Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss and motion to suppress, which Defendant filed before he was convicted of legal reentry after removal from the United States, holding that the district court did not err in not dismissing Defendant's indictment for delay in presentment or in not suppressing information that law enforcement had gathered about Defendant, including his identity.Defendant was a passenger in a van that was stopped for seatbelt violations. A Maine State Trooper who conducted the stop contacted an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officer for help identifying the passengers, several of whom did not appear to speak English. When he was asked for his identification, Defendant produced a consular ID card. ICE officers ran the card through ICE databases and determined that Defendant was suspected of illegal reentry. Defendant was subsequently convicted of illegally entering the United States after removal. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant made his initial appearance just as the criminal process was initiated, there was no unnecessary delay before his initial appearance and so no violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a); and (2) the district court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress. View "United States v. Garcia-Zavala" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of conspiracy to deprive a person of civil rights and sentence of eighty-seven months in prison, holding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant's conviction and that there was no other reversible error.Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motions for judgment of acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence; (2) the district court properly admitted testimony of two government witnesses under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); (3) the district court did not violate Defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause; (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's second motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; and (5) Defendant's sentence was procedurally reasonable. View "United States v. Martinez-Mercado" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the holding of the magistrate judge that Defendant, a repair company, was not liable under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A, holding that Plaintiff, LimoLiner, Inc., did not meet its burden of showing that Defendant's technical violations of the Massachusetts Attorney General's regulations that govern motor vehicle repairs, 940 Mass. Code Regs. 5.05, caused Plaintiff the loss of any money or property.In rejecting Plaintiff's regulatory claim, the magistrate judge concluded that the Attorney General's motor vehicle regulations did not apply to disputes between businesses. The First Circuit certified to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) the question of whether the regulation does apply in such situations. The SJC answered yes, so the First Circuit remanded the claims of violation of the Attorney General's regulations for further findings. On remand, the magistrate judge found, among other things, that Defendant's regulatory violations did not automatically establish liability under Chapter 93A and that Plaintiff failed to show that Defendant's regulatory violations were unfair or deceptive. The First Circuit on other grounds, holding that Plaintiff did not show that Defendant's regulatory violations caused Plaintiff any loss of money or property. View "LimoLiner, Inc. v. Dattco, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant to forty-eight months in prison for unlawfully possessing a firearm, holding that Defendant's variant sentence was not procedurally unreasonable.The guideline range specified by the presentence report was thirty to thirty-seven months. The district court ultimately imposed a forty-eight-month variant sentence. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court failed adequately to explain its reasons for imposing an above-guideline sentence, that a variant sentence was not supported by the record, and that the district court relied on erroneous facts. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court offered a plausible and coherent rationale for its eleven-month variance; and (2) the district court did not rely on erroneous facts in imposing Defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Rivera-Santiago" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's request to challenge the reliability of his victim's testimony by cross-examining the victim at Defendant's resentencing hearing, holding that the district court did not violate Defendant's procedural due process rights by disallowing cross-examination of the victim at Defendant's resentencing.Defendant pleaded guilty to kidnapping for ransom. The First Circuit remanded the case for resentencing. On remand, the district court judge sentenced Defendant to eight months less than his previous sentence. On appeal, Defendant argued that his procedural due process rights were violated when the judge denied him the opportunity to contest misinformation about his treatment of the victim during the abduction by cross-examining the victim, which led to the imposition of a sentence based on inaccurate information. The First Circuit disagreed and affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's request to cross-examine the victim at Defendant's resentencing hearing. View "United States v. Berrios-Miranda" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's partial entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff's age discrimination claim and his family's derivative tort claims and the denial of Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, holding that the district court's summary judgment rulings were proper.Plaintiff and five of his family member brought this action under Puerto Rico law against Plaintiff's former employer and its insurance carrier alleging unjust dismissal and age discrimination in employment, his family asserting derivative tort claims arising from the alleged age discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all but the unjust dismissal claim and denied Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, under the facts of this case, summary judgment was properly granted. View "Ramos-Santiago v. WHM Carib LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated in part the district court's grant of Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, holding that the warrantless search in this case violated the Fourth Amendment because the circumstances, including deception by law enforcement officers, vitiated the consent given by Plaintiff.Plaintiff alleged that he consented to FBI agents' entry into his home and search of his computers only because the officers lied about the true reason of why there were there and what they were looking for. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit vacated in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) because the totality of the circumstances pointed to a situation involving beguilement, the government did not meet its burden to prove voluntariness, and therefore, the warrantless entry into Plaintiff's home and the search and seizure of his computer violated the Fourth Amendment; (2) Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's search-based Fourth Amendment claim because any reasonable officer would have recognized that the circumstances were impermissibly coercive; and (3) even if Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim had merit, Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity. View "Pagan-Gonzalez v. Moreno" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the order of the district court ruling that the automatic stay provision of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) did not apply to proceedings to determine the amount of federal court-ordered payments that the Commonwealth owed to several federally qualified health centers (FQHCs) per a 2010 injunction, holding that the automatic stay applied in this case.In 2003, several FQHCs sought to enjoin the Secretary of the Department of Health of Puerto Rico from failing to reimburse them for their reasonable costs of providing services to Medicaid patients. In 2018, the Commonwealth filed a motion notifying the district court that the Commonwealth had filed for bankruptcy under Title III of PROMESA and, therefore, the litigation was subject to the automatic stay. The district court ruled that the automatic stay did not apply. The First Circuit reversed, holding that certain provisions of PROMESA did not preclude the automatic stay’s application in this case. View "Migrant Health Center, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court ruling that the Town of Weymouth’s local ordinance, as applied to a project in which Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC sought to build a natural gas compressor station in Weymouth, was preempted by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) authorizing construction of the Weymouth Compressor Station.Algonquin received a CPCN from FERC authorizing the project, but that certificate was conditioned upon the receipt of a consistency determination from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts pursuant to the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA). To complete its CZMA review the Commonwealth required Algonquin to furnish a permit from Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection, which, in turn, refused to issue such a permit until the Town of Weymouth approved the project under its local ordinance. Wemouth denied Algonquin’s permit applications. Algonquin ultimately commenced this action against Weymouth arguing that the local ordinance, as it applied to the compressor station, was preempted under federal law. The district court granted summary judgment for Algonquin. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that application of Weymouth’s ordinance to the proposed compressor station was foreclosed by federal law under the theory of conflict preemption. View "Algonquin Gas Transmission v. Weymouth Conservation Commission" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting judgment as a matter of law to Defendant-employer on Plaintiff’s age discrimination claims and Puerto Rico law claims and granting in part Defendant’s summary judgment motion, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.After Plaintiff was laid off as part of Defendant’s effort to cut costs, Plaintiff sued the hospital under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-634 and Puerto Rico antidiscrimination and tort law. The district court granted summary judgment in part for Defendant, finding that Defendant had facially legitimate, non-discriminatory grounds to terminate Plaintiff’s position. A jury trial ensued, but at the close of evidence the district court granted Defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there were fatal and uncontradicted defects in Defendant’s prima facie theory of liability as established by the evidence at trial. View "Hoffman-Garcia v. Metrohealth, Inc." on Justia Law