Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction, entered following his guilty plea, for aiding and abetting the possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime and aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, holding that there was no error.Following his guilty plea, the district court sentenced Defendant to serve an eighteen-month term of immurement on the drug-trafficking count and a consecutive 144-month term of immurement on the firearms count. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding (1) Defendant failed to demonstrate that the plea agreement was unenforceable because one section of the agreement lacked his signature; and (2) Defendant's sentence on the firearms count was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Merced-Garcia" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing a relator's qui tam action brought under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729 through 3733, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the action.At issue before the First Circuit was the function of the hearing provided by statute when the government files a motion to dismiss a relator's FCA qui tam action over the relator's objections. The Court held (1) the government must provide its reasons for seeking dismissal such that the relator can attempt to convince the government to withdraw its motion at the hearing; (2) if the government does not agree to withdraw its motion, the district court should grant the motion unless the relator can show that, in seeking dismissal, the government is transgressing constitutional limitations or perpetrating a fraud on the court; and (3) the district court properly granted the government's motion to dismiss this case. View "Borzilleri v. Bayer AG" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendants' convictions for conspiring to distribute twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine base, holding that neither Defendant was entitled to relief on his claims of error.Defendants Juan Pena and Rosnil Ortiz were convicted for conspiring to distribute twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine base. On appeal, Defendants argued that the district court erred in allowing the jury to consider certain video recordings and the "out-of-court" statements captured therein. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not commit reversible error in admitting certain portions of two videos and the audio statements therein; (2) did not deny Defendants' constitutional rights to confront witnesses and to present a complete defense by excluding certain statements, as Defendants intended to use them; and (3) did not deprive Defendants of their right to an impartial tribunal by instructing the jury mid-cross-examination that it was proper for law enforcement agents to use confidential informants and to take drug weight into account when directing controlled drug purchases. View "United States v. Pena" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions on six counts covering a range of federal crimes that stemmed from Defendant's use of a social security number assigned to another person, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in admitting into evidence a form that he submitted to the Social Security Administration in 2014 and wrongly permitted a former immigration officer to testify to the answers that Defendant gave in response to questioning at the Miami Intentional Airport. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by rejecting Defendant's objection to the admission of the form; and (2) did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the testimony of the former immigration official. View "United States v. Doe" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846, and one count of possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), holding that there was no error.Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop and admitting items seized from the vehicle at trial; (2) the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in admitting certain statements of lay witnesses; (3) the proceedings did not contravene Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial; and (4) Defendant's absence at certain pre-trial proceedings did not violate his statutory or constitutional presence rights. View "United States v. Reyes" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment for Defendants in this personal injury action, holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment as to all claims.This case arose from a car accident in Rhode Island involving Horace Johnson, the driver, and Carlton Johnson, a passenger. Carlton and his mother sued to recover damages for Carlton's injuries. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants - Horace, his insurer, and the company from which Horace had leased the vehicle. The First Circuit ultimately certified to the Rhode Island Supreme Court a question regarding the definition of "civil action" in Rhode Island's Rejected Settlement Offer Interest Statute, R.I. Gen. Laws 27-7-2.2. After the Rhode Island Supreme Court supplied its answer, this Court affirmed the district court's judgment in its entirety, holding that the district court (1) correctly concluded that section 27-7-2.2 was inapplicable; (2) properly concluded that an enforceable settlement agreement existed; and (3) was right to grant summary judgment as to Carlton's insurer bad faith claims. View "Johnson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Motus and CarData both provide tools for managing businesses' reimbursement of employee expenses. Motus is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in Boston.. CarData is a Toronto-based Canadian corporation. Motus sued CarData for trademark infringement and related wrongs for its use of a particular phrase in the meta title of its website, Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051-1129. Motus argued CarData had "purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the U.S. and Massachusetts" by maintaining numerous offices in the U.S. and marketing itself to and interacting with U.S. and Massachusetts customers through its website.The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Motus's suit without prejudice, for lack of personal jurisdiction, and denial of its request for jurisdictional discovery. The purposeful availment requirement was not met because there was not “something more” connecting CarData to the forum state beyond its website which is available to anyone with internet access, in any state. Motus did not act diligently to present facts to the court to show why jurisdiction would be found if discovery were permitted. Motus left the court to guess whether CarData has any Massachusetts customers, receives any revenue from Massachusetts, or has any other business connection with Massachusetts. Jurisdiction cannot be premised on guesswork; the record does not support a finding that the operation of CarData's website and/or its commercial contacts elsewhere in the country constitute purposeful availment with respect to Massachusetts. View "Motus, LLC v. CarData Consultants, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming Petitioner's order of removal and denying his requests for cancellation of removal and voluntary departure, holding that a conviction under R.I. Gen. Laws (RIGL) 31-9-1 is not categorically a theft offense.In 2016, Petitioner, a citizen of Cape Verde who came to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1989, was convicted in a Rhode Island superior court of driving a motor vehicle without consent of the owner or lessee, in violation of RIGL 31-9-1. Thereafter, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner. Petitioner argued that he was eligible for cancellation of removal and voluntary departure because a conviction under RIGL 31-9-1 did not constitute an aggravated felony theft offense. An immigration judge (IJ) determined that Petitioner's Rhode Island conviction was categorically a theft offense, thus denying relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit vacated the BIA's opinion, holding that Petitioner's conviction under RIGL 31-9-1 did not constitute a categorical aggravated felony theft offense. View "Da Graca v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction for interfering with commerce by threats or violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951 and 2 (Hobbs Act robbery); and using, carrying, or possessing a firearm during and in retaliation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), holding that there was no error.Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) Defendant's claim that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence for purposes of section 924(c)(1)(A) was meritless; (2) the trial court did not err by admitting video surveillance footage; and (3) the trial court did not err in excluding impeachment evidence challenging the credibility of the government's cooperating witness. View "United States v. Torres-Correa" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court denying Day & Zimmerman's (D&Z) motion to dismiss this lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against D&Z, a company incorporated in Delaware that maintained its principal place of business in Pennsylvania, seeking overtime wages pursuant to section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201-219. Plaintiff alleged that D&Z failed to pay him and other similarly situated employees and former employees their FLSA-required overtime wages. D&Z moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, citing Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of California (BMS), 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) and claiming that the claims subject to the motion to dismiss could not be brought in a Massachusetts federal court. The district court denied the motion, thus declining to extend BMS's personal jurisdiction requirements to FLSA cases brought in federal court. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying D&X's motion to dismiss the nonresident opt-in claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Waters v. Day & Zimmermann NPS, Inc." on Justia Law