Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions of aiding and abetting the wrongful disclosure of individually identifiable health information and obstructing a criminal investigation of a health care offense, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) inferring from certain evidence that Defendant knew that protected information was being accessed was neither unreasonable, insupportable, nor overly speculative, and therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction of aiding and abetting the wrongful disclosure of individually identifiable health information; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction for obstructing a criminal investigation of a health care offense. View "United States v. Luthra" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying Petitioner's request for temporary protected status (TPS) under 8 U.S.C. 1254a, holding that the BIA did not err in finding that Petitioner's ninety-eight-day absence from the country was not "brief, casual, and innocent" under the regulations.Petitioner entered the United States on December 27, 1997. Since then, Petitioner spent ninety-eight days outside the United States pursuant to an order of removal. In his TPS request, Petitioner argued that he could excuse the ninety-eight days at issue as "brief, casual, and innocent" under 8 U.S.C. 1254a(c)(4)(A)-(B) because an immigration judge later rescinded his order of removal. The BIA denied Petitioner's request, determining that the rescission of removal order was improper. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the BIA correctly found that the immigration judge's rescission order was not proper, and therefore, Petitioner's absence from the country was not brief, casual, and innocent. View "Machado Sigaran v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated Defendant's sentence of forty-two months' imprisonment, a year above the top of the guideline sentencing range, for illegal possession of a machine gun, holding that the sentencing court erred by varying upward from the range without adequately distinguishing Defendant's case from the mine-run machine gun possession case.Defendant entered a guilty plea to a single count charging him with illegal possession of a machine gun. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an upwardly variant term of forty-two months' imprisonment. The First Circuit vacated the sentence, holding that the sentencing court abused its discretion in varying upward from a property calculated guideline sentencing range without identifying some special characteristic attributable either to Defendant or to the offense of conviction serving to remove this case from the garden-variety machine gun possession case. View "United States v. Rivera-Berrios" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction for three counts of transmitting threatening interstate communications by telephone and sentence of twenty-seven months' imprisonment, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order a competency evaluation sua sponte.On appeal, Defendant's sole claim of error was that the district court erred by failing to order a competency evaluation under 18 U.S.C. 4241(a) sua sponte. The First Circuit disagreed, holding that where the record revealed no reasonable cause to believe that a substantial question existed concerning Defendant's competency to stand trial, the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order a competency evaluation sua sponte. View "United States v. Malmstrom" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the decision of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained through a search and seizure of his vehicle, holding that the warrantless seizure of Defendant's vehicle was unlawful.Defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana and unlawful possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. On appeal, Defendant argued that law enforcement officers had no right to seize and tow his car, thereby setting it up for the inventory search that produced the evidence leading to his conviction. The First Circuit agreed, holding (1) the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement did not apply in this case; (2) the government did not have probable cause to seize the vehicle pursuant to the Puerto Rico Uniform Forfeiture Act; and (3) the doctrine of inevitable discovery did not apply to justify the warrantless seizure of Defendant's vehicle. View "United States v. Del Rosario-Acosta" on Justia Law

In this case involving the bombing at the 2013 Boston Marathon, the First Circuit vacated Dzhokhar Tsarnaev's death sentences and reversed his three convictions for carrying a firearm during crimes of violence, holding that the judge did not meet the standard set by Patriarca v. United States, 402 F.2d 314, 318 (1st Cir. 1968), and erred in denying Tsarnaev's post-trial motion for judgments of acquittal.A jury convicted Tsarnaev of all charges for which he was indicted arising from the Boston Marathon bombing. The district judge imposed a sentence of death on six of the death-eligible counts. On appeal, Tsarnaev argued, among other things, that the judge erred in the way he handled Tsarnaev's venue-change motions and the jury-selection process. The First Circuit held (1) the trial judge in this high-profile case did not fully comply with Patriarca by running a voir dire sufficient to identify prejudice, which provided a sufficient ground to vacate Tsarnaev's death sentences; and (2) because not each of the underlying offenses constituted a crime of violence, three of Defendant's convictions for carrying a firearm for crimes of violence are reversed. View "United States v. Tsarnaev" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court denying Chapter 7 Trustee Nathaniel Richard Hull's objection to Jeffrey Rockwell's homestead exemption listed at the time he filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, holding that the Bankruptcy Code dictates that Rockwell's homestead exemption maintains the status it held on the day Rockwell filed his bankruptcy petition.When he filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy Rockwell exempted his home from the bankruptcy estate under Maine's homestead law. While the bankruptcy was proceeding, Rockwell sold that home and did not reinvest the proceeds of the sale in another homestead within six months, contrary to Maine law. When he converted his bankruptcy to a Chapter 7 proceeding, Hull objected to Rockwell's homestead exemption. The bankruptcy court denied the objection. The district court affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that exemptions are analyzed on the date the debtor files for bankruptcy and that the complete snapshot rule applies. View "Hull v. Rockwell" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed on Defendant for intimidating or interfering with United States probation officers (count one) and influencing United States probation officers by threat (count two), holding that the sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable.Defendant pled guilty to both charges without a plea agreement. The judge gave Defendant an above-guidelines sentence of sixty months in prison, consisting of twelve months on count one and forty-eight months on count two, to run concurrent with each other. Defendant appealed, challenging the substantive and procedural reasonableness of his sentence. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) there was no reversible procedural defect in Defendant's sentence; and (2) the challenged sentence was neither implausible nor indefensible. View "United States v. Davila-Bonilla" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment for failing to update his registration as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. 2250(a), holding that venue for a section 2250 prosecution is proper in the departure jurisdiction.Defendant, a state sex offender, failed to update his registration after he moved from Massachusetts to New York. Defendant was indicted in Massachusetts for his failure to register. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that, under the Supreme Court's decision in Nichols v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1113 (2016), he committed no crime in Massachusetts because his failure to register occurred in New York. The district court denied the motion, concluding that venue was proper where Defendant's interstate travel began. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that venue for Defendant's prosecution was proper in Massachusetts because the nature of the offense shows that its locus delicti encompasses the departure jurisdiction. View "United States v. Seward" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's plea-based conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, holding that Defendant's prosecution did not violate constitutional double jeopardy protections.In 2011, Defendant pleaded guilty in the United States District Court of the District of Puerto Rico to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute. In 2016, Defendant pleaded guilty in the United States District Court of the District of Puerto Rico to a drug trafficking conspiracy charge. Defendant appealed, arguing that his double jeopardy rights were violated because the two conspiracy prosecutions concerned conduct at the same "places" and charged him with violations of "the same statutory provision." The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was a rational basis to conduct that the two conspiracies were distinct. View "United States v. Perez-Gonzalez" on Justia Law