argued that their removal would cause "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to their U.S. citizen children. The IJ found that the petitioners did not meet this hardship requirement, despite finding them otherwise eligible for cancellation of removal. The IJ's decision was based on the conclusion that the children would not suffer the requisite level of hardship if the family relocated to Guatemala.The IJ's decision was appealed to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ's findings. The BIA agreed with the IJ that the petitioners had not demonstrated that their removal would result in "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to their children. The BIA reviewed the IJ's factual findings for clear error and found none, particularly regarding the health and well-being of the petitioners' son, A.B.M., who had experienced past trauma and had ongoing health issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court found that the BIA had legally erred by failing to consider key evidence, specifically a psychological report detailing the mental health status of A.B.M. The court held that the BIA must consider all relevant evidence in the record when reviewing the IJ's findings for clear error. The First Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the BIA to adequately consider the full record, including the psychological report, in its determination. View "Blanco Contreras v. Bondi" on Justia Law

In November 2004, Julio Rodríguez-Méndez participated in a carjacking in Puerto Rico while possessing a firearm. He was first prosecuted in a Puerto Rico Commonwealth court for robbery of a motor vehicle and carrying a weapon without a license, to which he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to twelve years in prison. Subsequently, a federal grand jury indicted him on three counts related to the same carjacking, including unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Rodríguez pleaded guilty to the felon-in-possession count, and the other charges were dismissed. He was sentenced to 216 months in prison, partly due to being classified as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).Rodríguez filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to vacate his conviction on double jeopardy grounds and to challenge his ACCA enhancement. The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico denied his motion, holding that double jeopardy did not apply and that his prior convictions for motor vehicle robbery qualified as ACCA predicates.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Rodríguez's double jeopardy claim, stating that the federal felon-in-possession offense and the Commonwealth firearm offense are separate offenses under the Blockburger test, as each requires proof of an element that the other does not. However, the court agreed with Rodríguez that his prior convictions under Article 173B of the Puerto Rico Penal Code did not qualify as ACCA predicates. The court found that the statute's definition of "intimidation" was broader than the ACCA's requirement for violent felonies, as it included threats against property, not just persons.The First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Rodríguez's double jeopardy claim but reversed the denial of his § 2255 motion regarding the ACCA enhancement, vacating his sentence and remanding for resentencing. View "Rodriguez-Mendez v. United States" on Justia Law

Mary E. Buscone, a Chapter 13 debtor, appealed an order rejecting her objection to a proof of claim for a Massachusetts state-court judgment owed to Ann Tracy Botelho. In a previous Chapter 7 bankruptcy, Botelho sought a determination that her judgment against Buscone was excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(4). Due to discovery abuse by Buscone and her counsel, the bankruptcy court entered a default judgment for Botelho. In her current Chapter 13 bankruptcy, Buscone objected to Botelho's proof of claim on the same grounds as before and argued that the interest rate and accrual date prescribed by Massachusetts state law should not apply to the judgment.The bankruptcy court overruled Buscone's objection, and the district court affirmed. Buscone then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The appellate court reviewed the bankruptcy court's findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. The court also reviewed the application of issue preclusion and determinations of post-judgment interest rates without deference.The First Circuit rejected Buscone's arguments. It held that she was precluded from raising the same affirmative defense to Botelho's proof of claim that she asserted in her motion to dismiss Botelho's adversary proceeding in the Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The court applied an exception to the actual-litigation requirement for issue preclusion, noting that the default judgment in the Chapter 7 proceeding was entered as a sanction for Buscone's misconduct. The court also held that the post-judgment interest on the state-court judgment debt should accrue at the rate set by Massachusetts law from the date of the state-court judgment's entry. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Buscone v. Botelho" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Kelechi Collins Umeh, was involved in a conspiracy to commit bank fraud. From June 2018 to January 2020, Umeh participated in a scheme that defrauded over 30 victims of more than $1.3 million through various online scams, including romance scams, advance fee scams, and business email compromise scams. Umeh, a Nigerian national, used fake passports to open bank accounts under false identities, into which the fraudulently obtained funds were deposited. He then withdrew the proceeds, with nearly $550,000 attributed to accounts he controlled.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts initially handled the case. Umeh was arrested in July 2022 and, after his initial appearance, requested appointed counsel. He later entered into a plea agreement, waiving indictment and pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud. The plea agreement detailed the maximum penalties, potential immigration consequences, and the government's sentencing recommendations. During the change-of-plea hearing, the district court conducted a colloquy with Umeh, confirming his understanding of the plea agreement and the rights he was waiving.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Umeh argued that errors during the change-of-plea colloquy rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary. However, the court found that any procedural shortcomings did not affect Umeh's decision to plead guilty. The court noted that Umeh was informed of his rights and the consequences of his plea through the plea agreement and his initial appearance. The court concluded that Umeh's substantial rights were not affected and affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Umeh" on Justia Law