Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court designating a magistrate judge to "hear and determine" under 28 U.S.C.(b)(1)(A) a motion to appoint a receiver over certain commercial properties that were the subject of a foreclosure action under Puerto Rico law, holding that the motion to appoint a receiver was "dispositive" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, despite the district court's apparent contrary determination.On appeal, Appellant argued that the motion to appoint a receiver could not be delegated to a magistrate judge under section 636(b)(1)(A) but, rather, must be made under 28 U.S.C. (b)(1)B). The First Circuit vacated and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the motion to appoint a receiver was "dispositive" under Rule 72, and therefore, this Court does not reach the merits of whether the magistrate judge's decision was correct. Rather, the Court remanded the case for the district court to apply de novo review to the magistrate judge's unauthorized order, in accordance with Rule 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1). View "ML-CFC 2007-6 Puerto Rico v. BPP Retail Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court against Kodak Alaris, Inc. based on the jury finding that Kodak was in breach of its contractual obligation to ITyX Solutions AG except as to the calculation of prejudgment interest, holding that the district court correctly rejected Kodak's motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial but that, as to the prejudgment interest award, the interest must be recalculated from a different date.Judgment in this case was entered against Kodak in the sum of $9,211,699.20, including prejudgment interest. The district court rejected Kodak's argument that the jury must have necessarily found that it was ITyX which actually breached the contract and that ITyX had breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court further rejected Kodak's various standing and damages arguments. The First Circuit affirmed the rulings of the district court in all respects except its award of prejudgment interest on damages, and, as to that prejudgment interest award, altered the date used and remanded. View "ITyX Solutions AG v. Kodak Alaris, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the order of the district court finding that the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) incorrectly approved the taking of two areas of land into trust for the Mashpee Wampanoag Indian Tribe, holding that the plain meaning of the text of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA) precluded the BIA's interpretation of 25 U.S.C. 5129.The Tribe planned to use land taken into trust in Mashpee, Massachusetts primarily for housing and planning to use land in Taunton, Massachusetts for economic activities. In approving the taking of the two areas of land into trust for the Tribe the BIA construed 25 U.S.C. 5129 to permit it to accept lands for the Tribe. The district court remanded the matter to the BIA, finding that the BIA incorrectly read the statute as giving it authority to take land into trust for the Tribe. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the IRA unambiguously foreclosed the BIA's interpretation of 25 U.S.C. 5129; and (2) therefore, the BIA lacked authority to take land into trust for the benefit of the Tribe. View "Littlefield v. Mashpee Wampanoag Indian Tribe" on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute, the First Circuit directed entry of summary judgment for Zurich American Insurance Company, holding that Zurich's decision to deny the insured's claim was supported by substantial evidence.Denise Arruda filed a claim for death benefits following the death of her husband, Joseph Arruda, in a car accident. Zurich denied the claim, concluding that Joseph's death was not within the coverage clause of the policy because the death was not independent of all other causes and that it was caused or contributed to by his pre-existing health conditions. Denise brought this action under 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B) alleging that Zurich violated ERISA by denying the insurance benefits. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Denise, concluding that substantial evidence did not support Zurich's decision. The First Circuit reversed, holding that Zurich's conclusion that Joseph's death was caused or contributed to by pre-existing medical conditions was not arbitrary or capricious and was supported by substantial evidence. View "Arruda v. Zurich American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial by an immigration judge (IJ) of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that the BIA's decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record.Petitioner applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. Thereafter, Petitioner was placed in removal proceedings. The IJ denied Petitioner's applications and ordered his removal. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision. The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) the denial of Petitioner's asylum application was supported by substantial record evidence; (2) because Petitioner could not succeed on his asylum claim his claim for withholding of removal was properly denied; and (3) Petitioner's claim regarding the denial of CAT protection was waived. View "Gao v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions for one count of conspiracy to make false statements and to conceal in connection with healthcare benefit programs and two counts of false statements in connection with healthcare benefit programs, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress or in instructing the jury.Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress data that the government had acquired pursuant to a warrant because even if the government's conduct violated the Fourth Amendment there was nothing in the record to show that any of the evidence introduce at trial should have been suppressed; and (2) the district court did not err in instructing the jury about the inferences that it could draw from the fact that a particular witness was not called to testify. View "United States v. Aboshady" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing this qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) against PharMerica, Inc. under the public disclosure bar, holding that relator James Banigan fell within an exception to that bar as an "original source of the information."Banigan and Richard Templin, former employees of the pharmaceutical company Organon, brought this action under the FCA and several of its state law equivalents alleging that PharMerica committed fraud by participating in a Medicaid scheme that rewarded it financially for incentivizing physicians to change patients' antidepressant prescriptions to Organon's medications. The district court dismissed the action under the public disclosure bar, which excludes from the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts qui tam actions that are based upon the public disclosure of allegations in a civil hearing and other sources. The First Circuit reversed, holding that where the allegations of fraud were based upon Banigan's direct knowledge, Banigan's sources met the statutory requirement of "direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based," see 31 U.S.C. 3730(e), to qualify as an original source. View "United States, ex rel. Banigan & Templin v. Pharmerica, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Appellant's federal law claims under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act, and on the state-law claims for discrimination, retaliation based on a complaint of age discrimination, and failure to investigate and vacated the summary judgment on the state law claims for retaliation based on a report of gender discrimination, breach of contract, intentional interference with contractual relations, and defamation, holding that the court erred in granting summary judgment as to these claims.This lawsuit arose from events that led to Appellant's retirement from his position as Fire Chief for the Fire Department of the Town of Marshfield, Massachusetts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town on all of Appellant's federal and state law claims. The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) summary judgment was properly granted as to some of Appellant's claims; but (2) as to the remaining state law claims, there was no analogue to the common law claims in the federal law claims that were addressed, and rather than attempt to resolve the state law issues that were in dispute as to these claims, their dismissal was directed without prejudice. View "Robinson v. Town of Marshfield" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied two petitions for judicial review challenging the orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) first finding that Petitioner was not entitled to asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT protection and then placing the case back on the docket and proceeding from where it left off before the case was administratively closed, holding that the BIA correctly interpreted the word "recalendar."In 2010, the BIA upheld the IJ's decision denying Petitioner's claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. The Petitioner petitioned for judicial review. First Circuit remanded the case to the BIA, and on remand, the government moved to close the proceedings administratively. The BIA granted the motion and administratively closed the case in 2013. The parties then filed a stipulation of dismissal, and the First Circuit dismissed the pending petition for judicial review and entered a judgment of voluntary dismissal. In 2016, the government moved to reinstate the case. The BIA granted the motion and decreed that its original 2010 decision "now takes effect." Petitioner petitioned for judicial review. The First Circuit denied both petitions for judicial review, holding that "recalendar" means to reinstate the case to the active docket in the same posture as it occupied when it was paused for administrative closure. View "Arevalo v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit held that Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC improperly submitted a patent for listing in "the Orange Book" and that Sanofi was potentially liable under the antitrust laws to drug purchasers who were allegedly harmed by the effective extension of Sanofi's monopoly.At the center of this appeal was a publication maintained by the FDA called Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, known as "the Orange Book," which lists patents said by their owners to claim FDA-approved drugs. When a patent is listed in the Orange Book the patent-owning drug manufacturer has the ability to trigger an automatic, thirty-month suspension of the FDA's approval of a competing product. Plaintiffs alleged that Sanofi artificially restricted competition in the market for insulin glargine by improperly listing a certain patent in the Orange Book, thereby delaying competition in the insulin glargine market and resulting in inflated prices. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' Sherman Act claims. The First Circuit vacated the dismissal as to Sanofi's alleged improper Orange Book listing of the patent, holding that Sanofi improperly submitted the patent for listing in the Orange Book and that Sanofi potentially liable under the antitrust laws to drug purchasers who were allegedly harmed by the effective extension of Sanofi's monopoly. View "In re Lantus Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law