Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this removed diversity suit, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient timely service of process, holding that Defendant did not evade service or conceal the defect in service and that the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Plaintiff had not shown good cause.Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(j) requires a plaintiff to effect service of process within ninety days of filing suit. Plaintiff failed to meet that deadline when bringing her claims for negligence and wrongful death. The district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss and denied Plaintiff's motion to extend time to perfect service of process under Mass. R. Civ. P. 6(b). The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted Defendant's motion to dismiss and Defendant's motion for an extension of time to perfect service of process. View "Crossetti v. Cargill, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants, the Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training and the State, on Plaintiff's complaint alleging discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2, holding that summary judgment was properly granted.In his complaint, Plaintiff claimed that the Department's promotion practices had a disparate impact on minority employees and that the Department declined to promote her because she is black. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) because Plaintiff could not show a disparate impact in the absence of statistical and statistically significant evidence, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff's claim of disparate impact; and (2) Plaintiff failed to present enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendants' stated reason for failing to promote her was pretextual. View "Luceus v. State" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court in connection with Appellant's plea of guilty to sex trafficking crimes pursuant to a plea agreement, holding that Appellant's claims on appeal failed.Appellant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement and was sentenced to 216 months of imprisonment. Appellant appealed, seeking a new sentencing hearing partially on the grounds that the prosecution breached the plea agreement by providing information to Probation and the court regarding victims of sex trafficking who were either covered by counts that were dismissed as part of the plea agreement or who were never included in any counts in the indictment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's breach claim fell within the plain language of the exemption from the appellate waiver in the plea agreement; (2) the government did not breach the plea agreement; and (3) the appellate waiver in the plea agreement barred Appellant's appeal on the issue of inadequate notice regarding victim statements presented at the sentencing hearing. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

In this dispute over who was the first-to-file relator in a case brought under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq., the First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court ruling that the first-to-file rule was jurisdictional, holding, for the first time in this circuit, that the first-to-file rule is not jurisdictional and that the Court had jurisdiction over Mark McGuire's crossclaim.The FCA's first-to-file rule prohibits relators other than the first to file from bringing a related action based on the facts underlying the pending action. In this case, the government successfully intervened in several qui tam suits against Millennium Health. Millennium settled with the government, setting aside fifteen percent of the settlement proceeds as a relator's share. McGuire brought a crossclaim for declaratory judgment that he was the first to file and was thus entitled to the fifteen-percent share. The district court dismissed the crossclaim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that the first-to-file rule was jurisdictional. The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) the first-to-file rule is not jurisdictional, and therefore, the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over McGuire's crossclaim; and (2) McGuire was the first-to-file relator and has stated a claim that he is entitled to the relator's share of the settlement. View "McGuire v. Estate of Robert Cunningham" on Justia Law

In this suit brought by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts seeking to enjoin the enforcement of two federal Interim Final Rules (IFRs), the First Circuit vacated the district court's determination that Massachusetts lacked standing to challenge the IFRs, holding that the Commonwealth had standing to challenge the rules.The IFRs at issue in this case were promulgated by the United States Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury and permitted employers with religious or moral objections to contraception to obtain exemptions from providing health insurance coverage to employees and their dependents for FDA-approved contraceptive care. The district court determined that the Commonwealth failed to establish standing because it had not set forth specific facts establishing that it would likely suffer future injury from the Departments' conduct. After the Commonwealth filed its appeal, the Departments issued final rules superseding the IFRs. The First Circuit held (1) the Commonwealth's substantive challenges to the federal regulations were not moot, but its procedural challenge to the IFRs was mooted by the promulgation of the final rules; and (2) the Commonwealth had Article III standing to challenge the Departments' actions. View "Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Department of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of possessing child pornography and transporting a minor with the intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction of possessing child pornography and that Defendant waived his argument that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument.On appeal, Defendant argued that that the government did not adequately prove that he possessed images of minors and that the photos could be not considered child pornography because the the government failed to show they were "lascivious." The First Circuit disagreed, holding (1) with the evidence presented, a rational jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the images admitted into evidence contained minors, and a jury reasonably could deem the photos were "lascivious"; and (2) Defendant waived his argument that the prosecutor's comments during summation were so improper and prejudicial as to require a new trial. View "United States v. Charriez-Rolon" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction compelling Defendants to provide Plaintiff with medication while she is incarcerated, holding that the district court properly found that a preliminary injunction was warranted under the circumstances of this case.Plaintiff, who was due to be incarcerated for forty days in the county jail, was informed that she was not to receive her twice daily dose of buprenorphine prescribed for an "opioid use disorder" while incarcerated. Plaintiff brought this suit seeking injunctive relief compelling Defendants to provide her medication while she was incarcerated. The district court found a sufficient likelihood of success combined with both a strong balance of harms and a public interest in favor of Plaintiff so as to warrant a preliminary injunction. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its preliminary assessment of the issues that must be balanced in deciding a request for preliminary injunctive relief. View "Smith v. Aroostook County" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Puerto Rico Ports Authority (the PRPA) on Plaintiffs' suit alleging that the PRPA violated the First Amendmen and Puerto Rico law by terminating Plaintiff's employment, holding that Plaintiffs' claims were barred by res judicata.Daniel Grajales, his wife, their children brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Puerto Rico law against the PRPA alleging that Grajales was transferred to a new job location and subsequently terminated from his employment because of both his political affiliation and his reporting of alleged safety violations by PRPA employees. Just before Grajales filed his federal complaint, the Secretary of Labor and Human Resources of Puerto Rico filed a civil complaint against the PRPA in the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance, which entered judgment for the PRPA. The PRPA moved for summary judgment in the federal case on res judicata grounds in light of the Court of First Instance's ruling. The district court ruled in favor of the PRPA. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly found that the two actions shared a "common nucleus of operative fact"; (2) Grajales's claims were barred by res judicata; and (3) the derivative claims of Grajales's family members necessarily failed. View "Grajales v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants in this case involving a constitutional challenge to a Massachusetts law proscribing the sale, transfer, and possession of certain semiautomatic assault weapons and large-capacity magazines (LCMs), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, 121, 131M (the Act), holding that the Act withstands intermediate scrutiny.In their constitutional challenge to the Act, Plaintiffs claimed that they had an "unfettered" Second Amendment right to possess the proscribed LCMs and assault weapons in their homes for purposes of self-defense. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) even if the proscribed weapons have some degree of protection under the Second Amendment, and even if the Act implicates the core Second Amendment right of individuals to bear arms in self-defense, the Act minimally burdens that right; and (2) the Act withstands intermediate scrutiny. View "Worman v. Healey" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of the denial of his motion to reopen his 2012 order of removal, holding that the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) did not err in denying the petition.In his motion to reopen his order of removal Petitioner, a Guatemalan citizen, asserted that his prior counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to file a brief with the Supreme Court in his petition for review of the BIA's denial of his previous challenge to that removal order. The BIA denied the petition, concluding that Petitioner had failed to establish either the requisite due diligence to excuse his failure to comply with the filing deadline for motions to reopen or a "likelihood of success" regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Petitioner failed to identify anything in the record that could compel the conclusion that he had shown the requisite prejudice from the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, on which he based his motion to reopen. View "Franco-Ardon v. Barr" on Justia Law