Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs' breach of contract action against Defendant, their insurer, holding that the district court properly dismissed for failure to state a claim Plaintiffs' claim that Defendant failed to defend and indemnify them in a state court action.Newton Covenant Church (NCC) was comprised of members of the Newton Presbyterian Church (NPC) who withdrew from the Presbyterian Church (USA) and affiliated with a non-Presbyterian organization. NPC and the Presbytery of Boston sued the NCC in the state superior court seeking, among other things, a declaratory judgment that NPC owned church property at 75 Vernon Street in Newton, Massachusetts. NCC submitted a notice to the Great American Insurance Company (GAIC) requesting a defense in the state court action under a Director and Officers insurance policy. GAIC denied coverage on the grounds that the named insured under the policy was NPC, not NCC. After the parties reached a settlement NCC and its individual officers (collectively, Plaintiffs) brought this action against GAIC for breach of contract. The district court dismissed the complaint. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' allegations were not reasonably susceptible of an interpretation that would state a claim covered under the policy. View "Newton Covenant Church v. Great American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the Saco, Maine Shaw's Supermarket on Plaintiff's claim that Shaw's owed a duty to protect its patrons from foreseeable harm and that an attack on his wife in the store was foreseeable, holding that, under Maine law of premises liability, the harm must have been foreseeable, and the attack in this case was not foreseeable.Connor MacCalister attacked and killed Wendy Boudreau with a knife in the Saco Shaw's Supermarket. Jeffrey Boudreau, Wendy's husband and the executor of her estate, brought this action against Shaw's asserting wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering under Maine law. The district court entered summary judgment for Shaw's, concluding that Shaw's did not owe a duty under Maine wrongful death law to protect Wendy from the attack because it was not foreseeable. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Shaw's did not owe a duty to protect Wendy from MacCalister; (2) the district court did not err in how it viewed the facts; and (3) there was no error in the district court's evidentiary rulings challenged on appeal. View "Boudreau v. Shaw's Supermarkets Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit declared that exclusion of otherwise eligible residents of Puerto Rico from receiving the disability benefits that are granted to persons residing in the fifty States, the District of Columbia, and the Northern Mariana Islands under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) provisions of Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1381-1383(f) is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest and is invalid.While residing in New York, Defendant became eligible and commenced receiving SSI disability benefits. The benefits were discontinued when the Social Security Administration became award that Defendant had moved to Puerto Rico. The United States subsequently brought suit against Defendant seeking to collect the amount the SSA claimed was owed by Defendant due to the allegedly improper payment of SSI benefits since Defendant's relocation to Puerto Rico. Defendant raised as an affirmative defense that the exclusion of Puerto Rico residents from the SSI program violated the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, holding that Congress's actions in this case failed to pass rational basis constitutional muster. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the Fifth Amendment forbids the categorial exclusion of Puerto Rico residents from SSI coverage. View "United States v. Vaello-Madero" on Justia Law

In this lawsuit brought against three Boston police officers who were involved in breaking up a party and arresting Plaintiffs, the First Circuit reversed the judgment for Plaintiffs, holding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for entering through the open door of a house under the community care taking exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.Plaintiffs brought civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, 11H and 11I, as well as state tort claims for, among other things, false imprisonment. The jury reached a unanimous verdict in favor of Defendants on all counts. The district court, however, granted Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, finding that the verdict was against the law as to the officers' warrantless entry into the home and that the warrantless entry on the facts as presented in the trial was not protected by qualified immunity. The court then amended its judgment so that it reflected a judgment in favor of Plaintiffs as to the section 1983 unlawful entry claim. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because, under the community caretaking exception, their entry through the home's open door did not violate Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. View "Castagna v. Jean" on Justia Law

In this case, a byproduct of litigation stemming from the derailment of a Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway, Ltd. (MMA) freight train carrying crude oil in Lac-Megantic, Quebec, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of judgment in favor of Robert Keath, the estate representative of MMA, and against creditor Wheeling & Lake Erie Railway Company, holding that, giving due deference to the fact-finder's resolution of the burden of proof, the judgment must be affirmed.One month after the derailment, MMA filed a voluntary petition for protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Wheeling instituted an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court against MMA and the estate representative, seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the existence and priority of its security interest in certain property of the MMA estate. The case involved intricate questions concerning secured transactions, carriage of goods, and corporate reorganization. After a settlement, the bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the estate representative. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) ultimately, this case turned on principals relating to the allocation of the burden of proof and the deference due to the finder of fact; and (2) giving due deference to the fact-finder's resolution of the burden of proof issue, the district court's judgment must be affirmed. View "Wheeling & Lake Erie Railway Co. v. Keach" on Justia Law

In this complaint alleging that Defendants intentionally or recklessly misled investors about Ocular Therapeutix, Inc.'s manufacturing problems the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that Plaintiffs failed to allege facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter as required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), 15 U.S.C. 78u-4, 78u-5.In 2015, Ocular submitted a new drug application to the FDA for approval of Dextenza. In 2017, the FDA published its observations of issues at Ocular's manufacturing facility, which resulted in a drop in the company's stock price. Plaintiffs, several shareholders, brought this securities fraud action on behalf of themselves and a putative class of investors alleging violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78t(a). The district court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) and 12(b)(6), the Exchange Act, and the PSLRA. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs did not allege facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter as required by the PSLRA. View "In re Ocular Therapeutix Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence of 100 months of imprisonment imposed for his convictions of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and illegal possession of a machine gun, holding that the sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable.A probation officer recommended a sentence of forty-one to fifty-one months for Defendant's offenses under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. At sentencing, the Government requested a sentence of at least sixty-three months' imprisonment or, in the alternative, an upward variance. The district court adopted the Guidelines' calculation and then imposed an upward variance of forty-nine months' imprisonment for a total of 100 months' imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the sentence was procedurally sound and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Garcia-Mojica" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the order of the district court denying Defendant's request for a sentence reduction under Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018, holding that the district court erred in finding that Defendant was ineligible for a reduction on the grounds that his offense was not a "covered offense" under the First Step Act.Specifically, the district court concluded that because the penalties for the quantity of controlled substances attributed to Defendant remained the same after passage of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, he was not convicted for "a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified." The First Circuit reversed and remanded the case, holding that Congress intended to provide potential relief to persons like Defendant whose penalties were dictated by 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C), and therefore, Defendant was convicted for a "covered offense" under Section 404. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting a preliminary junction to Defendant's former employer (Plaintiff), a healthcare company incorporated in Delaware, that enforced a nonsolicitation clause in the employment contract between the parties, holding that the district court did not err in applying Delaware law to assess whether Plaintiff had satisfied the "likelihood of success" requirement.The injunction sought by Plaintiff enforced a nonsolicitation clause in the parties' contract barring Defendant from engaging in certain work for his new employer, one of Plaintiff's competitors. The choice-of-law provision set forth in the employment contract explicitly stated that the agreement should be interpreted and enforced in accordance with Delaware law, without giving effect to its laws pertaining to conflict of las. The district court held that Massachusetts' choice-of-law rules permitted it to enforce the choice-of-law provision, thus premising its issuance of the preliminary injunction on its application of Delaware law. Defendant appealed, arguing that Massachusetts and not Delaware law applied to Plaintiff's breach of contract claims, and therefore, Plaintiff could not satisfy the likelihood-of-success requirement in seeking a preliminary injunction based on those claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no merit in Defendant's challenge to the issuance of the preliminary injunction against him. View "NuVasive, Inc. v. Day" on Justia Law

The First Circuit dismissed this interlocutory appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction and remanded the matter to the district court, holding that Appellant's challenge to the district court's denial of summary judgment was not a final, appealable order.Plaintiff, an inmate at Souza Baranowski Correctional Center (SBCC), brought this lawsuit alleging that Appellant, an SBCC prison official, and other SBCC officials failed to protect him from a substantial risk of serious harm in violation of his constitutional rights. Appellant and the remaining defendants filed for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity. The district court granted summary judgment to all SBCC officials except Appellant. Appellant filed a timely interlocutory appeal, alleging that the district court erred because the undisputed material facts showed Appellant was not deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff. The First Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that Appellant's challenge rested on factual, rather than legal, grounds, and therefore, this Court lacked appellate jurisdiction. View "Norton v. Rodrigues" on Justia Law