Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of armed bank robbery and related crimes, holding that Defendant's claims on appeal were without merit.After a trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit bank robbery, armed bank robbery, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and using, carrying or brandishing firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of eighty-seven months of imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; and (2) any constitutional shortcoming in the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) does not undermine Defendant's section 924(c) conviction. View "United States v. Hernandez-Roman" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the October 30, 2019 order of the National Labor Relations Board reinstating its November 10, 2016 order finding that Wang Theatre, Inc. (WTI) committed labor violations by failing to bargain with the Boston Musicians' Association, holding that the Board made errors of law and fact in certifying a bargaining unit that had no employees.BMA petitioned the Board to become the union representative for musicians employed by WTI. WTI argued that the petition should be dismissed because WTI had not employed any musicians since 2014. On November 10, 2016, the Board certified the bargaining unit. BMA then filed a charge with the Board alleging that WTI committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain. The Board granted summary judgment for BMA. On October 30, 2019, the Board reinstated its original November 10, 2016 order. The First Circuit vacated both orders, holding that the Board misapplied the law and its own case law in certifying a no-employee bargaining unit. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Wang Theatre, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting a Union's motion to dismiss two Hampshire state employees' (Appellants) complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, holding that Appellants' claim based on Janus v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018), was not cognizable under section 1983.Appellants sought retrospective relief for themselves and other state employees who were not members of the State Employees' Association of New Hampshire (the Union) but were forced to pay "agency fees" to it prior to the decision in Janus. In Janus, the United States Supreme Court overruled its decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and held that "agency fee" arrangements violate the First Amendment. The district court granted the Union's motion to dismiss Appellants' complaint for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly held that Appellants' damages claim failed. View "Doughty v. State Employees' Ass'n of New Hampshire" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition seeking review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing Petitioner's appeal of an Immigration Judge's (IJ) decision finding that Petitioner had abandoned his status as a lawful permanent resident (LPR) in the United States ordering removal, holding that the IJ's and the BIA's decisions were supported by the record evidence.Petitioner, a Lebanese citizen, was admitted to the United States as an LPR in 1991. Petitioner later moved to Canada. In 2014, the IJ found that Petitioner was not admissible into the United States because he had abandoned his LPR status. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the lower agencies' decisions were supported by the evidence. View "Mahmoud v. Barr" on Justia Law

In this contract dispute between Landlord and Tenant that arose under their lease to a shopping center premises the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Tenant on one claim and to Landlord on another claim, holding that any purported errors were harmless.When Tenant sought mortgage loan from Bank and offered its leasehold interest in the premises as collateral, Bank requested that Landlord execute a "section 3(n) agreement" pursuant to article 6, section 3(n) of the lease. Landlord did not sign the agreement. Bank then terminated the proposed mortgage loan. Tenant sued Landlord for breach of contract. Landlord countersued, claiming that Tenant had violated the lease through its subtenant's use of a pylon sign on the premises. The district court granted summary judgment to Tenant on Landlord's counterclaim. After a trial, the court found that Landlord had no obligation to execute the section 3(n) agreement. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not clearly err in finding that Landlord did not breach the lease by not signing the section 3(n) agreements proposed by Bank; and (2) the district court did not err in ruling on summary judgment that Tenant's subtenant's use of the pylon sign did not breach the lease. View "58 Swansea Mall Drive LLC v. Gator Swansea Property LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting Defendants' motions to compel Plaintiff's claims to the arbitration process, holding that Defendants had the authority to enforce the arbitration provision.Jackeline Barbosa carried an overdue, unpaid balance on her credit card account. The unpaid balance was sold to Midland Funding LLC. The rights to Barbosa's account were assigned to Midland Credit Management, Inc. (MCM) Schreiber/Cohen, LLC was the law firm retained by MCM on behalf of Midland Funding to assist in MCM's debt collection efforts. Barbosa sued MCM and Schreiber/Cohen, claiming violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692e and 1692f by the attempt to collect the credit card debt in Massachusetts state court after the statute of limitations for the collection action had expired. MCM and Shreiber/Cohen asked the district court to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration election provision in Barbosa's credit card agreement. The district court dismissed Barbosa's claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly concluded that MCM and Schreiber/Cohen were authorized to compel Barbosa to arbitrate her claims against them. View "Barbosa v. Midland Credit Management, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the sentencing court sentencing Defendant to a 235-month term of imprisonment for one count of abusive sexual contact with a child under the age of twelve, holding that the sentencing judge erred in applying the cross-reference provision in U.S.S.G. 2A3.4(c)(1).Defendant was indicted on two counts for abusing his two granddaughters. Defendant guilty to one count of sexual contact with a child under the age of twelve and the government dismissed the other count of the indictment, the charge of aggravated sexual abuse of a child under twelve. In sentencing proceedings, the government invoked the cross-reference provision at issue, the application of which resulted in a guideline range fourteen to eighteen years greater than the ordinary range for that offense. The sentencing court applied the cross-reference provision in sentencing Defendant. The First Circuit vacated the sentence, holding (1) only one of Defendant's acts considered by the sentencing court was suitable for consideration in assessing the appropriate sentence to be imposed; and (2) therefore, the sentencing judge erred when he relied on both acts to justify the application of the cross-reference provision. View "United States v. Castillo" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion for a new trial, holding that the government failed to show that the district court granted reversible error by granting the motion for a new trial upon finding when the court deemed to be a violation of the Confrontation Clause.Defendant was convicted of three counts charging her with wire fraud, honest services wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit both types of wire fraud. Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal or for a new trial. The district court granted the motion, concluding that the Confrontation Clause was violated in the proceedings below and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no plain error in the district court's choice of the applicable standard of harmlessness. View "United States v. Ackerly" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the order of the district court remanding this removed case to Puerto Rico's Court of First Instance, holding that the district court erred when it remanded to the local Puerto Rico court a suit asserting claims by Constructora Japimel, Inc. against Doral Bank under the circumstances of this case.Contrary to the text of 12 U.S.C. 1819(b)(2)(B), the district court remanded this case to the local Puerto Rico court Japimel's lawsuit against Doral, a failed bank, after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) had become Doral's receiver, had filed a notice of substitution in state court to become a party to the suit, and had timely removed the suit to federal court. The FDIC timely appealed the remand order. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred by ignoring section 1819(b)(2)(B)'s clear language and remanding the case to the Court of First Instance. View "Federal Deposit Insurance Co. v. Constructora Japimel, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied the petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Akebia Therapeutics, Inc. pursuant to the Crime Victim's Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. 3771(d)(3), requesting vacatur of the district court's restitution order, holding that the district court properly determined the award of restitution to Akebia, a corporate victim of a securities fraud conspiracy.A jury convicted Akebia's former director of biostatistics of securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud. During the sentencing phase, the government, on behalf of Akebia, sought reimbursement of $312,899 pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A. The requested reimbursement was for fees Akebia paid to attorneys it hired for assistance while Akebia responded to requests for information during the government's investigation into suspected insider trading activities. The district court awarded Akebia approximately half of the attorneys' fees it requested. The First Circuit affirmed the restitution award, holding that the district court did not improperly exercise its discretion in applying the relevant law and did not abuse its discretion in its award of restitution to Akebia. View "In re Akebia Therapeutics, Inc." on Justia Law