Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant sold home theater systems manufactured by Plaintiff, Bose Corporation, for use in the U.S. to customers abroad. Defendant, who was not an authorized reseller or distributor of Bose products, sold the systems across international markets to take advantage of high retail prices in other countries. Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant for breach of contract and trademark infringement, asserting that Defendant sold its American products in Australia without Plaintiff's consent even though he had signed a settlement agreement promising not to make such sales after he had made similar sales in Europe. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the settlement agreement was a valid contract; and (2) summary judgment on the trademark infringement claim was appropriate. View "Bose Corp. v. Ejaz" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. The district court determined that Petitioner had two prior felony convictions for a crime of violence and a controlled substance offense and accordingly sentenced him under a higher Guidelines range. Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed his sentence but did not challenge the district court's reliance on Defendant's previous Massachusetts assault-and-battery conviction as a crime of violence. Two years later, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held in United States v. Holloway that a Massachusetts conviction for assault and battery is not categorically a crime of violence. Petitioner subsequently moved to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The district court denied the petition, finding that Holloway did not apply retoactively to cases on collateral review and that Petitioner's claim was procedurally defaulted. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Petitioner's claim was procedurally defaulted because Petitioner failed to object to the crime-of-violence determination either at sentencing or on direct appeal. View "Damon v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff refinanced his home mortgage and entered into a refinancing loan and mortgage agreement with IndyMac Bank, which assigned the mortgage to OneWest Bank. The mortgage was serviced by IndyMac Mortgage Services (all three services are referred to as "OneWest"). After Plaintiff fell behind on his payments, Harmon Law Offices, counsel to OneWest, informed Plaintiff that his home would be foreclosed. Fannie Mae purchased Plaintiff's house at a subsequent foreclosure sale. Eleven days later, Harmon served Plaintiff with an eviction notice. Plaintiff sued OneWest, Fannie Mae, and Harmon, asserting negligence and negligent misrepresentation and seeking an injunction against the pending eviction, an order nullifying the foreclosure, and monetary damages. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the economic loss doctrine barred Plaintiff's tort claims and that the tort claims failed because Defendants had not breached any duties owed to Plaintiff. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's claims. View "Schaefer v. IndyMac Mort. Servs." on Justia Law

Mother, an Egyptian citizen, acted in violation of a court order when she, together with her two children, boarded an EgyptAir Airlines Company flight to Cairo, Egypt. The father of the children and Mother's former husband (Father) brought this lawsuit against Mother and EgyptAir. Father claimed EgyptAir was negligent in allowing Mother to board the flight despite "red flags" suggesting she was abducting the children. The district court granted summary judgment for EgyptAir, concluding that the airline did not know of Mother's plan to abduct the children and did not owe Defendant or the children a duty to investigate the red flags. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Father's claims, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction over the claims; and (2) the claims, which challenged airline ticketing, check-in, and boarding procedures, were preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act. View "Bower v. El-Nady Bower" on Justia Law

A federal law enforcement officer made a lawful traffic stop of Appellant, but by the time the officer stopped Appellant, he and Appellant were outside the jurisdiction in which the officer was authorized to make arrests. The officer could see that Appellant was intoxicated and arrested Appellant. Appellant was subsequently charged with operating a motor vehicle under the influence, unsafe operation of a motor vehicle, and refusal to submit to a breath test. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence from his arrest on the grounds that the officer lacked the authority to arrest him. The magistrate judge agreed that the officer lacked statutory authority to arrest Appellant but refused to suppress the evidence because the arrest was not an unreasonable seizure. The district judge affirmed the magistrate judge's decision not to suppress the evidence. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Appellant's arrest did not constitute the kind of invasion of privacy that the Fourth Amendment prohibits. View "United States v. Ryan" on Justia Law

The City of Providence, Rhode Island enacted two ordinances to reduce tobacco use by young people. The Price Ordinance restricted the City's tobacco and cigarette retailers from reducing prices on tobacco products through coupons and multi-pack discounts. The Flavor Ordinance restricted sales of certain flavored tobacco products other than cigarettes. The National Association of Tobacco Outlets challenged the ordinances, alleging, inter alia, that the ordinances were preempted by federal and state law. The district court upheld the ordinances. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because the Price Ordinance was an appropriate regulation of price, it fell outside the First Amendment; (2) because the Flavor Ordinance was an appropriate sales regulation, it was not preempted; and (3) neither ordinance conflicted with state law. View "Nat'l Ass'n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. Providence, R.I." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering pursuant to a plea agreement. Defendant stipulated to the amount of money laundered and received a prison sentence within the range of the federal sentencing guidelines. Defendant appealed, seeking to vitiate his guilty plea on grounds that the record failed to establish a sufficient factual basis for his plea and asserting a claim of sentencing error. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in accepting Defendant's guilty plea, as sufficient facts supported the plea; and (2) there was no sentencing error where Defendant's stipulation removed any necessity for independent proof of the stipulated facts. View "United States v. Torres-Vazquez" on Justia Law

Defendant stole his older brother's identity to obtain five fraudulent mortgages. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to three counts of wire fraud and one count of identity fraud pursuant to a plea agreement. Under to the agreement, Defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment and ordered to pay $454,207 in restitution to the two defrauded mortgage companies. The plea agreement also contained an appeal waiver. Defendant appealed, challenging the restitution component of his sentence and arguing that his appeal waiver did not extend to it. The First Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Defendant's appeal, as the waiver unambiguously encompassed restitution. View "United States v. Okoye" on Justia Law

Appellant was a criminal defense attorney that represented a client in a criminal case relating to the discharge of sewage into public waters. After trial, the First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the client's convictions and remanded for retrial. Appellant subsequently filed ten motions in limine mostly to exclude or limit certain evidence used in the first trial. The trial court issued an order sanctioning Appellant and his client for having filed the motions in limine over the course of the six days prior to the scheduled start of the trial, "abusively late." The court suggested that the motions were filed late to avoid impacting the client's speedy trial act motion or to force a continuance of the trial. The First Circuit reversed the order, holding that the trial court erred in sanctioning Appellant, as there was no clear deadline for the filing of the motions in limine. View "United States v. Agosto-Vega" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of the Dominican Republic, pled guilty in state court to possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. The Department of Homeland Security later ordered Petitioner's removal. Thereafter, Petitioner successfully sought vacatur of his criminal conviction. After Petitioner had been removed to the Dominican Republic, he filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied the motion, invoking a regulation known as the "post-departure bar," which precludes a noncitizen from filing a motion to reopen after his departure from the United States. The First Circuit Court of Appeals granted Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the post-departure bar cannot prevent a noncitzen from invoking his statutory right to file a motion to reopen. View "Perez Santana v. Holder" on Justia Law