Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court denying two local residents' (Appellants) motion to intervene in an action brought T-Mobile Northeast LLC pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, holding that the district court neither erred nor abused its discretion in denying the motions to intervene.T-Mobile sought to operate a wireless telecommunications facility in an existing church steeple in a community in Cape Cod. When T-Mobile was unsuccessful in obtaining the required municipal permissions it sued the Town of Barnstable, two of its agencies, and several municipal officials. Appellants moved to intervene on the grounds that they were abutting landowners who had a stake in the outcome of the case. The district court summarily refused the requests for intervention. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motions to intervene. View "T-Mobile Northeast LLC v. The Town of Barnstable" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claim for a violation of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the other claims, holding that Plaintiff's allegations told a plausible story of deliberate indifference by school officials to repeated and severe sexual harassment.Plaintiff alleged that she was the victim of several incidents of sexual assault and harassment while she was a student at the Pawtucket Learning Academy in Rhode Island. Plaintiff sued twenty-one defendants under sixteen different counts. The district court dismissed the entire action. The First Circuit vacated the judgment in part, holding that based on the facts set forth in Plaintiff's complaint it was plausible that a fact-finder could find that the conduct of school officials caused Plaintiff's harassment in some way or made Plaintiff liable or vulnerable to harassment. View "Doe v. Pawtucket School Department" on Justia Law

The First Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction prohibiting Defendants - Maine's Cape Elizabeth School District and officials of Cape Elizabeth High School - from suspending A.M., a student at the high school, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction.A.M. anonymously posted a sticky note on a mirror at the high school girls' bathroom stating, "There's a rapist in our school and you know who it is." Defendants determined that the note constituted bullying under the school's policies and imposed a three-day suspension on A.M. Through her mother, A.M. filed a complaint requesting that the district court enjoin Defendants from suspending her, arguing, among other things, that the suspension violated her right to free expression under the First Amendment. A.M. also moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court granted a preliminary injunction based on A.M.'s First Amendment claim. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that A.M. showed a likelihood of success in demonstrating that her sticky note was constitutionally protected speech. View "Norris v. Cape Elizabeth School District" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions of aiding and abetting the wrongful disclosure of individually identifiable health information and obstructing a criminal investigation of a health care offense, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) inferring from certain evidence that Defendant knew that protected information was being accessed was neither unreasonable, insupportable, nor overly speculative, and therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction of aiding and abetting the wrongful disclosure of individually identifiable health information; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction for obstructing a criminal investigation of a health care offense. View "United States v. Luthra" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying Petitioner's request for temporary protected status (TPS) under 8 U.S.C. 1254a, holding that the BIA did not err in finding that Petitioner's ninety-eight-day absence from the country was not "brief, casual, and innocent" under the regulations.Petitioner entered the United States on December 27, 1997. Since then, Petitioner spent ninety-eight days outside the United States pursuant to an order of removal. In his TPS request, Petitioner argued that he could excuse the ninety-eight days at issue as "brief, casual, and innocent" under 8 U.S.C. 1254a(c)(4)(A)-(B) because an immigration judge later rescinded his order of removal. The BIA denied Petitioner's request, determining that the rescission of removal order was improper. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the BIA correctly found that the immigration judge's rescission order was not proper, and therefore, Petitioner's absence from the country was not brief, casual, and innocent. View "Machado Sigaran v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated Defendant's sentence of forty-two months' imprisonment, a year above the top of the guideline sentencing range, for illegal possession of a machine gun, holding that the sentencing court erred by varying upward from the range without adequately distinguishing Defendant's case from the mine-run machine gun possession case.Defendant entered a guilty plea to a single count charging him with illegal possession of a machine gun. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an upwardly variant term of forty-two months' imprisonment. The First Circuit vacated the sentence, holding that the sentencing court abused its discretion in varying upward from a property calculated guideline sentencing range without identifying some special characteristic attributable either to Defendant or to the offense of conviction serving to remove this case from the garden-variety machine gun possession case. View "United States v. Rivera-Berrios" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction for three counts of transmitting threatening interstate communications by telephone and sentence of twenty-seven months' imprisonment, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order a competency evaluation sua sponte.On appeal, Defendant's sole claim of error was that the district court erred by failing to order a competency evaluation under 18 U.S.C. 4241(a) sua sponte. The First Circuit disagreed, holding that where the record revealed no reasonable cause to believe that a substantial question existed concerning Defendant's competency to stand trial, the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order a competency evaluation sua sponte. View "United States v. Malmstrom" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the decision of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained through a search and seizure of his vehicle, holding that the warrantless seizure of Defendant's vehicle was unlawful.Defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana and unlawful possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. On appeal, Defendant argued that law enforcement officers had no right to seize and tow his car, thereby setting it up for the inventory search that produced the evidence leading to his conviction. The First Circuit agreed, holding (1) the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement did not apply in this case; (2) the government did not have probable cause to seize the vehicle pursuant to the Puerto Rico Uniform Forfeiture Act; and (3) the doctrine of inevitable discovery did not apply to justify the warrantless seizure of Defendant's vehicle. View "United States v. Del Rosario-Acosta" on Justia Law

In this case involving the bombing at the 2013 Boston Marathon, the First Circuit vacated Dzhokhar Tsarnaev's death sentences and reversed his three convictions for carrying a firearm during crimes of violence, holding that the judge did not meet the standard set by Patriarca v. United States, 402 F.2d 314, 318 (1st Cir. 1968), and erred in denying Tsarnaev's post-trial motion for judgments of acquittal.A jury convicted Tsarnaev of all charges for which he was indicted arising from the Boston Marathon bombing. The district judge imposed a sentence of death on six of the death-eligible counts. On appeal, Tsarnaev argued, among other things, that the judge erred in the way he handled Tsarnaev's venue-change motions and the jury-selection process. The First Circuit held (1) the trial judge in this high-profile case did not fully comply with Patriarca by running a voir dire sufficient to identify prejudice, which provided a sufficient ground to vacate Tsarnaev's death sentences; and (2) because not each of the underlying offenses constituted a crime of violence, three of Defendant's convictions for carrying a firearm for crimes of violence are reversed. View "United States v. Tsarnaev" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court denying Chapter 7 Trustee Nathaniel Richard Hull's objection to Jeffrey Rockwell's homestead exemption listed at the time he filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, holding that the Bankruptcy Code dictates that Rockwell's homestead exemption maintains the status it held on the day Rockwell filed his bankruptcy petition.When he filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy Rockwell exempted his home from the bankruptcy estate under Maine's homestead law. While the bankruptcy was proceeding, Rockwell sold that home and did not reinvest the proceeds of the sale in another homestead within six months, contrary to Maine law. When he converted his bankruptcy to a Chapter 7 proceeding, Hull objected to Rockwell's homestead exemption. The bankruptcy court denied the objection. The district court affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that exemptions are analyzed on the date the debtor files for bankruptcy and that the complete snapshot rule applies. View "Hull v. Rockwell" on Justia Law