Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to AXIS Reinsurance Company (AXIS) on Plaintiffs' complaint seeking to enforce a directors and officers insurance policy with AXIS, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of AXIS and in denying Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment.Plaintiffs were BioChemics, Inc., a pharmaceutical company based in Massachusetts, and John Masiz, its president and chief executive officer. Plaintiffs sought damages for what they claimed was AXIS's breach, under the relevant policy, of its duty to defend them in connection with an investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission against BioChemics and its officers. In its motion for summary judgment, AXIS argued that it did not breach its duty to defend under the policy because Plaintiffs were seeking to enforce that duty in relation to a claim that was first made before the policy took effect and thus was not covered by the policy. The district court granted the motion. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to AXIS. View "Biochemics, Inc. v. Axis Reinsurance Co." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and motions related to his sentencing, holding that the record withstood Defendant's multiple claims of error.Defendant entered a straight guilty plea to forty-eight counts of an indictment charging him with fraud-based crimes. The district court denied Defendant's subsequent motion to withdraw his guilty plea and other sentencing-related motions and sentenced Defendant to 132 months' imprisonment and ordered him to make restitution in the amount of $7,737,486.10. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Defendant to retract his guilty plea; (2) the district court did not err in applying a two-level enhancement for crimes involving ten or more victims; (3) the district court did not err in calculating the amount of loss attributable to the offenses of conviction; (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to compel production of materials three days before his scheduled sentencing; (5) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for an evidentiary hearing at sentencing; (6) Defendant's due process rights were not violated during sentencing; and (7) there was no plain error in the district court's restitution order. View "United States v. Flete-Garcia" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of an administrative order of removal, holding that Petitioner's arguments challenges to the removal order were unavailing.Petitioner was an Irish citizen who entered the United States as a child and had been living here for more than seven years when he was apprehended by immigration officials. The government charged him with having been admitted to the United States via the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) and having stayed here beyond the ninety-day period permitted by the visa that he secured through the VWP. The government then issued a final order of removal. The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) the government presented sufficient evidence of Petitioner's removability; and (2) Petitioner's procedural due process challenge to the removal order failed. View "O'Riordan v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court upholding a decision of the Massachusetts Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA) ruling that the Natick Public School District had complied with the "free appropriate public education" (FAPE), "least restrictive environment" (LRE), and transition requirements in proposed individualized education programs (IEP) for C.D., holding that the district court did not err.Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Massachusetts law, the IEPs of certain disabled students must contain, in addition with FAPE and LRE requirements, postsecondary transition goals and services based on age-appropriate assessments. Appellants were C.D., who qualified as a child with a disability under the IDEA, and her parents. Appellants filed a complaint with the BSEA seeking reimbursement for C.D.'s tuition at a specialized private school. The BSEA denied Appellants' request. The district court affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) applied the correct legal standards; (2) properly ruled that the IEPs did not violate the LRE mandate; and (3) did not err in affirming the BSEA's ruling that the IEPs complied with the statute's transition provision. View "C.D. v. Natick Public School District" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the district court's denial of prison officials' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's lawsuit alleging the use of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, holding that the district court failed to fulfill its obligation to follow the law as set forth in controlling precedent.The prison officials moved for summary judgment arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion. The record contained two versions of the relevant interaction between Plaintiff and prison officials. Under Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007), the district court's job was to decide whether the prison officials' evidence blatantly contradicted Plaintiff's version of events. The district court, however, rejected the teaching of Scott and denied the qualified immunity defense. The First Circuit held that the court's denial of qualified immunity was predicated on its error of law and remand to another district court judge for further proceedings consistent with the law was required. View "Underwood v. Barrett" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Petitioner's petition for postconviction relief, holding that trial counsel's failure to consult with Petitioner about an appeal deprived Petitioner of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken.This appeal required the First Circuit to apply the presumption of prejudice set forth in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), in circumstances in which a defense attorney violates his or her duty to consult with a client about an appeal when the defendant reasonably demonstrated that he or she was interested in appealing or when a rational defendant would want to appeal. In the instant case, Petitioner previously executed a plea agreement containing a waiver-of-appeal provision. Petitioner filed a pro se petition to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal. The district court held that Flores-Ortega's presumption of prejudice was inapposite because Petitioner had executed an appeal waiver. The First Circuit reversed, holding that trial counsel did not properly discharge his duty to consult and that counsel's constitutionally deficient performance prejudiced Petitioner by depriving him of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken. View "Rojas-Medina v. United States" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the federal district court denying Appellant's request for a declaratory judgment asserting that a protective order that remained in effect in his now-closed state criminal case was unconstitutional, holding that the state court judge was protected from this lawsuit by the doctrine of judicial immunity.Appellant filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the protective order violated his First Amendment rights. Appellee, the state court judge, responded with a motion to dismiss, arguing that she was protected by judicial immunity. The federal district court granted Appellee's motion to dismiss. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Appellee's actions were shielded from attack by judicial immunity. View "Zenon v. Guzman" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, holding that the district court did not err in determining that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) acted reasonably in concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.Appellant was convicted in state court of first-degree murder. The SJC affirmed Appellant's convictions and found that the evidence was constitutionally sufficient to support the first-degree murder conviction. Appellant later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district court, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence grounding his murder conviction. The district court denied the petition. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the SJC's rejection of Appellant's sufficiency claim was objectively reasonable. View "Roman v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

In this removed diversity suit, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient timely service of process, holding that Defendant did not evade service or conceal the defect in service and that the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Plaintiff had not shown good cause.Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(j) requires a plaintiff to effect service of process within ninety days of filing suit. Plaintiff failed to meet that deadline when bringing her claims for negligence and wrongful death. The district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss and denied Plaintiff's motion to extend time to perfect service of process under Mass. R. Civ. P. 6(b). The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted Defendant's motion to dismiss and Defendant's motion for an extension of time to perfect service of process. View "Crossetti v. Cargill, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants, the Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training and the State, on Plaintiff's complaint alleging discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2, holding that summary judgment was properly granted.In his complaint, Plaintiff claimed that the Department's promotion practices had a disparate impact on minority employees and that the Department declined to promote her because she is black. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) because Plaintiff could not show a disparate impact in the absence of statistical and statistically significant evidence, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff's claim of disparate impact; and (2) Plaintiff failed to present enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendants' stated reason for failing to promote her was pretextual. View "Luceus v. State" on Justia Law