Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case arising out of a petition for bankruptcy filed by the Montreal Maine & Atlantic Railway (MMA) the First Circuit affirmed the decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) upholding the judgment of the bankruptcy court ruling that certain claims filed by creditor railroads should be given priority status pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 1171(b) because they were "Six Months Rule" claims, holding that the claims at issue were priority claims under section 1171(b).In their claims, the creditor railroads sought to recover their share of payments that the MMA was to collect for charges that had been billed to customers that had shipped freight on routes that covered rail systems owned by the MMA and the creditor railroads. The creditor railroads argued that their claims qualified as Six Months Rule claims and so must be paid in full before other claims because the MMA incurred the debt for their share of these payments so close in time to the MMA's bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court agreed with the creditor railroads and concluded that the claims were entitled to priority under section 1171(b). The BAP affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims were priority claims under the statute. View "Keach v. New Brunswick Southern Railway Co. Ltd." on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court ruling for Plaintiff on her action brought under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A and ch. 176D and awarding trebled damages in the amount of $5.4 million but reversed and remanded for calculation of prejudgment interest based on actual damages and not the treble damages figure of $5.4 million, holding that Plaintiff's measure of damages was her "actual damages" because there was no "judgment" in her case.Plaintiff, who was injured in a car accident at age twenty after drinking at a nightclub, sued the nightclub's insurer (Defendant), alleging that Defendant violated chapters 93A and 176D. The federal district court ruled for Plaintiff and assessed actual damages of $1.8 million against Defendant. The court then trebled the award after concluding that Defendant's violations were willful. The First Circuit affirmed on the whole but reversed as to the calculation of prejudgment interest, holding that the district court did not err in finding Defendant's violation of chapter 93A and 176D but erred when it calculated prejudgment interest on the trebled damages award instead of the single damages award. View "Capitol Specialty Insurance Corp. v. Higgins" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying Petitioner's motion to reopen his immigration case, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to reopen on the grounds that Petitioner did not establish changed country conditions.Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala who illegally entered the United States and was later placed in removal proceedings, applied for asylum and withholding of removal on the grounds that he feared gang violence upon his return to Guatemala. The immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's applications. The BIA dismissed Petitioner's appeal, agreeing with the conclusion of the IJ that Petitioner had not shown that he would more likely than not suffer persecution upon his return to Guatemala. Petitioner later moved the BIA to reopen his case, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and that country conditions in Guatemala had substantially changed. The BIA denied Petitioner's motion to reopen. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the BIA did not err in declining to equitably toll the ninety-day statutory filing deadline and in concluding that Petitioner had not demonstrated that country conditions in Guatemala had substantially changed since his hearing. View "Molina v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence of more than three years in prison imposed in connection with his violation of supervised release, holding that the district court did not commit reversible error when she tagged Defendant's drug offense with an A Grade.After seven years in federal prison, Defendant was arrested first for possessing drugs with intent to distribute then for domestic abuse under Puerto Rico law. The federal district judge found Defendant committed a "crime of violence" and a "controlled substance offense" as defined in the federal sentencing guidelines. These crimes, the judge found, were Grade A violations of Defendant's supervised release carrying the stiffest guideline penalties. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence for the district judge to call Defendant's crimes Grade A violations. View "United States v. Garcia-Cartagena" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated Defendant's sentence of thirty months in federal prison for violating the terms of his supervised release, holding that the district judge misapplied the Guidelines in concluding that Defendant's crime was a Grade A violation under U.S.S.G. 7B1.1(a)(A)(i).Six months after Defendant completed his sentence for federal drug crimes and began his six-year term of supervised release Defendant was charged on "information and belief" with committing aggravated domestic abuse under Puerto Rico law. The complaint did not indicate why the police believed Defendant committed the offense. Defendant pled down to a lesser offense, but, based on the complaint, the federal district court found that Defendant committed the more serious crime, which was a "crime of violence" and a Grade A violation. The First Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, holding that the district judge's Grade A finding, based only on unsubstantiated allegations in a charging document, was clear error that affected the sentence imposed. View "United States v. Colon-Maldonado" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the entry of a preliminary injunction enforcing a covenant not to compete included in a restrictive covenant agreement (RCA) that Appellant signed in 2017, holding that the district court did not err in finding that the covenant not to compete was reasonable and in entering the preliminary injunction.After working almost three decades at CVS Pharmacy, Inc., Appellant accepted a new position at PillPack LLC, a direct competitor of CVS. CVS sued Appellant seeking to enforce the covenant not to compete. The district court entered a preliminary injunction enjoining Appellant from working at PillPack for eighteen months, finding that the covenant was reasonable and that Appellant's new position would violate the covenant. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, under either the as-applied or the facial approach in evaluating the reasonableness of the restrictive covenant, CVS was likely to succeed on the merits of its claim for injunctive relief. View "CVS Pharmacy, Inc. v. Lavin" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of possession of child pornography, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motions to suppress and for a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).After agents executing a search warrant of Defendant's residence discovered digital files containing images and videos of child pornography on Defendant's computers Defendant filed a motion to suppress and, in the alternative, for a Franks hearing. The district court denied both motions. Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of child pornography. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) there was no evidence that the affidavit contained egregious misrepresentations sufficient to necessitate a Franks hearing to attack the warrant application, let alone to render the warrant invalid due to a misrepresentation; and (2) the warrant was adequately supported and the evidence obtained was admissible. View "United States v. Larson" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence entered upon Defendant's guilty plea to one count of possessing child pornography, holding that the district court's decision not to impose a below-guidelines sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable.Defendant's conviction stemmed from his possession of approximately 13,000 child pornography images. The district court sentenced Defendant to ninety-seven months' imprisonment and twenty years' supervised release, a sentence that was at the low end of the Guidelines Sentencing Range. The First Circuit affirmed the sentence, holding that the sentence was not procedurally unreasonable and that Defendant failed to overcome the presumption that the sentence was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Gomera-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court designating a magistrate judge to "hear and determine" under 28 U.S.C.(b)(1)(A) a motion to appoint a receiver over certain commercial properties that were the subject of a foreclosure action under Puerto Rico law, holding that the motion to appoint a receiver was "dispositive" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, despite the district court's apparent contrary determination.On appeal, Appellant argued that the motion to appoint a receiver could not be delegated to a magistrate judge under section 636(b)(1)(A) but, rather, must be made under 28 U.S.C. (b)(1)B). The First Circuit vacated and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the motion to appoint a receiver was "dispositive" under Rule 72, and therefore, this Court does not reach the merits of whether the magistrate judge's decision was correct. Rather, the Court remanded the case for the district court to apply de novo review to the magistrate judge's unauthorized order, in accordance with Rule 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1). View "ML-CFC 2007-6 Puerto Rico v. BPP Retail Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court against Kodak Alaris, Inc. based on the jury finding that Kodak was in breach of its contractual obligation to ITyX Solutions AG except as to the calculation of prejudgment interest, holding that the district court correctly rejected Kodak's motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial but that, as to the prejudgment interest award, the interest must be recalculated from a different date.Judgment in this case was entered against Kodak in the sum of $9,211,699.20, including prejudgment interest. The district court rejected Kodak's argument that the jury must have necessarily found that it was ITyX which actually breached the contract and that ITyX had breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court further rejected Kodak's various standing and damages arguments. The First Circuit affirmed the rulings of the district court in all respects except its award of prejudgment interest on damages, and, as to that prejudgment interest award, altered the date used and remanded. View "ITyX Solutions AG v. Kodak Alaris, Inc." on Justia Law