Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

David Keane's employment with Expeditors Hong Kong Limited (Expeditors HK) was terminated on December 11, 2023. Keane subsequently filed a lawsuit against Expeditors HK and Expeditors International of Washington, Inc. (Expeditors US) in the District of Massachusetts, alleging federal and state law claims related to his termination. Expeditors HK is a wholly owned subsidiary of Expeditors US. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and improper venue for the federal law claim.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the claims against Expeditors HK and the non-contract claims against Expeditors US for lack of personal jurisdiction. The contract claims against Expeditors US were dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The court found that Keane failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his assertion that Expeditors HK was an alter ego of Expeditors US.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissals. The appellate court held that the Massachusetts federal district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Expeditors HK. Regarding the claims against Expeditors US, the court found that Keane could not prevail without proving wrongful termination by Expeditors HK, and he failed to allege sufficient facts or legal theories to impute Expeditors HK's actions to Expeditors US. The court concluded that Keane's complaint did not provide adequate grounds to disregard the corporate formalities between Expeditors US and Expeditors HK. View "Keane v. Expeditors International of Washington, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves an enforcement action by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against Gregory Lemelson and Lemelson Capital Management, LLC. The SEC alleged that Lemelson made false statements of material fact, engaged in a fraudulent scheme, and violated securities laws, resulting in approximately $1.3 million in illegal profits. The SEC sought disgorgement of these profits, a permanent injunction, and civil monetary penalties. Lemelson moved to dismiss the complaint, and the district court dismissed one of the challenged statements. The SEC filed an amended complaint, and the jury ultimately found Lemelson liable for three statements but rejected other claims.The District Court for the District of Massachusetts held Lemelson in contempt for violating a protective order and threatening a priest who provided information to the SEC. After the jury verdict, the district court issued a final judgment, including a five-year injunction against Lemelson and a $160,000 civil penalty. Lemelson appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. Lemelson then moved for attorneys' fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), arguing that the SEC's demands were excessive compared to the final judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of Lemelson's motion for fees and costs. The appellate court found that the district court incorrectly compared the SEC's demand to the scope of the initial claims rather than the final judgment obtained. The appellate court vacated the denial of fees and costs and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the SEC's demands were excessive and unreasonable compared to the final judgment. The appellate court also noted that the district court should consider whether Lemelson acted in bad faith or if special circumstances make an award unjust. View "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Lemelson" on Justia Law

Four businesses involved in the cultivation, manufacture, possession, and distribution of marijuana within Massachusetts, in compliance with state laws, sued the Attorney General of the United States in 2023. They claimed that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) exceeded Congress's powers under Article I of the U.S. Constitution and violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. They sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction to prevent the enforcement of the CSA against their intrastate activities.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court reasoned that the Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales v. Raich, which upheld the CSA's application to intrastate marijuana activities under the Commerce Clause, was controlling. The District Court also found no precedent for recognizing a fundamental right to cultivate, process, and distribute marijuana, thus rejecting the plaintiffs' substantive due process claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's dismissal. The First Circuit held that the CSA's regulation of intrastate commercial marijuana activities was within Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. The court found that Congress had a rational basis for concluding that intrastate marijuana activities substantially affect interstate commerce. Additionally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' substantive due process claim, holding that there is no fundamental right to cultivate, manufacture, possess, and distribute marijuana. The court emphasized that historical practices and recent state legislative trends do not establish such a fundamental right. View "Canna Provisions, Inc. v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Victor Soto-Sanchez was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was violated when a police officer testified about an informant's tip. He also challenged the application of a two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice in his sentencing.The United States District Court for the District of Maine allowed the police officer's testimony, overruling Soto-Sanchez's objections on Confrontation Clause and hearsay grounds. The court provided a limiting instruction to the jury, stating that the informant's statements were not to be considered for their truth but to explain the officer's investigative steps. The jury found Soto-Sanchez guilty, and the court applied the obstruction of justice enhancement based on Soto-Sanchez's alleged attempts to influence a witness.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed that Soto-Sanchez's Sixth Amendment rights were violated but deemed the error harmless due to overwhelming evidence against him, including physical evidence and witness testimony. The court also rejected Soto-Sanchez's sentencing challenge, concluding that he had waived his arguments regarding the obstruction of justice enhancement. Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed Soto-Sanchez's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Soto-Sanchez" on Justia Law

In 2023, James Broad and Rebecca McCrensky began operating a car-rental agency, Becky's Broncos, LLC, on Nantucket Island without the necessary local approvals. The Town of Nantucket and the Nantucket Town Select Board ordered Becky's to cease operations. Becky's sought preliminary injunctive relief in the District of Massachusetts to continue their business.The District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied Becky's request for a preliminary injunction. The court found insufficient evidence of discriminatory effect under the dormant Commerce Clause and concluded that Becky's had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims. Becky's appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that Becky's did not show a likelihood of success on the merits of its dormant Commerce Clause claim, as the ordinance did not discriminate against out-of-state businesses. The court also found that Becky's failed to establish a likelihood of success on its antitrust claims due to a lack of a concrete theory of liability. Additionally, Becky's procedural due process argument was rejected because it did not establish a property interest in the required medallions. Lastly, the court held that the ordinance survived rational basis review under substantive due process, as it was rationally related to legitimate government interests in managing traffic and congestion on the island. View "Becky's Broncos, LLC v. Town of Nantucket" on Justia Law

Northeastern University operates a campus police department (NUPD) responsible for the safety and security of its Boston campus. The NUPD includes Sergeants and Sergeant Detectives who oversee Patrol Officers, Community Service Officers, and Detectives. The American Coalition of Public Safety (ACOPS) sought to represent a bargaining unit including these Sergeants and Sergeant Detectives. Northeastern argued that these employees were supervisors under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and thus excluded from the bargaining unit.The Regional Director for Region 1 of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) held a hearing and concluded that Northeastern failed to prove that Sergeants and Sergeant Detectives were supervisors. The Director found that while Sergeants had some role in assigning duties, they did not exercise independent judgment in doing so. The NLRB denied Northeastern's request for review and certified the union. Northeastern refused to bargain, leading to an unfair labor practice charge. The NLRB granted summary judgment against Northeastern, ordering it to bargain with ACOPS.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the NLRB's conclusion that Sergeants and Sergeant Detectives were not supervisors was not supported by substantial evidence and deviated from precedent without adequate explanation. The court held that Sergeants and Sergeant Detectives do exercise independent judgment in assigning duties and managing the Incident Containment Team (ICT) and details. Consequently, the court denied the NLRB's cross-petition for enforcement, vacated the unfair labor practice finding against Northeastern, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Northeastern University v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Anthony Basilici was convicted by a jury of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute heroin, commit kidnapping, and obstruct justice. He was also convicted of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, which was discharged, resulting in an enhanced sentence. Basilici appealed his firearm conviction, arguing trial errors and insufficient evidence.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts heard the case initially. The jury found Basilici guilty on all counts, including the firearm charge under Count Five. Basilici filed motions for acquittal and a new trial, which the district court denied, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Basilici contended that the evidence was insufficient to support his firearm conviction under the Pinkerton doctrine, which holds conspirators liable for reasonably foreseeable crimes committed by co-conspirators. He also argued that the jury instructions were misleading and confusing, and that the supplemental instruction given in response to a jury question was improper.The First Circuit affirmed the conviction, finding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the firearm discharge was reasonably foreseeable to Basilici. The court held that the district court did not err in giving the Pinkerton instruction and that the supplemental instruction was appropriate. The court also found no plain error in the district court's handling of the jury's note and the supplemental instruction. View "United States v. Basilici" on Justia Law

Igor Quinn-Goncalves, an undocumented native and citizen of Brazil, petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision that upheld an immigration judge's order for his removal from the United States. Quinn-Goncalves, who has been detained throughout the relevant period, acknowledged that his petition was filed late, arriving at the clerk's office three days after the deadline. His wife sent the petition via UPS on the last permissible day, following incorrect advice from the clerk's office that mailing by the deadline was sufficient.The BIA had previously denied Quinn-Goncalves's appeal of the immigration judge's removal order. The immigration judge had ordered his removal based on his undocumented status. Quinn-Goncalves then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, but his petition was not filed within the required 30-day period after the BIA's final order of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit dismissed the petition due to its untimeliness. The court emphasized that under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 25(a)(2)(A)(i), a petition for review must be received by the clerk within the statutory deadline to be considered timely. The court rejected Quinn-Goncalves's argument that mailing the petition within the deadline should suffice, distinguishing his case from the precedent set in Houston v. Lack, which applied a mailbox rule for pro se prisoners. The court concluded that it could not extend the filing deadline under Rule 26(b)(2) and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Goncalves v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Miya Water Projects Netherlands B.V. (Miya) filed a lawsuit under the Transparency and Expedited Procedure for Public Records Access Act (TEPPRA) against the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (the Board). Miya sought access to public records related to a canceled water infrastructure project. The Board, established by Congress in 2016, refused to provide the requested documents, claiming TEPPRA did not apply to it. Miya then sued the Board in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico.The district court dismissed Miya's case, ruling that the Board was protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity, which extends to Puerto Rico. The court applied the arm-of-the-state test and concluded that the Board, as an entity funded by the Commonwealth and with judgments paid by the Commonwealth, shared Puerto Rico's immunity. The court also determined that the Commonwealth did not waive this immunity through TEPPRA, as the statute did not meet the strict standards required to effect such a waiver under federal law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo. The appellate court agreed with the lower court's findings, holding that Puerto Rico's Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to the Board and that the Commonwealth did not waive this immunity through TEPPRA. The court emphasized that a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity must be unequivocally expressed in the statute's text, which TEPPRA did not do. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Miya's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Miya Water Projects Netherlands B.V. v. Financial Oversight and Management Board" on Justia Law

John Doe, a high school student with several psychological disabilities, repeated his freshman year at an out-of-state boarding school. Upon returning to Rhode Island, he sought a waiver from the Rhode Island Interscholastic League (the League) to extend his eligibility to play sports into his fifth year of high school, citing his disabilities as the reason for his request. The League denied the waiver, stating that his ineligibility was due to his voluntary decision to repeat the ninth grade, not his disabilities.Doe's parents appealed the League's decision to the Waiver Request Hearing Committee and the Principals' Committee, both of which upheld the denial. Subsequently, Doe filed a lawsuit in the District of Rhode Island, claiming that the League's refusal violated Titles II and III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted a permanent injunction, allowing Doe to play sports in his fifth year, reasoning that the League's rule was not an essential aspect of its program and that Doe's disability was the but-for cause of his ineligibility.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court's injunction. The appellate court concluded that Doe's disability was not the but-for cause of his ineligibility, as his decision to repeat the ninth grade was unrelated to his disability. Additionally, the court held that waiving the eight-semester rule would fundamentally alter the League's interscholastic athletics program, which aims to ensure competitive parity and maximize student participation. Thus, the requested accommodation was deemed unreasonable. View "Doe v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League" on Justia Law