Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant for disclosure of social security numbers and aggravated identity theft, holding that the district court did not commit clear or obvious error in refusing to ask prospective jurors about racial bias.On appeal, Defendant argued that there was a reasonable possibility that racial bias might have affected the jury because she requested that the district court ask the prospective jurors as a group a question during voir dire about whether any of them harbored racial bias and the district court denied that request. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant objection to the district court's failure to ask a question about racial bias during voir dire was at least forfeited; and (2) it was not clear or obvious error for the district court to refuse to ask such a question. View "United States v. Cezaire" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of RICO conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) and sentencing him to 228 months' imprisonment and three years of supervised release, holding that the district court correctly instructed the jury.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred by not following a statement of the law contained in United States v. Ramirez-Rivera, 800 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2015) and, more generally, challenged the jury instructions for failing to require the jury to make an affirmative finding as to which predicate acts he in fact committed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's arguments regarding the jury instructions were inconsistent with Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997); (2) the district court did not err when it instructed the jury on the requirements of a withdrawal defense; and (3) Defendant's remaining claims were without merit. View "United States v. Leoner-Aguirre" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the order of the district court dismissing the indictment against Defendants after a first trial ended in a mistrial, holding that the district court erred in concluding that Defendants were protected from a retrial by double jeopardy principles.Four defendant were charged with multiple counts of wire fraud, honest-services wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit both species of wire fraud. After trial began, one juror was diagnosed with a brain tumor requiring immediately surgery. The government was unwilling to consent to a reduced jury, and the court subsequently declared a mistrial. Defendants moved to preclude retail and to dismiss the indictment under the Double Jeopardy Clause on the ground that the government could not establish manifest necessity for its decision to force the mistrial. The court granted the motion to dismiss the indictment. The First Circuit reversed as to three of the four defendants, holding that the district court's decision to declare a mistrial rested on manifest necessity, and because the mistrial was not the produce of any purposeful instigation or other government misconduct, double jeopardy principles did not prohibit the government from retrying the defendants. View "United States v. Garske" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for judicial review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing Petitioner's appeal of the immigration court's order of removal and its denial of his application for cancellation of removal, holding that there was no merit to Petitioner's arguments.On appeal, Petitioner argued, among other things, that the notice to appear (NTA) that initiated his removal proceedings was defective because it omitted the date and time of his initial removal hearing, and thus, the immigration court lacked jurisdiction over the proceedings and the removal order was without effect. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) for the same reasons as were explicated in Goncalves Pontes v. Barr, __ F.3d __ (1st Cir. 2019), Petitioner's NTA was effective to commence removal proceedings in the immigration court; and (2) the BIA did not err in rejecting Petitioner's claim for relief from removal premised upon the allegedly ineffective assistance of Petitioner's counsel. View "Ferreira v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' claims that Defendants' conduct violated section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2, and various state antitrust and consumer protection laws, holding that the claims were barred by the filed-rate doctrine.Defendants were two large energy companies that purchased natural gas from producers, resold it to retail natural gas consumers throughout New England, and transported the natural gas along the interstate Algonquin Gas pipeline. Plaintiffs, a putative class of retail electricity customers in New England, brought this action alleging that Defendants strategically reserved excess capacity along the pipeline without using or reselling it, which ultimately resulted in higher retail electricity rates paid by New England electricity consumers. The district court dismissed the claims, concluding that they were barred by the filed-rate doctrine and, alternatively, for lack of antitrust standing and Plaintiffs' failure to plausibly allege a monopolization claim under the Sherman Act. The First Circuit affirmed without reaching the district court's alternative grounds for dismissal, holding that all of Plaintiffs' claims were barred by application of the filed-rate doctrine. View "Breiding v. Eversource Energy" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendants' convictions for conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), conspiracy to possess and distribute narcotics, use and carry of a firearm in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, and related offenses, holding that no prejudicial error occurred in the proceedings below.Defendants in this case were five members of La Rompe ONU, one of the largest and most violent of Puerto Rico's street gangs. The First Circuit affirmed Defendants' convictions, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the RICO-conspiracy, drug-conspiracy, and firearms convictions; (2) the trial court did not commit reversible error by admitting out-of-court statements about a murder-by-choking incident; (3) Defendants failed to show that the trial judge's general RICO-conspiracy instructions resulted in a miscarriage of justice; and (4) the two sentences challenged on appeal were reasonable. View "United States v. Rodriguez-Torres" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision affirming an immigration judge's (IJ) denial of his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that there was substantial evidence supporting the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's decision.In ordering the removal of Petitioner, a native and citizen of Ecuador, the IJ found that Petitioner was not a credible witness and that Petitioner had not met his burden for any relief. The BIA affirmed. Before the First Circuit, Petitioner argued that the BIA failed to consider all the evidence and erred in determining that he had not meaningfully challenged the adverse credibility finding. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence supporting the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's decision. View "Loja-Paguay v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint filed by Hoff Stauffer on behalf of the estate of Carlton Stauffer, his father, against the Internal Revenue Services (IRS) alleging that the IRS improperly denied his April 2013 for his father's 2006 tax refund as untimely, holding that the Estate's arguments on appeal were unavailing.Before the district court, the Estate argued that the applicable statute of limitations for the filing of a tax refund claim was tolled due to Carlton's financial disability. The district court disagreed, concluding that because Hoff held a durable power of attorney (DPA) authorizing him to act on behalf of Carlton in financial matters the limitations period was not tolled. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the DPA qualified Hoff as a person authorized to act on behalf of Carlton in financial matters for the purposes of I.R.C. 6511(h)(2)(B); and (2) there was no clear error in the court's factual finding that Hoff never renounced the DPA. View "Stauffer v. Internal Revenue Service" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for judicial review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ordering Petitioner removed to his homeland of Cape Verde and denying his motions to terminate removal proceedings, holding that the BIA's order of removal was in accordance with law.On appeal, Petitioner argued that because the notice to appear (NTA) that initiated the removal proceedings against him did not include the date and time of his contemplated hearing, it was a defective charging instrument and thus ineffectual to commence removal proceedings. Consequently, Petitioner argued, the immigration court did not acquire jurisdiction over his removal proceedings and the agency's final order of removal was a nullity. The First Circuit disagreed, holding (1) Petitioner's NTA complied with the regulations as reasonably interpreted by the BIA, and therefore, the NTA was effective to confer jurisdiction upon the immigration court; (2) Petitioner's motions to terminate his removal proceedings were properly denied; and (3) the BIA's final order of removal was lawful. View "Goncalves Pontes v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part the decision of the district court dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff's claims of alleging that he was denied the fruits of a profitable exclusive-seller agreement for the sale of a Ferrari when Defendant caused the breach of that agreement by threatening economic harm to the other party to the contract, holding that Plaintiff plausibly pleaded his claim of tortious interference with an existing contract.Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant alleging claims of tortious interference with an advantageous business relationship, tortious interference with an existing contract, and violations of Massachusetts's Consumer Protection Law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 11. The district court dismissed the suit, concluding that Plaintiff had failed plausibly to allege any impermissible motive or means of interference with Plaintiff's business relationships or existing contracts. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff plausibly pleaded that Defendant harmed Plaintiff by tortiously interfering with the contract; and (2) the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiff's remaining claims. View "Hamann v. Carpenter" on Justia Law