Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the magistrate judge concluding that Defendant, a state drug lab supervisor, was not entitled to qualified immunity from a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and vacated the denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss an intentional infliction of emotional distress state law claim, holding that Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity from the section 1983 claim.Plaintiff's conviction was vacated after the discovery of the drug abuse of Sonja Farak, a chemist at the Amherst Drug Lab on the campus of the University of Massachusetts. Plaintiff brought this complaint alleged that Defendant's inadequate supervision Farak constituted deliberate indifference to Defendant's constitutional rights. Defendant also claimed intentional infliction of emotional distress. The magistrate judge denied Defendant's motion to dismiss the section 1983 claim and held that Defendant's behavior showing a disregard for "repeated red flags" was enough to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under state law. The First Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity from the section 1983 claim; and (2) because the sole basis for federal jurisdiction was dismissed the judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress state law claim is remanded to state court. View "Penate v. Hanchett" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied the petition filed by Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, seeking review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying as untimely Petitioner's motion to reopen her earlier removal proceedings, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion.Petitioner sought to reopen her earlier removal proceedings alleging that changed country conditions in China regarding religious persecution would impact her given her recent conversion to Christianity. The BIA denied the motion to reopen, finding that it was time-barred and that the evidence did not support an exception to the time limits. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Petitioner's motion to reopen removal proceedings was time-barred. View "Lin v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the district court's sentence imposed in connection with Defendant's conviction for sexual exploitation of a child, access with intent to view child pornography, and possession of child pornography, holding that the district court erred in applying the 2016 Guidelines Sentencing Manual to two ungrouped, later-committed offenses in calculating the offense level for an offense committed in 2001.Defendant pleaded guilty to all offenses under the same indictment, and the district court sentenced Defendant to a 196-month term of incarceration. The 2016 version of the manual, as compared to the version in effect in 2001, resulted in a high total offense level. Further, the court gave no explanation for why it chose the sentence or for why it would have done so even if it knew it was upwardly variant. The First Circuit remanded the case for resentencing, holding (1) application of the subsequent manual to the prior, ungrouped offense violated the Ex Post Facto Clause; and (2) the district court plainly erred in providing no justification for the resulting upward variance. View "United States v. Mantha" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortion and one count of aiding and abetting the same, holding that there was ample and sufficient evidence to support the verdict on both crimes.Defendant and other ostensible members of an organized crime organization tried to extort money from the owner of an interstate towing company through a variety of means. A jury convicted Defendant of conspiracy to interfere with commerce by threats of violence and interference with commerce by threats or violence and aiding and abetting the same. The district court sentenced Defendant to a twenty-month term of imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the evidence was more than sufficient to support the verdict on both crimes. View "United States v. Valentini" on Justia Law

In this case convicting Defendant of multiple offenses stemming from his criminal scheme of purportedly sending clients cyanide so they could commit suicide the First Circuit reversed Defendant's conviction as to count 14 (witness tampering) and affirmed his remaining convictions, holding that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence having great prejudicial effect but little probative value, and the error was not harmless as to count 14.Defendant pleaded guilty to nine fraud-related counts and went to trial on the remaining counts. The jury found Defendant guilty on five of the six tried counts. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant on counts 1 and 14 (the mailing injurious articles and witness tampering counts); (2) with respect to counts 1 and 14 and certain fraud-related counts (counts 5, 7, 12), the district court abused its discretion in admitting highly charged evidence having significant prejudicial effect but scant probative value, but this error was harmless as to most of the tried counts; (3) as to count 14, the error in admitting the evidence at issue was not harmless, requiring a new trial on that count; and (4) the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant. View "United States v. Kilmartin" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing for want of jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) this lawsuit asking that the district court enjoin the collection of certain Rhode Island tolls as violative of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, holding that the TIA's prohibition stating that district courts shall not enjoin levy or collection of "any tax under State law" where a remedy may be had in state courts is inapplicable to the Rhode Island tolls.A Rhode Island statute authorized the Rhode Island Department of Transportation to collect from tractor-trailers certain tolls in order to pay for replacement, reconstruction, maintenance, and operation of Rhode Island bridges. Plaintiff trucking entities brought this lawsuit. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction under the TIA. The First Circuit reversed, holding the the tolls in this case were not a "tax" under the statute. View "American Trucking Ass'n v. Alviti" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting the Attorney General's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint alleging that the "Au Pair Program" at issue in this case impliedly preempts Massachusetts from requiring host families to comply with its wage and hour laws and ordering Plaintiff's case dismissed, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.The United States Department of State (DOS) administers the Au Pair Program, through which foreign nationals may obtain a special visa then provide in-home childcare services to host families in the United States while the foreign nationals pursue post-secondary school studies. Plaintiffs, a DOS-approved private placement agency based on Massachusetts, and two individuals, brought this lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and alleging that state law measures are preempted insofar as they protect au pair participants by imposing obligations on their host families as their employer that may be enforced against the host families. The district court found that there was no preemption. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs did not meet their burden to establish field or conflict preemption. View "Capron v. Massachusetts Attorney General" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant and dismissing Plaintiff's claims that Defendant terminated his employment to deprive him of a significant equity incentive, holding that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that when Defendant fired Plaintiff it deprived Plaintiff of compensation that he had already earned by virtue of his past services.In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that Plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence to show that, at the time of his discharge, Plaintiff was deprived of compensation that he had fairly earned and legitimately expected by virtue of his past work. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of Defendant. View "Suzuki v. Abiomed, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed in part the magistrate judge's grant of summary judgment for Defendants and dismissing Plaintiff's civil rights action, holding that the magistrate judge erred by granted summary judgment on the claims that police officers unlawfully searched Defendant's property and falsely arrested Defendant and that a jury could find that one police officer and the chief of police violated Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.Defendant was arrested for theft after police officers obtained a warrant to search Defendant's home for certain property. Defendant later brought this action alleging that there was no probable cause for his arrest. A magistrate judge dismissed all of Defendant's claims on summary judgment. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) the magistrate judge erred by granting summary judgment on the claims under the federal and state civil rights acts that the officers unlawfully searched Defendant's property; (2) the magistrate judge erred in granting summary judgment on Defendant's federal and state civil rights claims for false arrest; and (3) Defendant alleged sufficient facts that a jury might reasonably find the chief of police and one police officer liable on the Fourth Amendment claims, and the Court declined to affirm the judgment on qualified immunity grounds. View "Jordan v. Town of Waldoboro" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence, holding that the district court erred in determining that Defendant's sister had either actual or apparent authority to consent to the search.Defendant filed a motion to suppress fentanyl obtained from within closed black garbage bags that were found in his sister's storage unit during a warrantless search. The district court denied the motion to suppress and denied Defendant's subsequent motion for reconsideration. Specifically, the district court concluded that Defendant's sister, who had apparent authority to consent to the search, gave it even if she did not have actual authority to give consent. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the government failed to meet its burden to show that Defendant's sister had either actual or apparent authority to consent to the search of the evidence at issue. View "United States v. Moran" on Justia Law