Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Carlos Reyes-Rosario was convicted of five federal offenses related to a drug trafficking conspiracy in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The indictment charged him with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances within 1,000 feet of a protected location, and possession with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine base, cocaine, and marijuana within 1,000 feet of a protected location. He was also charged with possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime but was acquitted of this charge. Reyes was sentenced to concurrent terms of 168 months for four counts and 120 months for one count.Reyes filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing insufficient evidence for his convictions, particularly for Count Two, which involved aiding and abetting the possession with intent to distribute heroin. The District Court denied his motion, finding sufficient evidence for the jury to convict him based on his involvement in the conspiracy and the actions of his co-conspirators under the Pinkerton doctrine. Reyes appealed, challenging the denial of his motion for acquittal, the admission of certain evidence, and the reasonableness of his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the District Court's decision, finding that the evidence presented at trial, including testimony and video recordings, was sufficient to support Reyes's conviction under the Pinkerton doctrine. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the admission of the video and items seized during the search, as they were properly authenticated by a cooperating witness. Additionally, the court rejected Reyes's Confrontation Clause challenges, noting that he had ample opportunity to cross-examine the witness about relevant topics.The First Circuit affirmed the District Court's rulings, including the denial of Reyes's motion for acquittal and the admission of evidence. The court also found Reyes's sentence to be procedurally and substantively reasonable, as the District Court had adequately considered the relevant factors and provided a sufficient explanation for the sentence imposed. View "United States v. Reyes-Rosario" on Justia Law

Derek Capozzi was convicted in 1999 on three counts: possession of a firearm as a felon, attempted extortion, and use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. The district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) enhancement, resulting in a 360-month sentence. Capozzi's direct appeal was unsuccessful, and the Supreme Court declined to review the case. In 2005, Capozzi filed his first motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that his prior convictions should not count as ACCA predicates. The district court denied the motion, finding that the presentence report indicated his prior convictions involved buildings, qualifying them as ACCA predicates.In 2015, Capozzi sought permission to file a second § 2255 motion based on the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, which invalidated the ACCA's residual clause. The district court granted the motion in part, vacating his firearm-in-furtherance conviction but denying his Johnson II claim, reasoning that the ACCA enhancement was not based solely on the residual clause. Capozzi appealed, arguing that the district court had jurisdiction to hear his Johnson II claim and that it erred in not conducting a resentencing hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Capozzi could not establish a Johnson II claim because his sentence was not based solely on the residual clause. The court found that the district court had relied on the enumerated clause, which was not invalidated by Johnson II. Consequently, Capozzi's claim was time-barred under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in opting to correct Capozzi's sentence without conducting a de novo resentencing. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Capozzi" on Justia Law

Orlando Miguel Martínez-Ramos pleaded guilty to carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury and aiding and abetting the same, following a home invasion, robbery, and brutal physical attack on a 77-year-old woman who died nine days later. The advisory guideline sentencing range was up to fourteen years, but Martínez-Ramos acknowledged that an upward variance was warranted due to the victim's death. At sentencing, Martínez-Ramos argued for a fifteen-year sentence, while the government requested sixteen years.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico did not accept either recommendation. Instead, it considered a higher advisory guideline range based on the first-degree murder cross-reference, which would have recommended a life sentence, reduced to twenty-five years due to the statutory maximum. However, the court did not apply this cross-reference, citing insufficient causation evidence and the belief that a twenty-five-year sentence was too harsh given Martínez-Ramos's youth. The court imposed an eighteen-year sentence, a substantial upward variance from the guideline range, due to the physical attack contributing to the victim's death.Martínez-Ramos appealed, arguing that the upward variance was substantively unreasonable and that the court applied too lenient a standard of causation. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Martínez-Ramos had acknowledged the victim's death as a factor in his plea agreement and that the autopsy listed facial and bodily trauma as contributory factors to the death. The court concluded that the district court's finding was not clearly erroneous and affirmed the eighteen-year sentence. View "United States v. Martinez-Ramos" on Justia Law

Richard Evans, a former Captain in the Boston Police Department (BPD), was convicted of wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, federal programs theft, and conspiracy to commit federal programs theft. These charges stemmed from his submission of false claims for overtime pay and his involvement in a scheme to submit such claims. Evans and his subordinates falsely reported working four-hour overtime shifts, even when they worked fewer hours or when the Evidence Control Unit (ECU) was closed.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found Evans guilty on all counts after a five-day jury trial. He was sentenced to one year and one day of incarceration for each count, to be served concurrently, fined $15,000, and ordered to pay $17,390.99 in restitution. Evans appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the willful blindness instruction, and other aspects of the trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Evans' convictions for wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, finding that the willful blindness instruction was appropriate given the numerous "flags of suspicion" that Evans ignored. However, the court vacated Evans' convictions for federal programs theft and conspiracy to commit federal programs theft, concluding that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that the BPD received more than $10,000 in federal benefits during the relevant period, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 666(b). The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

In 2016, Tucker Cianchette secured a multimillion-dollar judgment in Maine Superior Court against his father, step-mother, and two LLCs after they backed out of a 2015 agreement that would have given him sole control of a Ford dealership. Following this, in 2021, Eric and Peggy Cianchette, along with Cianchette Family, LLC, and Better Way Ford, LLC, filed a lawsuit alleging that Ford Motor Company violated state and federal laws during the failed 2015 negotiations and through false testimony by Ford employees in Tucker's 2016 suit.The 2021 lawsuit was initially filed in Maine Superior Court but was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Maine. The District Court dismissed all claims against Ford, leading the plaintiffs to appeal. The plaintiffs argued that Ford's actions during the 2015 negotiations and the 2016 lawsuit constituted violations of Maine's civil perjury statute, the Dealers Act, the federal Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act, and also amounted to breach of contract and tortious interference with contract.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's dismissal. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that Ford made any false representations or that any reliance on such representations was justified. The court also found that the plaintiffs' claims under the Dealers Act were barred by res judicata due to a prior ruling by the Maine Motor Vehicle Franchise Board. Additionally, the court concluded that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing did not apply to the breach of contract claims under Michigan law, as the SSA explicitly granted Ford the right to approve changes in ownership. View "Better Way Ford, LLC v. Ford Motor Company" on Justia Law

In 2008, Andy Luu Tran granted Citizens Bank a mortgage on his Massachusetts home. In 2022, the Bank foreclosed on the property, and Herbert Jacobs was the high bidder at the auction. The Bank recorded an affidavit of sale but the foreclosure deed lacked the required signature page. Tran filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and an adversary complaint to avoid the transfer of his interest in the property due to the improperly recorded deed.The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment against Tran, holding that the only transfer at foreclosure was of Tran's equity of redemption, which was extinguished at the foreclosure auction. The court found that the properly recorded affidavit of sale provided constructive notice, making the transfer unavoidable. The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts affirmed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Tran's equity of redemption was extinguished at the foreclosure auction when the memorandum of sale was executed. The court also held that the properly recorded affidavit of sale provided constructive notice of the foreclosure, making the transfer of Tran's equity of redemption unavoidable under Massachusetts law. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court. View "Tran v. Citizens Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Approximately two years after Jessica Silveira da Silva brought her minor son, A.R., to the United States, A.R.'s father, Edervaldo Rodrigues da Silva, initiated proceedings in federal court to return A.R. to Brazil under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Rodrigues proved that A.R. had been wrongfully removed, and Silveira invoked the "now settled" defense, arguing that A.R.'s extensive ties to the community in Lowell, Massachusetts, weighed against returning him to Brazil.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held a three-day bench trial and ultimately concluded that A.R. was not settled in the United States. The court found that although A.R. had lived in Lowell for over two years, attended the same school, and had some family and community ties, these factors did not sufficiently demonstrate that A.R. was settled. The court ordered Silveira to return A.R. to Brazil.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court's findings. The appellate court held that the district court erred in concluding that A.R. was not settled in the United States. The First Circuit found that the totality of the circumstances, including A.R.'s age, stable home environment, consistent school attendance, and community involvement, demonstrated that A.R. was indeed settled. The court vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for the district court to decide whether to exercise its equitable discretion to order A.R.'s return to Brazil despite his settled status. View "Rodrigues da Silva v. Silveira da Silva" on Justia Law

Edison Burgos-Montes, serving a life sentence, sought compassionate release due to serious medical conditions, including severe hypertension and obstructive sleep apnea. He argued that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) failed to provide adequate treatment for these conditions. Burgos filed a motion with the district court in late 2021, presenting evidence of his ongoing severe hypertension and lack of treatment for his sleep apnea. The district court found that Burgos was receiving adequate medical care and denied his motion without prejudice.Burgos appealed, contending that the district court's finding was clearly erroneous. He pointed to evidence that, nearly a year after his sleep apnea diagnosis, the BOP had not provided him with a CPAP machine, the standard treatment for sleep apnea. The district court had relied on a letter from Dr. Gary Venuto, Clinical Director at FCC Coleman, stating that Burgos was receiving adequate care. However, Burgos argued that this assessment overlooked significant evidence of inadequate treatment.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court clearly erred in concluding that Burgos was receiving adequate treatment for his sleep apnea. The appellate court noted that Burgos had not received a CPAP machine or any other treatment for his sleep apnea, despite a diagnosis and a recommendation from an outside cardiologist. The court vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if Burgos had demonstrated an "extraordinary and compelling" reason for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). View "United States v. Burgos-Montes" on Justia Law

Power Rental Op Co, LLC ("Power Rental") is a Florida-based company providing water and energy services. The Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority ("WAPA") is a municipal corporation in the U.S. Virgin Islands. In 2012, WAPA entered into a rental agreement with General Electric International, which Power Rental later acquired. By 2019, WAPA owed Power Rental over $14 million, which was reduced to approximately $9.3 million through a promissory note governed by New York law. WAPA defaulted on the note in 2020, leading Power Rental to sue in Florida state court for breach of the note and other claims.The case was removed to the Middle District of Florida, which dissolved pre-judgment writs of garnishment issued by the state court, granted partial summary judgment in favor of Power Rental, and ordered WAPA to complete a fact information sheet. The court found that WAPA waived its sovereign immunity defenses under the terms of the note. WAPA's appeal to the Eleventh Circuit was voluntarily dismissed.Power Rental registered the judgment in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, which issued a writ of execution served on WAPA's account at FirstBank in Puerto Rico. WAPA filed an emergency motion to quash the writ, arguing that the funds were exempt under Virgin Islands law and that the Puerto Rico court lacked jurisdiction. The District of Puerto Rico denied the motion, finding that the separate entity rule did not apply and that it had jurisdiction to issue the writ.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District of Puerto Rico's order. The court held that the separate entity rule was outdated and did not apply, allowing the Puerto Rico court to have jurisdiction over the writ. The court also upheld the lower court's finding that WAPA had waived its statutory immunity defenses. View "Power Rental OP CO, LLC v. Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority" on Justia Law

SMS Financial Recovery Services, LLC ("SMS") sued Samaritan Senior Village, Inc. and Samaritan Medical Center, Inc. (collectively, "Samaritan") for breach of contract after Samaritan canceled two contracts during the COVID-19 pandemic. The contracts, signed in December 2019, required Harmony Healthcare International Inc. ("Harmony"), SMS's predecessor, to provide healthcare consulting services to Samaritan for three years. Samaritan canceled the contracts in May 2020, citing financial constraints and the inability to allow Harmony's representatives on-site due to state COVID-19 restrictions.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of Samaritan, finding that Samaritan's performance was excused under the doctrine of impracticability. The court reasoned that New York State Department of Health guidelines made it illegal for Harmony representatives to enter Samaritan's facilities, thus excusing Samaritan from its contractual obligations.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and found that a genuine dispute of material fact remained regarding whether Harmony could have performed its contractual obligations remotely, despite the state visitation restrictions. The court noted that the doctrine of frustration of purpose might apply, but it was unclear whether the temporary nature of the restrictions substantially frustrated the overall purpose of the three-year contracts. The court also found that the issue of whether Samaritan's performance was excused only temporarily should be determined by a factfinder.The First Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on SMS's claims of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and violations of Massachusetts General Law Chapter 93A, finding no evidence of bad faith or consumer protection violations by Samaritan. View "SMS Financial Recovery Services, LLC v. Samaritan Senior Village, Inc." on Justia Law