Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case, the defendant, Domingo Emmanuel Bruno-Cotto, pleaded guilty to two counts of carjacking and one count of kidnapping following a multi-day crime spree in Puerto Rico. The spree included carjacking an Uber driver, kidnapping an airport passenger, and committing multiple sexual assaults on a woman at a beach. The district court sentenced Bruno-Cotto to 208 months in prison, which was 20 months above the advisory guideline range, citing the unusual cruelty of his actions.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially reviewed the case. Bruno-Cotto did not contest the facts in the presentence report but requested a lower sentence based on his difficult childhood and mental health issues. The government argued for a high-end guideline sentence, emphasizing Bruno-Cotto's leadership role and the premeditated nature of his crimes. The district court ultimately imposed a higher sentence, highlighting the severity and cruelty of Bruno-Cotto's actions, particularly the repeated sexual assaults.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case on appeal. Bruno-Cotto argued that the sentence was procedurally flawed due to the district court's reliance on unreliable hearsay and that it was substantively unreasonable compared to his co-defendant's sentence. The appellate court found no plain error in the district court's reliance on the presentence report, noting that the hearsay information had sufficient indicia of trustworthiness. The court also found the sentence substantively reasonable, given the egregious nature of Bruno-Cotto's conduct and the differences in culpability between him and his co-defendant. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's 208-month sentence. View "United States v. Bruno-Cotto" on Justia Law

The case involves Miguel Santana-Avilés, who was convicted of assaulting a correctional officer at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico. On August 20, 2020, during an inmate count, Officer Efrén Rosario found an extra pillow in the cell shared by Santana-Avilés and two other inmates, which violated prison policy. When Officer Rosario attempted to remove the pillow, one of the cellmates, Héctor Maldonado-Maldonado, attacked him. Santana-Avilés then grabbed Officer Rosario from behind, allowing Maldonado to continue the assault. Santana-Avilés also encouraged the attack by shouting "Hit him." The officers eventually subdued both inmates with the help of reinforcements.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico presided over the initial trial. Santana-Avilés did not testify but sought to introduce statements he made during the incident, claiming they were excited utterances. The court excluded these statements as hearsay. Additionally, the court admitted an email from a prison technician explaining the lack of video evidence due to technical issues, despite Santana-Avilés's objections. The jury found Santana-Avilés guilty of aiding and abetting the assault of a correctional officer, and he was sentenced to eighty-seven months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Santana-Avilés argued that the district court made erroneous evidentiary rulings by excluding his statements and admitting the email. The appellate court found that even if the exclusion of Santana-Avilés's statements was an error, it was harmless given the overwhelming evidence against him. The court also held that the email was properly admitted to rebut an implied charge of fabrication or improper motive. Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Santana-Aviles" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner was convicted by a jury in New Hampshire state court for the first-degree murder of Larry Lemieux. The petitioner admitted to shooting Lemieux but claimed he acted in self-defense or in defense of another, arguing he did not act with premeditation. After his conviction, the prosecution disclosed a proffer letter recommending a suspended sentence for drug charges against Jose Gomez, a key prosecution witness. The petitioner argued that the failure to disclose this letter violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland.The state trial court denied the petitioner's motion for a new trial, finding that the nondisclosure of the proffer letter did not prejudice the petitioner. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed this decision, holding that the petitioner was not prejudiced under New Hampshire law, which sets stricter standards than Brady. The court found that the undisclosed evidence would not have altered the defense strategy or the trial's outcome, given the overwhelming additional evidence of premeditation presented by other witnesses.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on whether the New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The First Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief, concluding that the New Hampshire Supreme Court reasonably determined that the petitioner was not prejudiced by the nondisclosure of the proffer letter. The court noted the overwhelming evidence of premeditation from multiple witnesses, which supported the jury's verdict independent of Gomez's testimony. View "Etienne v. Edmark" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a Guatemalan national, entered the United States on a tourist visa in January 2000 and overstayed. In April 2018, he applied for asylum, citing his dangerous job as a bodyguard for a congressman in Guatemala and fear of extortion and threats from gang members. Removal proceedings were initiated against him, and he conceded removability but cross-applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). His application mentioned only one entry into the U.S. and claimed ignorance of the one-year filing requirement for asylum.An Immigration Judge (IJ) held a hearing in December 2018, where the petitioner testified about his fears of returning to Guatemala. The IJ found the petitioner not credible due to inconsistencies between his oral testimony and written application, such as unlisted entries into the U.S. and unmentioned incidents of threats. The IJ also noted the petitioner's use of false documentation and legal violations in the U.S. The IJ found no extraordinary circumstances to excuse the late asylum application and determined that the petitioner had not suffered past persecution or established a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ also found insufficient evidence for CAT protection.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision in September 2023, agreeing that the petitioner had not demonstrated past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA noted the lack of evidence of threats in the past twenty years and upheld the IJ's findings on withholding of removal and CAT protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA's decision. The court found substantial evidence supporting the adverse credibility determination and agreed that the petitioner had not established eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT protection. The petition for judicial review was denied. View "Garcia Oliva v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Government of Puerto Rico sued several pharmaceutical benefit managers (PBMs) and pharmaceutical manufacturers in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Court of First Instance. The Commonwealth alleged that the PBMs, including Express Scripts and Caremark, schemed to unlawfully inflate insulin prices through rebate negotiations and price setting. The PBMs removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), arguing that they acted under federal authority in negotiating rebates and setting drug prices, and that the lawsuit related to their federal service.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico remanded the case back to the Court of First Instance. The district court found that the Commonwealth's disclaimer, which stated that it was not seeking relief related to any federal program or contract, effectively excluded any claims upon which the PBMs could base removal under § 1442(a)(1). The district court concluded that the PBMs could not claim they acted under federal authority for their non-federal PBM services and that dividing the work done for federal and non-federal clients was possible.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the disclaimer did not prevent removal because Caremark's rebate negotiations for federal and non-federal clients were indivisible. The court found that Caremark acted under federal authority when negotiating rebates for FEHBA plans and possessed a colorable federal defense under FEHBA's express preemption provision. The court concluded that the disclaimer did not eliminate the possibility that the Commonwealth would recover for Caremark's official acts, thus justifying removal under § 1442(a)(1). The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to return it to federal court. View "Government of Puerto Rico v. Express Scripts, Inc." on Justia Law

Luis Efrain Vargas-Salazar, his wife Wilma Jeaneth Vargas-Lasso, and their son Maykel Eliab Vargas-Vargas, natives of Ecuador, sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order affirming the Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of their applications for asylum. Vargas-Salazar also contested the denial of his application for withholding of removal. The family entered the United States without inspection in June 2021 and conceded removability. Vargas-Salazar filed for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), naming his wife and son as derivative beneficiaries.The IJ held a hearing and found Vargas-Salazar's testimony credible. He testified about extortion attempts by a gang in Ecuador, which included threats and a physical altercation resulting in a head injury. The IJ concluded that the harm Vargas-Salazar suffered did not rise to the level of past persecution and that there was no sufficient nexus between the harm and a protected ground. The IJ also denied the application for withholding of removal and CAT protection, finding no evidence of likely future torture by government officials.The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the harm Vargas-Salazar experienced did not constitute persecution and that the threats were not severe enough to cause significant suffering. The BIA also upheld the IJ's finding that there was no nexus between the harm and a protected ground. The BIA noted that the petitioner's CAT claim was waived as it was not raised on appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and applied the substantial evidence standard to the IJ's factual findings. The court found that substantial evidence supported the IJ and BIA's conclusions that the harm did not amount to past persecution and that there was no well-founded fear of future persecution on a protected ground. Consequently, the court denied the petition for review. View "Vargas-Salazar v. Garland" on Justia Law

Jose Mauricio Figueroa, a native and citizen of El Salvador, sought special rule cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against him in 2007. In 2018, Figueroa appeared before an immigration judge (IJ) to request relief, arguing that his removal would cause "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to himself or his spouse, Maria. Figueroa and DHS agreed that a heightened NACARA standard applied due to his criminal history, requiring him to show continuous physical presence in the U.S. for ten years, good moral character, and the specified hardship.The IJ found that Figueroa had lived in the U.S. for thirty years, worked, and managed finances for two properties he and Maria owned. Despite acknowledging the emotional and economic hardship Maria would face, the IJ concluded that Figueroa did not meet the burden of proving exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. The IJ also noted Figueroa's health issues but found no credible evidence that he would be unable to obtain medical care or employment in El Salvador. Additionally, the IJ determined that Figueroa did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion due to his repeated arrests for indecent assault and battery.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Figueroa's appeal, agreeing with the IJ's application of the hardship standard. The BIA found that Figueroa had not proven that he and Maria would be unable to secure employment or meet their basic needs in El Salvador. The BIA also noted that general crime conditions in El Salvador did not meet the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the application of the hardship standard to the established facts was reviewable as a mixed question of law and fact. The court found no error in the agency's conclusion that Figueroa failed to establish the requisite hardship to himself or Maria. The petition for review was denied. View "Figueroa v. Garland" on Justia Law

Four noncitizens from India, who have been lawfully residing in the U.S. for over ten years, filed for permanent residency more than four years ago. Their applications have not been adjudicated, prompting them to sue the Director of USCIS and the Secretary of DOS under the APA for unreasonable delay and unlawful withholding of agency action. They argue that USCIS's policy of not adjudicating applications until a visa is "immediately available" violates 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1). The court found that the plaintiffs' interpretation of § 1255(a) was incorrect and that the agencies' policies were within their discretion. The court ruled that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for unreasonable delay and unlawful withholding under the APA.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal. The appellate court held that § 1255(a) sets eligibility criteria for applying for adjustment of status but does not mandate the timing of adjudication. The court found that the 1976 amendment to § 1255(a) did not preclude USCIS from considering visa availability at the time of approval. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' structural arguments based on other statutory provisions, finding no conflict with USCIS's policy. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the APA against both USCIS and DOS. View "Patel v. Jaddou" on Justia Law

The case involves Lucas Sirois and Alisa Sirois, who were indicted for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). They sought to enjoin the Department of Justice (DOJ) from prosecuting them, arguing that their conduct was in substantial compliance with the Maine Medical Use of Cannabis Act, which allows for the use, distribution, possession, and cultivation of medical marijuana under state law. The defendants claimed that the DOJ's prosecution violated the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment, which prohibits the DOJ from using funds to prevent states from implementing their medical marijuana laws.The United States District Court for the District of Maine denied the defendants' request for injunctive relief. The court held a hearing where the government presented evidence that the defendants' operations, particularly a grow operation known as the "Shoe Shop," violated Maine's medical marijuana laws by operating as a collective and engaging in black-market sales. The court found that the government had met its burden of production, showing a substantial evidentiary basis for the prosecution. However, the defendants failed to meet their burden of persuasion to demonstrate that the prosecution lacked a substantial evidentiary basis or was arbitrary or irrational.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The appellate court held that the defendants did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that they were in substantial compliance with Maine's medical marijuana laws. The court noted significant evidence that the Shoe Shop operated as a collective and that Lucas Sirois engaged in black-market sales. The court concluded that the defendants failed to demonstrate that the DOJ's prosecution would prevent Maine from giving practical effect to its medical marijuana laws, as required under the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment. Therefore, the denial of the motion to enjoin the prosecution was affirmed. View "United States v. Sirois" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendants, Aurea Vázquez Rijos, Marcia Vázquez Rijos, and José Ferrer Sosa, were involved in a murder-for-hire plot that resulted in the death of Adam Anhang Uster in Old San Juan, Puerto Rico, in 2005. Adam, a Canadian entrepreneur, was attacked and killed by a man hired by the defendants while walking with his wife, Aurea. The motive was financial gain from a prenuptial agreement that favored Aurea significantly more in the event of Adam's death than in the case of a divorce.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico tried the defendants. A federal jury convicted Aurea of murder for hire and all three defendants of conspiring to commit murder for hire. Each received a life sentence. The defendants appealed, raising numerous issues related to the trial, sentencing, and post-trial phases.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court addressed various claims, including the sufficiency of the evidence, the denial of severance, the admission of certain evidence, judicial bias, and the handling of post-trial motions related to the mental health of a key witness, Alex Pabón Colon. The court found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the convictions and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings on severance, evidentiary matters, and judicial conduct.The court also examined the defendants' claims regarding the mental health of Pabón, who testified that he was hired by the defendants to kill Adam. The court concluded that the district court did not err in its handling of Pabón's competency and the related post-trial motions. The court affirmed the district court's decisions across the board, upholding the convictions and sentences of the defendants. View "United States v. Vazquez-Rijos" on Justia Law