Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

For twenty years, Defendants, various entities of OneBeacon American Insurance Company (collectively, “OneBeacon”), had a program known as Multiple Line Excess Cover (“MLEC Program”) under which OneBeacon entered into reinsurance contracts (“MLEC Agreements”) with various reinsurers. Employers Insurance Company of Wausau, National Casualty Company, and Swiss Reinsurance America Corporation (“Swiss Re”) participated as reinsurers in the MLEC Program. Some of the MLEC Agreements Wausau entered into with OneBeacon were practically identical to OneBeacon’s MLEC Agreements with Swiss Re. In 2007, OneBeacon demanded arbitration with Swiss Re seeking reinsurance recovery for losses arising out of claims against OneBeacon by policyholders. The arbitration panel decided in favor of Swiss Re. In 2012, OneBeacon demanded arbitration with Wausau and National Casualty for, according to Wausau, the same claims OneBeacon arbitrated and lost against Swiss Re. Wausau and National Casualty petitioned for a declaratory judgment that the prior arbitration award between OneBeacon and Swiss Re had preclusive effect on the arbitration pending between OneBeacon and Wausau. The district court denied the petition. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that judicial confirmation of an arbitration award “does not warrant deviation from the general rule that the preclusive effect of a prior arbitration is a matter for the arbitrator to decide.” View "Nat'l Cas. Co. v. OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2012, a grand jury in the District of Rhode Island served the Narragansett Indian Tribal Historic Preservation Office (NITHPO) with a subpoena duces tecum directing NITHPO to appear before the grand jury with a series of documents. NITHPO refused to produce the subpoenaed records. The sitting grand jury was subsequently discharged, and in 2013, a new grand jury was empanelled. Thereafter, the government filed a motion to compel NITHPO’s compliance with the 2012 subpoena. The district court granted the government’s motion to compel and ordered NITHPO to comply with the 2012 grand jury subpoena. After NITHPO failed to appear on the agreed-upon date, the district court adjudged NITHPO in civil contempt and imposed a fine for noncompliance. On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) vacated the district court’s order holding NITHPO in civil contempt, holding that a subpoena duces tecum compelling the production of documents to a now-defunct grand jury cannot be enforced by civil contempt sanctions before a successor grand jury; and (2) rejected NITHPO’s contentions that tribal sovereign immunity shielded it from subpoena and that the subpoena was unreasonably broad in scope. View "In re Grand Jury Proceedings" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in state court, Petitioner was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. After the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on direct appeal, Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the federal district court, asserting (1) insufficient evidence supported his conviction; and (2) because the prosecutor argued at Petitioner’s state-court trial that Petitioner had shot and killed the victim but, at an earlier state-court trial, argued that Petitioner’s accomplice had shot and killed the victim, the prosecutor’s inconsistent approaches deprived him of his due process rights. The district court denied the petition. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence presented in Petitioner’s state-court trial was adequate to support his conviction; and (2) the prosecution of Petitioner and his accomplice in different trials on materially inconsistent theories of guilt did not violate due process, as (i) state law permitted such a course of action, (ii) any potential inconsistency in result between Petitioner’s and his accomplice’s cases had been remedied by the time the Supreme Court heard Petitioner’s appeal, and (iii) the Commonwealth did not unfairly manipulate the evidence. View "Housen v. Gelb" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a seven-count complaint against Defendants, asserting claims related to the alleged breach of various agreements involving the sale of aviation equipment. Ultimately, a jury trial was held, and the jury awarded Plaintiff $1,112,476 in damages. After dismissing the jury, the parties filed several post-trial motions, which the district court resolved partially in favor of Plaintiff and partially in favor of Defendants. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s orders, holding that the district court did not err in (1) finding that Defendants did not breach a support agreement with Plaintiffs as a matter of law; (2) holding that Plaintiff waived the issue of prejudgment interest; and (3) upholding the jury’s award of damages for Plaintiff’s claim alleging breach of a purchase agreement. View "Atlantech Inc. v. Am. Panel Corp." on Justia Law

After Plaintiff applied unsuccessfully to be a firefighter in the Puerto Rico Firefighters Corps of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (“the Corps”) Plaintiff sued the Commonwealth, claiming that the Corps refused to hire her because of her gender. The parties eventually signed a settlement agreement pursuant to which the Corps agreed to employ Plaintiff as a transitory firefighter until the next training academy was held and to hire Plaintiff as a firefighter if she graduated from the academy. Thereafter, Plaintiff again sued the Corps, alleging that, during her transitory employment, the Corps subjected her to abuse in retaliation for her earlier suit. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her claim for unlawful retaliation. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s order, holding that Plaintiff’s complaint stated a plausible claim of unlawful retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Remanded. View "Rodriguez-Vives v. P.R. Firefighters Corps" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs granted a mortgage on their property in Massachusetts to Ameriquest Mortgage Company, which assigned its interest in the mortgage to Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. (MERS). MERS later purported to assign Plaintiffs’ interest to HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc. (HSBC). HSBC subsequently began foreclosure proceedings on Plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs filed an eight-count complaint against HSBC, claiming the assignment was void, and therefore, HSBC never acquired the mortgage to their property and had no right to initiate foreclosure proceedings. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that Plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the assignment because they were not a party to the assignment, nor were they third-party beneficiaries of the assignment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under Massachusetts law, homeowners in Plaintiffs’ position have standing to challenge a prior assignment of their mortgage on the grounds that the assignment was void, but because Plaintiffs did not set forth a colorable claim that the mortgage assignment in question was void, Plaintiffs lacked standing to raise certain claims; and (2) Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for promissory estoppel with respect to a loan modification. View "Wilson v. HSBC Mortgage Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of second-degree murder. Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on appeal by the state court. Petitioner subsequently sought a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court, which denied habeas relief but issued a certificate of appealability as to three claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the state court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support Petitioner’s conviction for second-degree murder; (2) the state court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to find a due process violation based on the unavailability of the victim’s larynx; and (3) the state court’s determination that certain statements made by the prosecutor did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct sufficient to warrant setting aside Petitioner’s conviction was not an unreasonable application of the law. View "Magraw v. Roden" on Justia Law

Petitioners, a married couple from Guatemala, entered the United States illegally in the mid-1990s. In 2008, Petitioners applied for asylum. Their application was denied, and removal proceedings subsequently began. Petitioners conceded removability but sought cancellation of removal, asserting that their departure would cause hardship to their twelve-year-old son, Brian, who was born in the United States and would, Petitioners claimed, face several formidable obstacles in Guatemala. An immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioners’ application and ordered them removed to Guatemala, finding that Petitioners failed to meet the hardship eligibility requirement for cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld the IJ’s judgment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied in part and otherwise dismissed Petitioners’ petition for review, holding that the IJ correctly found that the evidence presented by Petitioners was not capable of supporting an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” finding. View "Alvarado v. Holder" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, two former San Jan municipal police officers, Raquel Delgado-Marrero (“Delgado”) and Angel Rivera-Claudio (“Rivera”), were convicted on drug and gun charges arising from an FBI reverse sting operation. Both defendants received a fifteen-year sentence. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) vacated Delgado’s convictions and remanded her case for a new trial, holding that the district court committed reversible error by excluding the testimony of a defense witness; and (2) withheld judgment on Rivera’s convictions for thirty days, holding that Rivera’s sentence could not stand in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United States, where the district court plainly erred in articulating the jury instructions imparted in connection with a post-verdict special jury form. View "United States v. Delgado-Marrero" on Justia Law

Michael Mahon sued the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) after falling from a second-story portico during a wedding reception at the Commandant’s House at the Charlestown Navy Yard in Massachusetts. Mahon later amended his complaint to add claims against Eastern National and Amelia Occasions, which contracted with the interior Department’s National Park Service to manage the House and handle the events. The district judge granted the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA applied. The district judge subsequently granted Mahon’s motion for reconsideration and allowed discovery to go forward on the issue of whether the government’s relationship with Eastern National and Amelia Occasions was governed by a “concession contract,” which could have led the government to learn about the portico’s “impermissibly low railing,” thus placing the case beyond the discretionary-function exception’s reach. After discovery, the district judge dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that, ultimately, Mahon’s case was within the ambit of the discretionary-function exception. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the FTCA’s discretionary-function exception barred Mahon’s claims against the government. View "Mahon v. United States" on Justia Law