Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gleysi Idalia Diaz-Valdez, a Guatemalan national, entered the United States in May 2019 and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, citing persecution by gang members in Guatemala. An immigration judge (IJ) denied her requests on August 6, 2021. Diaz attempted to appeal the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) by sending her Notice of Appeal via FedEx's next-day delivery service on September 4, 2021, expecting it to arrive by the September 7 deadline. However, FedEx delivered the package on September 8, resulting in the BIA summarily dismissing her appeal as untimely.Diaz then requested the BIA to accept her late filing, arguing that FedEx's failure to deliver on time warranted equitable tolling of the appeal deadline. The BIA construed her request as a motion to reconsider its summary dismissal but denied the motion, stating that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Diaz had delivered the appeal to FedEx on September 4 and that the federal holiday was not an extraordinary circumstance.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court found that the BIA applied the incorrect legal standard by disregarding the representation of Diaz's counsel and failing to consider supporting evidence, such as the FedEx label and tracking information. The court also held that the BIA abused its discretion by not applying its own precedent from Matter of Morales-Morales, which allows for equitable tolling when a guaranteed delivery service fails to fulfill its guarantee.The First Circuit granted Diaz's petition, vacated the BIA's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, instructing the BIA to reevaluate Diaz's diligence and the extraordinary circumstances under the correct legal standards. View "Diaz-Valdez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Two Massachusetts-based Volvo dealers filed a lawsuit against Volvo Car USA, Volvo Car Financial Services, and Fidelity Warranty Services, alleging violations of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93B. The dispute centers on Volvo-branded Prepaid Maintenance Program (PPM) contracts, which allow customers to prepay for future maintenance services at a discounted rate. Fidelity administers these contracts, which the dealers sell to their customers. The dealers claimed that the defendants were underpaying them for the parts and labor costs incurred in servicing these PPM contracts.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts heard cross-motions for summary judgment from both parties. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that entities like Fidelity are not regulated by the relevant provisions of Chapter 93B. The court denied the dealers' motion for summary judgment, leading the dealers to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision, but for a different reason. The appellate court held that the dealers' sale and service of the Volvo PPM are not franchise obligations under Chapter 93B. The court found that the Retailer Agreement between the dealers and Volvo USA did not obligate the dealers to sell or service the Volvo PPM. The court also noted that the dealers had the discretion to sell various financial products, including the Volvo PPM, and that servicing the PPM was not a material term of the Retailer Agreement. Therefore, Chapter 93B did not require Fidelity to reimburse the dealers at the statutory rates. View "Colony Place South, Inc. v. Volvo Car USA, LLC" on Justia Law

A Puerto Rico agency, the Milk Industry Regulatory Office (ORIL), revoked a dairy farmer's license and ordered him to sell his milk production quota rights. When the farmer, Luis Manuel Ruiz Ruiz, failed to comply, ORIL planned to auction the quota rights. Ruiz, who had filed for Chapter 12 bankruptcy in 2015, argued that the auction violated the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code.The bankruptcy court enjoined ORIL from auctioning the quota without court permission, finding that the planned auction violated the automatic stay. The court granted partial summary judgment to Ruiz, determining that ORIL's actions were not protected by the police power exception. ORIL appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, which affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, agreeing that the police power exception did not apply.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that ORIL's plan to auction Ruiz's milk quota fell within the police power exception to the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). The court reasoned that the auction was part of enforcing a judgment obtained in an action to enforce ORIL's regulatory power, which is not a money judgment. The court emphasized that ORIL's actions were aimed at protecting public health and welfare by regulating milk production and distribution, rather than advancing a pecuniary interest.The First Circuit reversed the judgments of the bankruptcy and district courts, directing judgment in favor of ORIL. The court concluded that ORIL's planned auction did not violate the automatic stay and was protected by the police power exception. View "Milk Industry Regulatory Office v. Ruiz Ruiz" on Justia Law

In 2016, Kevin Millette was charged with possession of child pornography, having 24,277 images and 1,022 videos. He admitted to a lifelong problem with child pornography and pleaded guilty, receiving a 120-month prison sentence followed by seven years of supervised release. In December 2020, after serving about sixty-one months, he was granted compassionate release with several special conditions, including a prohibition on unsupervised contact with minors. In August 2023, a probation officer found Millette's teenage daughter in his bedroom while his approved supervisor, his mother, was outside. Millette initially lied about the sleeping arrangements but later admitted to sleeping in the same room as his daughter without supervision.The United States District Court for the District of Maine held a revocation hearing in September 2023. The court found that Millette violated the condition prohibiting unsupervised contact with minors, noting that his conduct was a clear violation given his criminal history and the purpose of the condition. The court sentenced him to two months' imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release, reimposing the same special condition.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Millette argued that the phrase "in the presence of" in the special condition was ambiguous and that the district court erred in finding a violation and reimposing the condition. The Court of Appeals found no error, holding that the condition was clear and that Millette's conduct constituted a violation. The court also found that reimposing the condition was justified given Millette's history and ongoing risk to minors. The court affirmed the revocation of Millette's supervised release and the reimposition of the special condition. View "U.S. v. Millette" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Dominick Bailey, pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). This was Bailey's third conviction for the same offense, with previous convictions in 1997 and 2006. In 2019, Bailey was involved in a guns-for-drugs transaction, where he admitted to possessing firearms despite his felon status. He was arrested in Boston with multiple firearms in his possession. Bailey pleaded guilty without a plea agreement during a virtual proceeding.The District Court for the District of Massachusetts sentenced Bailey to eighty-seven months of imprisonment, departing upward from the advisory sentencing guideline range due to Bailey's extensive criminal history. Bailey objected to the sentencing departure in the district court.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Bailey challenged the indictment, the voluntariness of his guilty plea, the procedural aspects of his sentencing, and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. The appellate court reviewed Bailey's claims, applying plain error review to unpreserved claims and abuse of discretion to preserved claims.The First Circuit found no plain error in the district court's determination that Bailey's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, despite Bailey's mental health conditions and medication use. The court also found that the district court did not err in its explanation for the upward departure, noting that Bailey's criminal history was extensive and warranted a higher sentence for public protection and deterrence. The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the eighty-seven-month sentence was reasonable given Bailey's persistent criminality and the seriousness of the offense. View "United States v. Bailey" on Justia Law

US Ghost Adventures, LLC (Ghost Adventures) operates a bed and breakfast at the Lizzie Borden House in Fall River, Massachusetts, offering ghost tours and related activities. Ghost Adventures holds federal trademarks for the name "Lizzie Borden" and a hatchet logo. Miss Lizzie's Coffee LLC (Miss Lizzie's) opened a coffee shop next to the Lizzie Borden House, using the Lizzie Borden story in its marketing, including a hatchet logo and references to being "The Most Haunted Coffee Shop in the World." Some visitors mistakenly believed the two businesses were affiliated.Ghost Adventures sued Miss Lizzie's in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts for trademark infringement and unfair competition, seeking a preliminary injunction to stop Miss Lizzie's from using the "Lizzie Borden" name and hatchet logo. The district court denied the preliminary injunction, finding that Ghost Adventures failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. The court determined that the key element in any infringement action is the likelihood of confusion, which Ghost Adventures did not demonstrate. The court found that Miss Lizzie's hatchet logo and use of the name "Lizzie" were not similar enough to Ghost Adventures' trademarks to cause confusion.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the hatchet logos were dissimilar and that Miss Lizzie's reference to "Lizzie" was to the historical figure, not the trademark. The court also found that any consumer confusion was due to the proximity of the businesses and their common reliance on the Lizzie Borden story, not the similarity of their marks. The court concluded that Ghost Adventures did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, and the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "US Ghost Adventures, LLC v. Miss Lizzie's Coffee LLC" on Justia Law

Gerson Adonay Cortez-Mejia, his wife, and their two minor children, all natives and citizens of El Salvador, petitioned for judicial review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). They sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming fear of persecution by rival gangs in El Salvador. The Immigration Judge (IJ) found the petitioners credible but denied their applications, determining they had not demonstrated past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground. The IJ also found they failed to establish eligibility for withholding of removal and CAT protection.The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the petitioners' experiences did not rise to the level of past persecution and that they had not established a well-founded fear of future persecution linked to a protected ground. The BIA also noted the petitioners had not articulated a cognizable particular social group and had not meaningfully pursued their CAT claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on the BIA's decision. The court found that the BIA's determinations were supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the petitioners' fear of gang violence was generalized and not linked to a protected ground. The court also upheld the BIA's finding that the petitioners had not established a cognizable particular social group. Consequently, the court denied the petition for judicial review, affirming the BIA's decision to deny asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. View "Cortez-Mejia v. Garland" on Justia Law

Gloria Cocuzzo, a long-term employee of Trader Joe's East Inc., claimed she was terminated due to age discrimination. Cocuzzo, who began working at Trader Joe's in 2003 and was promoted to Merchant in 2012, received positive performance reviews and regular pay increases. In February 2021, she purchased beer for her underage grandson, also an employee at the store. This incident was reported to her supervisor, Jennifer Gillum, who, after consulting with a regional vice president, decided to terminate Cocuzzo. Cocuzzo was given the option to retire but was ultimately terminated when she refused to sign a termination notice.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of Trader Joe's and Gillum, finding no evidence of age discrimination. The court held that Trader Joe's had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Cocuzzo, namely her violation of the store's alcohol policy by purchasing alcohol for an underage individual. The court also found that Cocuzzo failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that this reason was a pretext for age discrimination.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Trader Joe's had a legitimate reason for terminating Cocuzzo and that she did not provide adequate evidence to prove that this reason was a pretext for age discrimination. The court also found that the evidence presented by Cocuzzo, including her positive performance reviews and the treatment of other employees, did not support her claims of disparate treatment or discriminatory animus. Consequently, the court upheld the summary judgment in favor of Trader Joe's and Gillum. View "Cocuzzo v. Trader Joe's East Inc." on Justia Law

Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana, a native and citizen of El Salvador, along with his wife Sayra Iliana Gamez-Mejia and their minor child, petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order affirming the Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of their asylum requests. Urias-Orellana also sought review of the denial of his application for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The denials were based on the grounds that the petitioners did not demonstrate harm rising to the level of persecution for asylum or withholding of removal and did not show they could not reasonably relocate within El Salvador. Additionally, Urias-Orellana did not prove it was likely he would face torture with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.The IJ found Urias-Orellana's testimony credible but concluded that the threats and assault he experienced did not amount to past persecution. The IJ also determined that the petitioners did not meet their burden of showing a reasonable fear of future persecution, noting that Urias-Orellana's relatives lived unharmed in El Salvador and that he had successfully relocated within the country without facing harm. The IJ further found that Urias-Orellana's CAT claim failed because he did not report his harassment to the police and did not demonstrate that doing so would be futile.The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the threats and assault did not constitute persecution and that the petitioners had not shown that internal relocation would be unreasonable. The BIA also upheld the IJ's finding that Urias-Orellana had not shown he qualified for CAT relief, noting his failure to report the mistreatment to the authorities.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and denied the petition for judicial review. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Agency's conclusions that the petitioners did not demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution and that Urias-Orellana did not meet the burden for CAT protection. View "Urias-Orellana v. Garland" on Justia Law

An Ecuadorian woman, along with her minor daughter, entered the United States in June 2021, fleeing domestic abuse by her former partner, Fausto. She applied for asylum, arguing that Ecuadorian authorities would not protect her from Fausto. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against her and her daughter. At a hearing, she conceded inadmissibility and applied for asylum. She testified about the abuse and an incident where neighbors called the police, who wanted to arrest Fausto, but she asked them not to due to fear of retaliation. She never reported Fausto to Ecuadorian authorities and eventually separated from him, moving to the U.S. with him and their daughter.An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied her asylum application, finding that she did not demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ noted that the violence was not connected to government action or inaction, as the petitioner never reported Fausto to the police, and the police had shown willingness to arrest him. The IJ also found that the petitioner did not have an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution, given her continued interactions with Fausto in the U.S. and her testimony that no one in Ecuador would harm her.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the petitioner failed to show that the Ecuadorian government was unwilling or unable to protect her. The BIA also upheld the IJ's finding that the petitioner did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution, as Fausto's return to Ecuador was speculative and there was no evidence of a pattern or practice of persecution against Ecuadorian women.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and denied the petition for review. The court held that the BIA's determinations were supported by substantial evidence, including the petitioner's failure to report the abuse and the police's willingness to arrest Fausto. The court also found that the petitioner did not demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution or a pattern or practice of persecution against Ecuadorian women. View "Medina-Suguilanda v. Garland" on Justia Law