Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1995, a number of government agencies opened investigations into the dealings of Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc. with various federally funded health-care programs. In 2000, Fresenius entered into a series of criminal plea and civil settlement agreements with the government. The civil settlement agreements released several claims against Fresenius, including claims made under the False Claims Act (FCA). Those agreements eschewed any tax characterization. Thereafter, the parties began disputing the tax treatment of the balance of the civil settlements. Fresenius commenced a tax refund action for the purpose of determining the deductibility of the amount in dispute. The district court concluded that where the parties had eschewed any tax characterization, the critical consideration in determining deductibility was the extent to which the disputed payment was compensatory as opposed to punitive. At trial, the court’s jury instructions embodied this conclusion. The jury found that a large chunk of the settlement was deductible. The court accepted this finding and ordered tax refunds totaling more than $50,000,000. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, “in determining the tax treatment of an FCA civil settlement, a court may consider factors beyond the mere presence or absence of a tax characterization agreement between the government and the settling party.” View "Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

George Schussel’s former company fraudulently transferred millions of dollars to him in order to avoid paying income taxes. The IRS, which is authorized by statute to collect a person’s tax debt by reclaiming assets the debtor has transferred to someone else, claimed that Schussel was liable as a transferee for the company’s tax deficiencies. The United States Tax Court held Schussel liable for the company’s back taxes of over $4.9 million plus interest of at least $8.7 million. Schussel appealed, disputing the amount he owed the IRS as a result of the fraudulent transfers. The First Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the tax court erred in calculating prejudgment interest on the fraudulently transferred funds under the federal tax interest statute rather than assessing the prejudgment interest at the Massachusetts rate; (2) the tax court did not err in accepting as a proper measure of the assets Schussel received the actual amount transferred from the company into Schussel-controlled accounts; and (3) Schussel’s loans to the company to pay Schussel’s litigation expenses did not reduce the net amount transferred to him. View "Schussel v. Werfel" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a tax credit that offset federal tax owed on income earned in the operation of a business in Puerto Rico. The credit remained available to taxpayers under section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code during the ten-year transition period after section 936 was repealed. During the transition period, the taxable income an eligible claimant could claim in computing its credit was capped at an amount approximately equal to the average of the amounts it had previously claimed, but the cap could be adjusted for a taxpayer’s purchases and sales of businesses that had generated credit-eligible income. In this case, Appellant-corporation, a U.S. taxpayer, sold a line of businesses in Puerto Rico to a foreign corporation that did not pay U.S. corporate income taxes. Appellant argued it was not required to reduce its cap because the buyer had no credit cap to increase. The district court granted summary judgment for the government. The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) the reduction in a seller’s cap as a result of the sale of a business line is appropriate only in the event of a corresponding increase in the buyer’s cap; and (2) therefore, the transfers did not reduce Appellant’s credit cap. View "OMJ Pharms., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

The IRS held a tax lien against Patrick Hannon’s property, including a parcel of land Hannon owned in Newton, Massachusetts. The IRS discharged that specific parcel from its tax lien under 26 U.S.C. 6325(b)(2)(A) to allow the City of Newton could take the property by eminent domain, and the IRS authorized the discharge upon its receipt of a portion of the amount paid by Newton. Following the taking, Hannon sued Newton in Massachusetts state court and was awarded damages for undercompensation. Both the government and Rita Manning, a lower-priority creditor who had obtained a judgment against Hannon, intervened and asserted priority to receive the damages award. A federal district court entered summary judgment in favor of Manning on the issue of whose lien had priority, concluding that the IRS’s decision to discharge the property from federal tax liens in exchange for payment from the taking meant the government had relinquished any tax lien on the later damages award. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the IRS certificate issued under section 6325(b)(2)(A) did not release any claims the IRS had on the post-taking proceeds awarded to Hannon; and (2) the IRS tax lien on those post-taking proceeds was valid and thus senior to Manning’s judgment lien. View "Hannon v. United States" on Justia Law

The United States filed suit against Kathleen Haag and her husband seeking to reduce to judgment federal income tax liabilities for several years. The district court granted summary judgment to the United States, concluding that Haag's claim that she was entitled to "innocent spouse" relief was barred by the two-year limitations period. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Haag eventually filed a fourth suit asserting that Lantz v. Commissioner had invalidated the two-year limitations period on requests for innocent spouse relief. The tax court and First Circuit held that res judicata applied. At this point, Lantz had been reversed, but the IRS had issued Notice 2011-70, which stated that taxpayers whose innocent spouse relief claims had been litigated previously and barred by the statute of limitations would not be subject to collection under certain circumstances. The First Circuit concluded that Notice 2011-70 did not apply to Haag. Haag then filed this complaint, arguing that Notice 2011-70 afforded her equitable relief from the judgment and that the First Circuit's prior finding to the contrary was mere dicta. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit affirmed, concluding, once again, that Notice 2011-70 was inapplicable to Haag. View "Haag v. United States" on Justia Law

Four corporations acknowledged they owed the federal government more than $24 million in taxes and penalties, but before the IRS could collect its dues, the corporations transferred all of their assets to other entities. At issue was whether the previous owner of the four corporations, a trust (Trust), was liable to the IRS for the corporations' unpaid taxes and penalties. The tax court looked to state substantive law to determine the Trust's liability and concluded that the Trust could not be held liable because the IRS (1) failed to prove the Trust had knowledge of the new shareholders' asset-stripping scheme, and (2) did not show that any of the corporation's assets were transferred directly to the Trust. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the tax court correctly looked to Massachusetts law to determine whether the Trust could be held liable for the corporations' taxes and penalties; but (2) the tax court misconstrued Massachusetts fraudulent transfer law in making its decision. Remanded for a determination of whether the conditions for liability were met in this case. View "Frank Sawyer Trust of May 1992 v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

This dispute about the payment of a penalty imposed on them by the IRS arose out of Plaintiffs' underlying joint personal income tax liability for the tax year 1994. After the IRS audited Plaintiffs for that year, the tax court imposed a penalty on Plaintiffs for failing to timely file a return. Plaintiffs completed payment of their agreed 1994 tax liability under a payment plan. Plaintiffs subsequently filed an administrative claims for refused of the 1994 failure-to-pay penalty and the interest they paid on that penalty. The IRS denied the claim. Plaintiffs filed suit in the district court, and the court granted summary judgment in favor of the government. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing there was at least a dispute of material fact as to whether (1) the IRS was equitably estopped from assessing this fee, (2) they had reasonable cause not to pay the relevant taxes with the time provided by statute, and (3) the IRS had ever provided them with proper notice and demand for payment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to any of their claims. View "Shafmaster v. United States" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of having, among other things, engaged in a scheme to conceal and avoid her company's employment tax liability. The district court determined that Defendant was responsible for approximately $1.2 million in tax losses. Defendant was sentenced to eighty-seven months incarceration. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) Defendant waived her argument that the district court erred by submitting a set of summary charts to the jury; (2) the district court did not err by adopting the government's calculation of the tax losses for which Defendant should be held responsible as a result of her fraudulent payroll scheme; and (3) the district court did not plainly err by failing to inquire specifically as to whether Defendant had reviewed the presentence report (PSR) with her attorney because the evidence showed Defendant reviewed the PSR with her sentencing counsel. View "United States v. Deleon" on Justia Law

Taxpayer owned fifteen acres of land in Ludlow, Massachusetts. Taxpayer obtained a commitment from Bank to make a loan to fund development on the land. The commitment stipulated that the loan would be made to Taxpayer or "nominee" and that, if Taxpayer assigned the commitment to a nominee, he would be required to guarantee the loan personally. Taxpayer subsequently transferred title of the property to an LLC he formed. Later, the loan became delinquent, and Bank foreclosed on unsold lots in the development. After selling the lots at auction, Bank filed this interpleader action to determine who had the right to the surplus proceeds. The United States claimed an interest in the fund, as did the town of Ludlow. At issue was who was the "nominee" of Taxpayer for purposes of the federal tax lien that attached to Taxpayer's property. The district court held in favor of the United States, concluding that the LLC was Taxpayer's nominee. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the nature of the relationship between Taxpayer pointed to the fact that the LLC was a "legal fiction," and therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that the LLC was Taxpayer's nominee. View "Berkshire Bank v. Town of Ludlow, Mass." on Justia Law

Defendants Michael Powers and John Mahan, who ran an employment agency supplying temporary workers, were convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy to defraud the United States by impeding the functions of the IRS and mail fraud. Powers was also convicted of subscribing false tax returns and Mahan of procuring false tax returns. The tax fraud amounted to $7.5 million. Powers was sentenced to eighty-four months' imprisonment and Mahan to a term of seventy-six months. Defendants' appealed, alleging that the trial court committed errors requiring a new trial. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Defendants' convictions and sentences, holding (1) there was no prejudice to Defendants in the trial court's failure to give an defense instruction on advice of counsel; (2) various witnesses were not allowed to testify as to the ultimate issues, and thus the role of the jury was not invaded; (3) defense counsel was afforded a reasonable opportunity to impeach adverse witnesses; and (4) the district court did not plainly err in excluding testimony by Defendants' witnesses. View "United States v. Mahan" on Justia Law