Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Liberty Mutual Insurance Corporation on Brendan Kelly’s claim that Liberty was bound to provide uninsured motorist coverage for his benefit, holding that no uninsured motorist coverage was provided under the policy.The insurance contract was an umbrella policy issued to Kelly’s employer and the named insured and was issued in New Hampshire. The named insured rejected uninsured motorist coverage in writing, but the writing was not incorporated into the policy. Kelly argued that that the lack of an explicit reference to the named insured’s written rejection rendered that rejection inoperative against an additional insured like himself, and that provision of uninsured motorist coverage was therefore required under state law. The First Circuit disagreed, holding that Kelly’s position was not implicit in the statute. View "Kelly v. Liberty Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Appellant’s revocation sentence, holding that the district court’s upwardly-variant sentence following revocation was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable and that the district court’s imposition of Appellant’s supervised release term in addition to the statutory maximum term of imprisonment upon revocation was not in error.Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of cyberstalking in 2012. In 2016, Appellant commenced his supervised release term, but the supervised release term was revoked the next year because Appellant violated some of his conditions. The district court varied upwards from the Guidelines Sentencing Range of five to eleven months to impose a sentence of twenty-four months in prison and twelve months of supervised release. The First Circuit affirmed the revocation sentence, holding (1) under the totality of the circumstances, the district court’s sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable and not an abuse of discretion; and (2) there was no error in the district court’s imposition of Appellant’s supervised release term on revocation. View "United States v. Sayer" on Justia Law

In this Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) suit, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment finding that Plaintiff’s appeal from the expiration of her long-term disability (LTD) benefits was untimely and granting a motion for judgment on the administrative record for the disability insurer and the plan under which Plaintiff received the benefits, holding that the district court did not err.After Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company (Hartford) gave notice to Plaintiff that the LTD benefits it had provided her under the Dartmouth Hitchcock Clinic Company Long Term Disability Plan (Plan) would expire, Plaintiff filed an untimely appeal. Plaintiff then brought this action arguing that even if the appeal was untimely, the untimeliness should be excused. The district court granted a motion for judgment on the administrative record for Hartford and the Plan. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the ERISA regulation defining an “adverse benefit determination” requires that the 180-day time limit start from the date of notice of termination of benefits; (2) Hartford properly followed the terms of the Plan, which met the ERISA requirements; (3) the ERISA substantial compliance doctrine did not excuse Plaintiff’s untimely ERISA administrative appeal; and (4) the New Hampshire notice-prejudice rule did not apply to Plaintiff’s situation. View "Fortier v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In this diversity case, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Deutsche Bank National Trust Company’s mortgage interest in a property in New Hampshire was subject to a homestead right of Jennifer Pike, the property’s resident, and the district court’s denial of Pike’s request for attorney’s fees, holding that the district court did not err.After consolidating Pike’s appeal from the denial of her request for attorney’s fees with Deutsche Bank’s appeal, the First Circuit held (1) the district court correctly determined that Pike retained her homestead right under the plain language of a divorce decree; (2) the district court correctly declined to apply equitable subrogation to defeat Pike’s homestead right; and (3) the district court correctly concluded that Pike was not entitled to attorney’s fees under a New Hampshire state statute and the mortgage because she was not the “borrower” for purposes of the mortgage. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Pike" on Justia Law

In these appeals arising from a complaint filed by Ms. S. with the Maine Department of Education alleging violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., the First Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss Ms. S.’s action with prejudice, holding that Ms. S.’s claims about her son’s education in school years 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 were time barred.The state due process hearing officer dismissed as untimely Ms. S.’s claims about 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 and found no violations as to school years 2011-2012 and 2012-2013. In the First Circuit’s second decision it held (1) the district court erred in ruling that an earlier decision by the First Circuit foreclosed the interpretation of Maine’s Unified Special Education Regulation (MUSER) that Maine has established a two-year statute of limitations for due process complaints and has done so to align its statute of limitations with the IDEA’s; and (2) Ms. S.’s proposed construction of MUSER, her waiver argument, and her argument that the Regional School Unit 72 misled her were all without merit. View "Ms. S. v. Regional School Unit 72" on Justia Law

The First Circuit held that members of the Financial Oversight and Management Board (Board Members) created by the 2016 Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) are “Officers of the United States” subject to the U.S. Constitution’s Appointments Clause and directed the district court to enter a declaratory judgment to the effect that PROMESA’s protocol for the appointment of Board Members is unconstitutional and must be severed.This matter arose from the restructuring of Puerto Rico’s public debt under PROMESA. May 2017, the Board exercised its authority under Title III of PROMESA to initiate debt adjustment proceedings on behalf of the Puerto Rico government. Appellants sought to dismiss the Title III proceedings, arguing that the Board lacked authority to initiate them because the Board Members were illegally appointed in contravention of the Appointments Clause. The district court rejected Appellants’ motions to dismiss. The First Circuit reversed in part, (1) the Territorial Clause does not displace the Appointments Clause in an unincorporated territory such as Puerto Rico; (2) Board Members are “Principal” “Officers of the United States” subject to the Appointments Clause; and (3) therefore, the process PROMESA provides for the appointment of Board Members is unconstitutional. View "Aurelius Investments, LLC v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that Appellant was barred from relitigating his argument that Plaintiffs should be compelled to arbitrate various tort claims, holding that the district court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to compel arbitration.At issue in this procedurally complicated case was whether Appellant’s association with a certain law firm required that Plaintiffs’ various tort claims, including their claims of legal malpractice, be submitted to arbitration. After adopting a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and applying principles of collateral estoppel derived from Rhode Island law, the district court denied Appellant’s motion to compel. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Appellant waived any claim of error regarding the magistrate judge’s analysis under Rhode Island collateral estoppel law. View "Patton v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the district court entering judgment for Plaintiff on Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B and defamation claims against the City of Fitchburg and its mayor and the award of punitive damages, holding that the award of punitive damages was improper and that the district court erred in entering judgment for Plaintiff on the defamation claim.Plaintiff brought this action against the City and its mayor after the mayor decided not to nominate Plaintiff for the position of the City police chief. Plaintiff alleged that the City violated his rights under Chapter 151B by deciding not to hire him because of his failure to disclose a criminal case against him of which he was later acquitted and that the mayor defamed him through statements she made to the media. A jury found for Plaintiff on both claims and awarded punitive damages. The First Circuit held (1) the district court erred in denying Plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial on Plaintiff’s defamation claim because the statement at issue was not false; (2) the evidence was sufficient with respect to the Chapter 151B claim; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to support the punitive damages award. View "Heagney v. Wong" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court granting Bank’s motion to dismiss this case alleging that Bank failed to comply with the notice requirements in Plaintiffs’ mortgage before foreclosing on their property, holding that Bank’s failure to strictly comply with paragraph 22 of the mortgage invalidated the foreclosure.Paragraph 22 required that prior to accelerating payment by Plaintiffs, the mortgagee had to provide Plaintiffs with notice specifying certain elements. After Bank sent default and acceleration notices to Plaintiffs Plaintiff failed to cure the default, and Bank conducted a foreclosure sale. Plaintiffs then filed a complaint alleging that Bank failed to comply with the paragraph 22 notice requirements prior to foreclosing on their property. The district court granted Bank’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, concluding that Bank’s default and acceleration notice strictly complied with paragraph 22. The First Circuit disagreed, holding (1) the mortgage terms for which Massachusetts courts demand strict compliance include the provisions in paragraph 22 requiring and prescribing the preforeclosure default notice; and (2) because the default letter omitted certain information that rendered the notice potentially deceptive the Bank violated the strict compliance requirement, thus invalidating the foreclosure. View "Thompson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release and remanded the matter for resentencing, holding that the judge erred in citing rehabilitation needs and unproven domestic-violence allegations, and the errors were presumptively prejudicial.Defendant was sentenced to 168 months in prison in connection with his conviction of conspiracy to distribute cocaine followed by five years of supervised release. After Defendant began supervised release, the government filed a motion to revoke Defendant’s supervised release. Defendant admitted that he violated the terms of his release, and the district court imposed an upward variance, sentencing Defendant to two years’ imprisonment plus two years of supervised release. The First Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing, holding (1) the district court likely did rely on rehabilitation in fixing the sentence in a way that is at odds with the Sentencing Reform Act; and (2) the unproven domestic-violence charges are not to be considered upon resentencing. View "United States v. Vazquez-Mendez" on Justia Law