Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed on Defendant for intimidating or interfering with United States probation officers (count one) and influencing United States probation officers by threat (count two), holding that the sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable.Defendant pled guilty to both charges without a plea agreement. The judge gave Defendant an above-guidelines sentence of sixty months in prison, consisting of twelve months on count one and forty-eight months on count two, to run concurrent with each other. Defendant appealed, challenging the substantive and procedural reasonableness of his sentence. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) there was no reversible procedural defect in Defendant's sentence; and (2) the challenged sentence was neither implausible nor indefensible. View "United States v. Davila-Bonilla" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment for failing to update his registration as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. 2250(a), holding that venue for a section 2250 prosecution is proper in the departure jurisdiction.Defendant, a state sex offender, failed to update his registration after he moved from Massachusetts to New York. Defendant was indicted in Massachusetts for his failure to register. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that, under the Supreme Court's decision in Nichols v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1113 (2016), he committed no crime in Massachusetts because his failure to register occurred in New York. The district court denied the motion, concluding that venue was proper where Defendant's interstate travel began. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that venue for Defendant's prosecution was proper in Massachusetts because the nature of the offense shows that its locus delicti encompasses the departure jurisdiction. View "United States v. Seward" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's plea-based conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, holding that Defendant's prosecution did not violate constitutional double jeopardy protections.In 2011, Defendant pleaded guilty in the United States District Court of the District of Puerto Rico to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute. In 2016, Defendant pleaded guilty in the United States District Court of the District of Puerto Rico to a drug trafficking conspiracy charge. Defendant appealed, arguing that his double jeopardy rights were violated because the two conspiracy prosecutions concerned conduct at the same "places" and charged him with violations of "the same statutory provision." The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was a rational basis to conduct that the two conspiracies were distinct. View "United States v. Perez-Gonzalez" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint seeking to recoup assets purportedly gifted to a charitable institution for less than adequate consideration by Plaintiff's ex-husband, holding that the district court erred by dismissing Plaintiff's claims on the basis that she lacked standing.Janet and Robert Foisie entered into a divorce settlement agreement in which each party agreed to a mutually acceptable split of assets. When Janet discovered that Robert had fraudulent transferred several million dollars to the Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI), Janet brought a civil action against WPI asserting claims of actual and constructive fraudulent transfers under both the common law and Connecticut's version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA). The district court dismissed the complaint. The First Circuit vacated the judgment, holding (1) Janet easily satisfied the three elements of Article III standing, and her claims were ripe; (2) a choice-of-law analysis would be better performed on a more fully developed factual record; (3) the district court erred by dismissing Janet's UFTA claims on the basis that she lacked standing as a creditor; (4) the dismissal of Janet's common law claims on preemption grounds cannot stand; and (5) Janet's UFTA and common law claims were adequately pleaded. View "Foisie v. Worcester Polytechnic Institute" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision to deny his application for deferral of removal under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that Petitioner was not eligible for deferral of removal under the CAT.Petitioner, who was born in Venezuela, was convicted of heroin trafficking in the United States. Petitioner was subsequently served with a notice informing him that he was removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. Petitioner requested withholding of removal under CAT protection, stating that if he returned to Venezuela he feared retaliation by drug traffickers, as well as persecution, torture, and death because of his earlier membership in a Venezuelan opposition political party. An immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's application, and the BIA dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the record did not compel the conclusion that Petitioner demonstrated eligibility for deferral of removal under the CAT. View "Sanabria Morales v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Walden Security and dismissing the suit brought by Plaintiffs for statutory separation pay pursuant to Puerto Rico Law 80, holding that Plaintiffs had no remedy pursuant to Law 80.Plaintiffs had served as court security officers for the District of Puerto Rico for thirty-two years when Walden Security assumed the federal contract to provide courthouse security services. Walden refused to hire Plaintiffs because they lacked certification from a law enforcement training academy. Plaintiffs subsequently filed the instant lawsuit for statutory separation pay. The district court granted summary judgment for Walden, reasoning that Law 80 did not apply to Plaintiffs' claims. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the district erred in ignoring the theory of liability that Plaintiff's advanced: Puerto Rico's common law successor employer doctrine. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court misconstrued Plaintiffs' theory of liability; but (2) the successor employer doctrine was clearly inapplicable to Plaintiffs' case. View "Lopez-Santos v. Metropolitan Security Services" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to TLS Management and Marketing Services, LLC (TLS) on its breach of contract claims against Ricky Rodriguez-Toledo, ASG Accounting Solutions Group, Inc. (ASG), and Global Outsourcing Services, LLC (GOS) and the court's finding that Rodriguez and ASG were liable for misappropriation of trade secrets, holding that TLS failed to prove its trade secret claims, and the nondisclosure agreements were unenforceable.Rodriguez was the founder of ASG, a company that, like TLS, offered services in tax planning. ASG signed a subcontractor agreement with TLS that included a nondisclosure provision. Rodriguez later began working for TLS and signed a nondisclosure agreement. After his departure from TLS Rodriguez provided tax services in competition with TLS through ASG and GOS. TLS alleged that Rodriguez and ASG misappropriated TLS's trade secrets and that Rodriguez, ASG, and GOS breached their nondisclosure agreements. The district court granted summary judgment to TLS on the breach of contract claims. After a non-jury trial on the trade secret claims, the district court found in favor of TLS. The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) TLS failed to satisfy its burden to prove the existence of trade secrets; and (2) the nondisclosure agreements were so broad as to be unenforceable. View "TLS Management & Marketing Services, LLC v. Rodriguez-Toledo" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Appellants' motion to compel arbitration in this putative class action, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act's (FAA) exemption for "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" encompasses the contracts of transportation workers who transport goods or people within the flow of interstate commerce.Plaintiff was a delivery driver for Amazon.com, Inc. and its subsidiary, Amazon Logistics, Inc. (collectively, Amazon) who collected packages for delivery in Massachusetts and did not cross state lines during the course of his deliveries. Plaintiff filed this putative class action asserting misclassification of Amazon's drivers contracted with through its smartphone application as independent contractors and violations of Massachusetts labor laws. Amazon moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the mandatory arbitration provision of Plaintiff's employment agreement with Amazon. The district court denied the motion in part, concluding that Plaintiff's agreement was exempt from the FAA and that the provision was unenforceable based on Massachusetts public policy. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the FAA does not govern the enforceability of the dispute resolution section of the agreement; and (2) the district court rightly refused to compel arbitration pursuant to state law. View "Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying a judgment creditor's motion for leave to execute on the judgment and its motion for reconsideration, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in viewing the judgment creditor's collection efforts as lacking in diligence and thus deeming unwarranted an extension of the period for execution of judgments.The district court entered a consent judgment in favor of Erikon LLC and against two defendants, jointly and severally, for $7.5 million. After Defendants stopped making payments, Erikon made no meaningful effort to collect the balance of the judgment for several years. Erikon eventually moved for leave to execute on the judgment. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that Erikon had waited to file its motion until more than six years after Defendants' final payment. The court then denied Erikon's motion for reconsideration. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that where, over the course of more than six years, Erikon took minimal steps to enforce the judgment, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deeming unwarranted an extension of the period for execution of judgments. View "Caribbean Management Group, Inc. v. Erikon, LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court on resentencing pursuant to the 2018 First Step Act that Defendant was a career offender under section 4B1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, holding that Defendant failed to establish that the scope of joint venture liability under Massachusetts law is broader than under the generic standard.In classifying Defendant as a career offender, the district court relied on two Massachusetts drug convictions. On appeal, Defendant argued that the two Massachusetts drug convictions did not qualify as predicate controlled substance offenses under the career-offender guideline. Specifically, Defendant argued (1) the convictions implicitly included what was then called joint venture liability, which was broader in scope than generic aiding and abetting liability; and (2) therefore, there could not be a categorical match between the convictions and the definition of "controlled substance offense." The First Circuit disagreed, holding (1) Defendant's contention that his two prior state convictions were over broad and did not qualify as controlled substance offenses was unavailing; and (2) the district court properly sentenced Defendant under the career-offender guideline. View "United States v. Capelton" on Justia Law