Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Orgill, Inc. in this case alleging copyright infringement claims, holding that a copyright licensee given the unrestricted right to grant sublicenses may do so without using express language.Orgill markets and sells Sylvania lightbulbs. At issue was Orgill's use of Photographic Illustrators Corporation (PIC) photos of Sylvania lightbulbs in Orgill's electronic and paper catalogs. PIC and Sylvania had negotiated a license setting forth the scope of Sylvania's permission to use PIC's photographs of Sylvania lightbulbs, but Sylvania did not tell Orgill that Orgill needed to abide by an attribution restriction in Sylvania's license. PIC sued Orgill and other Sylvania dealers and distributors claiming copyright infringement. The district court determined that Orgill had a sublicense from Sylvania to use the photos and rejected PIC's argument that sublicensee of copyrights are ineffective absent language expressly granting permission to use the copyrighted work. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) where a licensor grants to a licensee the unrestricted right to sublicense and permit others to use a copyrighted work, a sublicense may be implied by the conduct of the sublicensor and sublicensee; and (2) a reasonable jury could have found that Sylvania granted an implied sublicense to Orgill. View "Photographic Illustrators Corp. v. Orgill, Inc." on Justia Law

In this appeal concerning whether a settlement contract under Rhode Island law was formed after a personal injury lawsuit was filed the First Circuit certified to the Rhode Island Supreme Court the question of what is the definition of 'civil action' in R.I. Gen. Laws 27-7-2.2.Horace Johnson was the driver and Carlton Johnson was the sole passenger in a car accident. The accident occurred in Rhode Island. Both men were seriously injured. Horace was insured by Arbella Mutual Insurance Company. Arbella accepted Carlton's demand to settle for the policy limit of $100,000. Thereafter, Carlton filed a lawsuit against Horace, Arbella, and other defendants. A federal district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The district court rejected Carlton's argument that Rhode Island's Rejected Settlement Offer Interest Statute, section 27-7-2.2, applied to the case. Carlton appealed, arguing that the statute rendered the settlement contract unenforceable because Arbella failed to accept his settlement offer within the timetable set forth by the statute. At issue was whether the court correctly determined that the statute's "[i]n any civil action" language requires that a legal proceeding in court needs to be underway to trigger the statute's application. The First Circuit certified to the Rhode Island Supreme Court a question concerning the definition of "civil action." View "Johnson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In this case arising out of a petition for bankruptcy filed by the Montreal Maine & Atlantic Railway (MMA) the First Circuit affirmed the decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) upholding the judgment of the bankruptcy court ruling that certain claims filed by creditor railroads should be given priority status pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 1171(b) because they were "Six Months Rule" claims, holding that the claims at issue were priority claims under section 1171(b).In their claims, the creditor railroads sought to recover their share of payments that the MMA was to collect for charges that had been billed to customers that had shipped freight on routes that covered rail systems owned by the MMA and the creditor railroads. The creditor railroads argued that their claims qualified as Six Months Rule claims and so must be paid in full before other claims because the MMA incurred the debt for their share of these payments so close in time to the MMA's bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court agreed with the creditor railroads and concluded that the claims were entitled to priority under section 1171(b). The BAP affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims were priority claims under the statute. View "Keach v. New Brunswick Southern Railway Co. Ltd." on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court ruling for Plaintiff on her action brought under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A and ch. 176D and awarding trebled damages in the amount of $5.4 million but reversed and remanded for calculation of prejudgment interest based on actual damages and not the treble damages figure of $5.4 million, holding that Plaintiff's measure of damages was her "actual damages" because there was no "judgment" in her case.Plaintiff, who was injured in a car accident at age twenty after drinking at a nightclub, sued the nightclub's insurer (Defendant), alleging that Defendant violated chapters 93A and 176D. The federal district court ruled for Plaintiff and assessed actual damages of $1.8 million against Defendant. The court then trebled the award after concluding that Defendant's violations were willful. The First Circuit affirmed on the whole but reversed as to the calculation of prejudgment interest, holding that the district court did not err in finding Defendant's violation of chapter 93A and 176D but erred when it calculated prejudgment interest on the trebled damages award instead of the single damages award. View "Capitol Specialty Insurance Corp. v. Higgins" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying Petitioner's motion to reopen his immigration case, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to reopen on the grounds that Petitioner did not establish changed country conditions.Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala who illegally entered the United States and was later placed in removal proceedings, applied for asylum and withholding of removal on the grounds that he feared gang violence upon his return to Guatemala. The immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's applications. The BIA dismissed Petitioner's appeal, agreeing with the conclusion of the IJ that Petitioner had not shown that he would more likely than not suffer persecution upon his return to Guatemala. Petitioner later moved the BIA to reopen his case, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and that country conditions in Guatemala had substantially changed. The BIA denied Petitioner's motion to reopen. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the BIA did not err in declining to equitably toll the ninety-day statutory filing deadline and in concluding that Petitioner had not demonstrated that country conditions in Guatemala had substantially changed since his hearing. View "Molina v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence of more than three years in prison imposed in connection with his violation of supervised release, holding that the district court did not commit reversible error when she tagged Defendant's drug offense with an A Grade.After seven years in federal prison, Defendant was arrested first for possessing drugs with intent to distribute then for domestic abuse under Puerto Rico law. The federal district judge found Defendant committed a "crime of violence" and a "controlled substance offense" as defined in the federal sentencing guidelines. These crimes, the judge found, were Grade A violations of Defendant's supervised release carrying the stiffest guideline penalties. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence for the district judge to call Defendant's crimes Grade A violations. View "United States v. Garcia-Cartagena" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated Defendant's sentence of thirty months in federal prison for violating the terms of his supervised release, holding that the district judge misapplied the Guidelines in concluding that Defendant's crime was a Grade A violation under U.S.S.G. 7B1.1(a)(A)(i).Six months after Defendant completed his sentence for federal drug crimes and began his six-year term of supervised release Defendant was charged on "information and belief" with committing aggravated domestic abuse under Puerto Rico law. The complaint did not indicate why the police believed Defendant committed the offense. Defendant pled down to a lesser offense, but, based on the complaint, the federal district court found that Defendant committed the more serious crime, which was a "crime of violence" and a Grade A violation. The First Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, holding that the district judge's Grade A finding, based only on unsubstantiated allegations in a charging document, was clear error that affected the sentence imposed. View "United States v. Colon-Maldonado" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the entry of a preliminary injunction enforcing a covenant not to compete included in a restrictive covenant agreement (RCA) that Appellant signed in 2017, holding that the district court did not err in finding that the covenant not to compete was reasonable and in entering the preliminary injunction.After working almost three decades at CVS Pharmacy, Inc., Appellant accepted a new position at PillPack LLC, a direct competitor of CVS. CVS sued Appellant seeking to enforce the covenant not to compete. The district court entered a preliminary injunction enjoining Appellant from working at PillPack for eighteen months, finding that the covenant was reasonable and that Appellant's new position would violate the covenant. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, under either the as-applied or the facial approach in evaluating the reasonableness of the restrictive covenant, CVS was likely to succeed on the merits of its claim for injunctive relief. View "CVS Pharmacy, Inc. v. Lavin" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of possession of child pornography, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motions to suppress and for a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).After agents executing a search warrant of Defendant's residence discovered digital files containing images and videos of child pornography on Defendant's computers Defendant filed a motion to suppress and, in the alternative, for a Franks hearing. The district court denied both motions. Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of child pornography. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) there was no evidence that the affidavit contained egregious misrepresentations sufficient to necessitate a Franks hearing to attack the warrant application, let alone to render the warrant invalid due to a misrepresentation; and (2) the warrant was adequately supported and the evidence obtained was admissible. View "United States v. Larson" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence entered upon Defendant's guilty plea to one count of possessing child pornography, holding that the district court's decision not to impose a below-guidelines sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable.Defendant's conviction stemmed from his possession of approximately 13,000 child pornography images. The district court sentenced Defendant to ninety-seven months' imprisonment and twenty years' supervised release, a sentence that was at the low end of the Guidelines Sentencing Range. The First Circuit affirmed the sentence, holding that the sentence was not procedurally unreasonable and that Defendant failed to overcome the presumption that the sentence was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Gomera-Rodriguez" on Justia Law