Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Derek Muñoz-Gonzalez was indicted on multiple charges related to child pornography, including production, possession, and distribution. He agreed to plead guilty to two counts of producing child pornography. The plea agreement included a waiver-of-appeal clause, which stated that Muñoz waived his right to appeal if sentenced to 327 months or less. The district court sentenced him to 327 months. Muñoz appealed, claiming the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by advocating for two enhancements not included in the agreement's sentencing guidelines calculation and argued that the waiver-of-appeal clause did not preclude him from raising this breach claim.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially reviewed the case. Muñoz was charged by a federal grand jury and subsequently pleaded guilty to two counts of producing child pornography. The plea agreement stipulated an advisory guideline range of 262 to 327 months' imprisonment, and the government agreed to dismiss the other counts. At sentencing, the district court considered the stipulated facts and sentenced Muñoz to 327 months, within the waiver-of-appeal limit.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Muñoz argued that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by highlighting facts not included in the guidelines calculation. The court held that the prosecutor did not breach the plea agreement, as the comments made were consistent with the stipulated facts and were in response to the defense's arguments for a lesser sentence. The court also noted that Muñoz failed to address the plain-error standard in his opening brief, resulting in a waiver of his breach-of-plea-agreement claim. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Munoz-Gonzalez" on Justia Law

In 2013, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Lesbia Asucena Alay, a native and citizen of Guatemala. Alay conceded her removability but sought cancellation of removal, arguing that her removal would result in "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to her two U.S. citizen children. Alay also applied for asylum and withholding of removal but later withdrew those applications.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Alay's application for cancellation of removal in December 2019, concluding that she had not demonstrated that her removal would result in "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to her children. The IJ found that Alay's children, A.L. and F.L., would remain in the U.S. with their father, who could care for and support them. The IJ acknowledged the potential hardships, including loss of income and separation from their mother, but determined these were not substantially beyond what is normally expected from removal.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, recognizing the hardships Alay's children would face but agreeing that these did not meet the threshold of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship." The BIA noted that A.L. and F.L. were healthy and doing well in school, and concluded that the hardships they would experience were consistent with those ordinarily resulting from the removal of a close family member.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and denied Alay's petition for review. The court held that the agency had properly considered the evidence and made an individualized assessment of the hardships. The court found no legal error in the agency's determination that the hardships faced by Alay's children did not meet the statutory standard for cancellation of removal. View "Alay v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Brazil, entered the United States without inspection in 2004 to be with his son, Gustavo, a U.S. citizen. Petitioner sought cancellation of removal, claiming his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to Gustavo. The immigration judge (IJ) found Petitioner credible but determined he failed to meet the high burden of proving such hardship. The IJ noted Gustavo's behavioral issues but found no evidence of medical or learning disabilities and concluded that Gustavo's mother, who was his primary caretaker, would continue to support him.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision on two grounds: first, Gustavo had turned 21 while the appeal was pending, disqualifying him as a qualifying relative; second, the BIA agreed with the IJ's hardship determination. Petitioner then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.The First Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision, which had adopted the IJ's reasoning. The court noted that it could only review legal questions and not factual determinations. Petitioner argued that the BIA failed to state the standard of review, applied the wrong standard, ignored relevant factors, cherry-picked evidence, and improperly required expert reports. The court found no merit in these arguments, noting that the BIA's decision was consistent with its precedent and that the BIA had appropriately reviewed the IJ's findings for clear error and the hardship determination de novo.Ultimately, the First Circuit held that the agency did not err in its hardship determination, finding that Petitioner failed to prove that Gustavo's hardship would be substantially beyond the ordinary hardship expected when a close family member is removed. The petition for review was denied. View "Goncalves Leao v. Bondi" on Justia Law

In 2024, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico revoked Kelvin García-Oquendo's terms of supervised release and imposed concurrent terms of 21 months and 18 months of imprisonment. This decision was based on findings that García had violated the conditions of his release by engaging in new criminal conduct, including identity theft and bank fraud.Previously, in 2013, García had pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud and aggravated identity theft, and in 2015, he pleaded guilty to unauthorized use and transfer of access devices. He was sentenced to a total of 89 months' imprisonment and five years of supervised release. In 2023, the Probation Office alleged that García had committed new crimes, leading to his arrest and a preliminary revocation hearing where probable cause was found for some of the allegations.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. García argued that the District Court erred by admitting hearsay testimony without proper balancing under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b) and the Due Process Clause. The First Circuit agreed that the District Court erred in admitting the testimony but concluded that the error was harmless due to the strong circumstantial evidence supporting the violation findings. The court held that Rule 32.1's limited confrontation right applies to the entirety of the revocation proceeding, including the determination of post-revocation sanctions. However, it found that any error in considering the hearsay testimony during sentencing was also harmless, as the other evidence strongly supported the District Court's findings.The First Circuit affirmed the District Court's revocation order and sentences. View "United States v. Garcia-Oquendo" on Justia Law

Jadnel Flores-Nater, a member of a gang, participated in the kidnapping and murder of a victim in Puerto Rico. On June 8, 2018, Flores-Nater and four other gang members kidnapped the victim from a public housing complex, each carrying an assault rifle. They drove the victim to a remote area, where Flores-Nater and other gang members shot and killed him. Flores-Nater was charged with kidnapping resulting in death, using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence causing murder. He pleaded guilty to discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and the government agreed to dismiss the other charges.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially sentenced Flores-Nater to 360 months in prison, which was above the 120-month guideline and the 300-month recommendation in the plea agreement. Flores-Nater appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the sentence, finding it substantively unreasonable due to the district court's failure to articulate a plausible rationale for the upward variance. On remand, the district court again imposed a 360-month sentence, citing the high crime rate in Puerto Rico and the need for deterrence, but did not address Flores-Nater's argument regarding his age at the time of the offense.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case again. The court found that the district court committed procedural error by failing to explain whether and why it rejected Flores-Nater's argument that his youth at the time of the offense should be considered a mitigating factor. The appellate court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, requiring the district court to provide a clear explanation of its reasoning, particularly regarding the defendant's age. The court did not find that the government breached the plea agreement by defending the higher sentence on appeal. View "United States v. Flores-Nater" on Justia Law

In 2023, Maine voters passed "An Act to Prohibit Campaign Spending by Foreign Governments" to prevent foreign governments and entities influenced by them from contributing to or influencing elections. The Act also requires media platforms to ensure they do not distribute communications that violate this prohibition, with violators facing civil and criminal penalties. Several companies and individuals, including Central Maine Power (CMP) and Versant Power, challenged the Act, claiming it violated the First Amendment. The district court granted a preliminary injunction against the Act, and Maine appealed.The United States District Court for the District of Maine granted the preliminary injunction, finding that the Act was likely unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The court held that the Act's prohibition on spending by entities with at least 5% foreign ownership was not narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. It also found that the definition of "foreign government-influenced entity" was overly broad and likely to stifle domestic speech regardless of actual foreign influence. The court declined to sever the unconstitutional provisions from the rest of the Act, reserving the issue for later consideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the Act's 5% foreign ownership threshold was not narrowly tailored and that the definition of "foreign government-influenced entity" was overly broad. The court also found that the Act's restrictions on contributions and expenditures were likely unconstitutional. The court did not address the issue of severability, leaving it for the district court to decide. The court also did not find it necessary to discuss the preemption determination in affirming the injunction. View "Central Maine Power Co. v. Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices" on Justia Law

José Miguel Guzmán-Ceballos was sentenced to ninety months' imprisonment for his involvement in transporting 385 kilograms of cocaine from the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico. He pleaded guilty to all counts without a plea agreement and sought a mitigating role adjustment under § 3B1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which the district court denied. Guzmán-Ceballos argued that he was merely a fisherman recruited for the smuggling operation due to economic hardship and had no significant role in planning or organizing the venture.The District Court of Puerto Rico held a change-of-plea hearing where Guzmán-Ceballos pleaded guilty. At the sentencing hearing, he objected to the presentence report (PSR) for not applying the mitigating role adjustment. The district court denied his objection, adopted the PSR's recommendations, and sentenced him to ninety months' imprisonment, noting it considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and his role in the offense. Guzmán-Ceballos timely appealed, arguing the district court failed to conduct the necessary legal analysis for the mitigating role adjustment.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with Guzmán-Ceballos. The court found that the district court did not engage in the required four-part analysis to determine his role in the offense. Specifically, the district court failed to identify the universe of participants, order them along a continuum of culpability, and compare Guzmán-Ceballos's role to the average participant using the § 3B1.2 factors. The appellate court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, instructing the district court to perform the correct mitigating role analysis. View "United States v. Ceballos" on Justia Law

In January 2018, Nycole Amaury Rosario Sánchez, then fifteen years old, and six accomplices committed a series of violent crimes in Puerto Rico, including three robberies, two carjackings, and four murders. Rosario brandished and discharged firearms during these crimes, resulting in multiple injuries and deaths. He was arrested on January 25, 2018, and agreed to be prosecuted as an adult. Rosario pleaded guilty to six counts, including interference with commerce by robbery, carjacking, and using a firearm during a crime of violence causing murder.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico sentenced Rosario to 480 months' imprisonment. Rosario appealed, arguing that the district court failed to consider mitigating factors such as his age, mental and emotional condition, and the sentencing disparity between him and his co-defendants. He also claimed that his sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had considered Rosario's age, mental and emotional condition, and other mitigating factors, as evidenced by the sentencing transcript and the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR). The court also noted that Rosario's co-defendants were sentenced by a different judge and that Rosario had not provided sufficient information to establish an unwarranted sentencing disparity.The First Circuit held that the district court did not commit procedural error in its consideration of the section 3553(a) factors or in addressing the sentencing disparity. The court also found that Rosario's sentence was substantively reasonable, given the seriousness of his offenses and his behavior while incarcerated. Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed Rosario's 480-month sentence. View "United States v. Rosario Sanchez" on Justia Law

Thiago de Souza Prado was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft. The scheme involved defrauding rideshare and food delivery companies by creating and using fraudulent accounts, and misappropriating the identities of third parties. Prado, who was ineligible to drive for these companies due to numerous driving infractions and his unauthorized status in the U.S., initially used fraudulent accounts created by others and later began creating and renting out his own fraudulent accounts. He obtained driver's license images and Social Security numbers from various sources, including associates and the dark web, and used software to spoof GPS information to inflate driver fees and generate fake referral rewards.The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts sentenced Prado to seventy months in prison. Prado appealed, challenging his convictions and sentence. He argued that he was prejudiced by an amendment to the third superseding indictment during trial and by the district court's refusal to disqualify the prosecution team. He also contended that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found no error in the district court's decision to allow the amendment of the indictment, as it did not alter the substance of the charges. The court also upheld the district court's finding that the wall separating Levy, a former defense attorney who joined the U.S. Attorney's Office, from the prosecution team had not been breached. Additionally, the court determined that any potential errors in calculating loss and Prado's criminal history were harmless, as the district court indicated it would have imposed the same sentence regardless.The First Circuit affirmed Prado's convictions and sentence, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion and that Prado's sentence was reasonable. View "United States v. De Souza Prado" on Justia Law

In March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic led to a surge in demand for personal protective equipment (PPE). Bay Promo, LLC, a merchandise supplier, sought to profit by supplying PPE to various entities. Arely Nicolle Moncada Alaniz, a college student, was brought in to assist. Disputes arose over who was responsible for securing lucrative contracts, leading to litigation.The case was first heard in the Massachusetts Federal District Court. After a two-day bench trial, the court found that Bay Promo breached a contract, entitling Moncada to a commission on one PPE order. However, the court denied Moncada's claims for commissions on nine other orders, determining there was no agreement for those commissions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Bay Promo argued that the district court erred in its breach of contract finding and in admitting certain evidence. Moncada contended she was entitled to commissions on all orders and sought equitable relief. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's evidentiary rulings and upheld the factual findings that Bay Promo breached the contract by failing to deliver FDA-approved masks on time. The court also agreed that Moncada did not establish new contracts for additional commissions and was not entitled to equitable relief.The First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Moncada was only entitled to a commission on the initial PPE order and not on subsequent orders. View "Moncada Alaniz v. Bay Promo, LLC" on Justia Law